Burden of proof (Ch.IV)

Example 10 — When divergent burden of proof rules guide behaviour

Chapter IV · ¶4.14–4.15 · Taxpayers and tax administrations · two jurisdictions

OECD Guidelines 2022
At a glance
Two jurisdictions are involved in a controlled transaction that is under examination. In one of them it is the taxpayer who carries the burden of proof, in the other the tax administration. If taxpayers and tax administrations take their strict legal rights under those rules as the guide to how they should behave, what follows?
  1. A controlled transaction that is under examination involves two jurisdictions.
  2. In the first jurisdiction it is the taxpayer who carries the burden of proof.
  3. In the second jurisdiction it is the tax administration that carries it.
  4. The example assumes that the burden of proof guides behaviour: taxpayers and tax administrations rely on their strict legal rights under those rules to decide how to act.
A

In the first jurisdiction it is the taxpayer who carries the burden of proof, and in the second the tax administration does. The burden of proof is guiding behaviour: taxpayers and tax administrations take their strict legal rights under those rules as the guide to how they should behave.

What could follow if the burden of proof guides behaviour in this way?

OECD analysis · Risks conflict and double taxation
If behaviour follows the burden of proof, the tax administration in the first jurisdiction might put forward a view of the transfer pricing without substantiating it, and the taxpayer might accept it. It would then be for the tax administration in the second jurisdiction, which carries the burden there, to disprove the pricing. It could be that the two with no burden to carry, the tax administration in the first jurisdiction and the taxpayer in the second, make no effort to establish an acceptable arm's-length price. Behaviour of that kind would open the way to significant conflict and to double taxation. ¶4.16 calls this a misuse of the burden of proof, one that jurisdictions and taxpayers alike should, in practice, avoid.
B

The facts are the same and the burden of proof again guides behaviour, but the taxpayer in the first jurisdiction is now a subsidiary of a taxpayer in the second. The subsidiary may be unable or unwilling to show its transfer prices to be arm's length. The tax administration in the first jurisdiction examines the case and, acting in good faith on the information it has, makes an adjustment.

What follows for the two tax administrations?

OECD analysis · Competent authority agreement difficult
The subsidiary carries the burden of proof in the first jurisdiction, yet, notwithstanding that burden and the Guidelines, it may be unable or unwilling to demonstrate that its transfer prices are at arm's length; after examination, the tax administration there adjusts in good faith on the information it has. In the second jurisdiction the burden rests with the tax administration, so the parent is not obliged to give it any information showing that the pricing was arm's length. The result, according to the text, is that the two tax administrations will find agreement hard to reach in competent authority proceedings. ¶4.17 adds that in such proceedings it is for the State proposing the primary adjustment to satisfy the other State that both the principle and the amount of the adjustment are justified, and that a cooperative approach is expected of both competent authorities.
Key takeaway
As a matter of good practice, neither tax administrations nor taxpayers should use the burden of proof to justify assertions about transfer pricing that are groundless or cannot be verified. Each should be prepared to show in good faith that its determination, or its pricing, is consistent with the arm's-length principle, wherever the burden of proof lies (¶4.16).

Related: Section B.2 of Chapter IV (burden of proof) · ¶4.16 (good practice: care and restraint in relying on the burden of proof) · ¶4.17 (competent authority proceedings; Commentary on paragraph 2 of Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention)

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