OECD TP Guidelines: Interactive Learning Experience

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This project provides a walkthrough of the examples contained in the OECD TP Guidelines. The aim is to facilitate the common understanding of TP principles by practitioners and tax administrations.

📖 The OECD’s own words — every paragraph as published, with its number. Hover over a paragraph reference to read it; copy any paragraph with its citation.

OECD TPG 2022 · Chapter IV

Administrative approaches to avoiding and resolving transfer pricing disputes

The OECD’s text of Chapter IV and its two annexes, word for word. Hover over a paragraph reference to read it, and copy any paragraph with its citation. Amount B, the annex to Chapter IV on baseline distribution activities, has its own page.

A. Introduction

4.1

This chapter examines various administrative procedures that could be applied to minimise transfer pricing disputes and to help resolve them when they do arise between taxpayers and their tax administrations, and between different tax administrations. Such disputes may arise even though the guidance in these Guidelines is followed in a conscientious effort to apply the arm’s length principle. It is possible that taxpayers and tax administrations may reach differing determinations of the arm’s length conditions for the controlled transactions under examination given the complexity of some transfer pricing issues and the difficulties in interpreting and evaluating the circumstances of individual cases.

4.2

Where two or more tax administrations take different positions in determining arm’s length conditions, double taxation may occur. Double taxation means the inclusion of the same income in the tax base by more than one tax administration, when either the income is in the hands of different taxpayers (economic double taxation, for associated enterprises) or the income is in the hands of the same juridical entity (juridical double taxation, for permanent establishments). Double taxation is undesirable and should be eliminated whenever possible, because it constitutes a potential barrier to the development of international trade and investment flows. The double inclusion of income in the tax base of more than one jurisdiction does not always mean that the income will actually be taxed twice.

4.3

This chapter discusses several administrative approaches to resolving disputes caused by transfer pricing adjustments and for avoiding double taxation. Section B discusses transfer pricing compliance practices by tax administrations, in particular examination practices, the burden of proof, and penalties. Section C discusses corresponding adjustments (Paragraph 2 of Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention) and the mutual agreement procedure (Article 25). Section D describes the use of simultaneous tax examinations by two (or more) tax administrations to expedite the identification, processing, and resolution of transfer pricing issues (and other international tax issues). Sections E and F describe some possibilities for minimising transfer pricing disputes between taxpayers and their tax administrations. Section E addresses the possibility of developing safe harbours for certain taxpayers, and Section F deals with advance pricing arrangements, which address the possibility of determining in advance a transfer pricing methodology or conditions for the taxpayer to apply to specified controlled transactions. Section G considers briefly the use of arbitration procedures to resolve transfer pricing disputes between jurisdictions.

B. Transfer pricing compliance practices

4.4

Tax compliance practices are developed and implemented in each jurisdiction according to its own domestic legislation and administrative procedures. Many domestic tax compliance practices have three main elements: a) to reduce opportunities for non-compliance (e.g. through withholding taxes and information reporting); b) to provide positive assistance for compliance (e.g. through education and published guidance); and, c) to provide disincentives for non-compliance. As a matter of domestic sovereignty and to accommodate the particularities of widely varying tax systems, tax compliance practices remain within the province of each jurisdiction. Nevertheless a fair application of the arm’s length principle requires clear procedural rules to ensure adequate protection of the taxpayer and to make sure that tax revenue is not shifted to jurisdictions with overly harsh procedural rules. However, when a taxpayer under examination in one jurisdiction is a member of an MNE group, it is possible that the domestic tax compliance practices in a jurisdiction examining a taxpayer will have consequences in other tax jurisdictions. This may be particularly the case when cross-border transfer pricing issues are involved, because the transfer pricing has implications for the tax collected in the tax jurisdictions of the associated enterprises involved in the controlled transaction. If the same transfer pricing is not accepted in the other tax jurisdictions, the MNE group may be subject to double taxation as explained in paragraph 4.2. Thus, tax administrations should be conscious of the arm’s length principle when applying their domestic compliance practices and the potential implications of their transfer pricing compliance rules for other tax jurisdictions, and seek to facilitate both the equitable allocation of taxes between jurisdictions and the prevention of double taxation for taxpayers.

4.5

This section describes three aspects of transfer pricing compliance that should receive special consideration to help tax jurisdictions administer their transfer pricing rules in a manner that is fair to taxpayers and other jurisdictions. While other tax law compliance practices are in common use in OECD member countries – for example, the use of litigation and evidentiary sanctions where information may be sought by a tax administration but is not provided – these three aspects will often impact on how tax administrations in other jurisdictions approach the mutual agreement procedure process and determine their administrative response to ensuring compliance with their own transfer pricing rules. The three aspects are: examination practices, the burden of proof, and penalty systems. The evaluation of these three aspects will necessarily differ depending on the characteristics of the tax system involved, and so it is not possible to describe a uniform set of principles or issues that will be relevant in all cases. Instead, this section seeks to provide general guidance on the types of problems that may arise and reasonable approaches for achieving a balance of the interests of the taxpayers and tax administrations involved in a transfer pricing inquiry.

B.1. Examination practices

4.6

Examination practices vary widely among OECD member countries. Differences in procedures may be prompted by such factors as the system and the structure of the tax administration, the geographic size and population of the jurisdiction, the level of domestic and international trade, and cultural and historical influences.

4.7

Transfer pricing cases can present special challenges to the normal audit or examination practices, both for the tax administration and for the taxpayer. Transfer pricing cases are fact-intensive and may involve difficult evaluations of comparability, markets, and financial or other industry information. Consequently, a number of tax administrations have examiners who specialise in transfer pricing, and transfer pricing examinations themselves may take longer than other examinations and follow separate procedures.

4.8

Because transfer pricing is not an exact science, it will not always be possible to determine the single correct arm’s length price; rather, as Chapter III recognises, the correct price may have to be estimated within a range of acceptable figures. Also, the choice of methodology for establishing arm’s length transfer pricing will not often be unambiguously clear. Taxpayers may experience particular difficulties when the tax administration proposes to use a methodology, for example a transactional profit method, that is not the same as that used by the taxpayer.

4.9

In a difficult transfer pricing case, because of the complexity of the facts to be evaluated, even the best-intentioned taxpayer can make an honest mistake. Moreover, even the best-intentioned tax examiner may draw the wrong conclusion from the facts. Tax administrations are encouraged to take this observation into account in conducting their transfer pricing examinations. This involves two implications. First, tax examiners are encouraged to be flexible in their approach and not demand from taxpayers in their transfer pricing a precision that is unrealistic under all the facts and circumstances. Second, tax examiners are encouraged to take into account the taxpayer’s commercial judgment about the application of the arm’s length principle, so that the transfer pricing analysis is tied to business realities. Therefore, tax examiners should undertake to begin their analyses of transfer pricing from the perspective of the method that the taxpayer has chosen in setting its prices. The guidance provided in Chapter II, Part I dealing with the selection of the most appropriate transfer pricing method also may assist in this regard.

4.10

A tax administration should keep in mind in allocating its audit resources the taxpayer’s process of setting prices, for example whether the MNE group operates on a profit centre basis. See paragraph 1.5.

B.2. Burden of proof

4.11

Like examination practices, the burden of proof rules for tax cases also differ among OECD member countries. In most jurisdictions, the tax administration bears the burden of proof both in its own internal dealings with the taxpayer (e.g. assessment and appeals) and in litigation. In some of these jurisdictions, the burden of proof can be reversed, allowing the tax administration to estimate taxable income, if the taxpayer is found not to have acted in good faith, for example, by not co-operating or complying with reasonable documentation requests or by filing false or misleading returns. In other jurisdictions, the burden of proof is on the taxpayer. In this respect, however, the conclusions of paragraphs 4.16 and 4.17 should be noted.

4.12

The implication for the behaviour of the tax administration and the taxpayer of the rules governing burden of proof should be taken into account. For example, where as a matter of domestic law the burden of proof is on the tax administration, the taxpayer may not have any legal obligation to prove the correctness of its transfer pricing unless the tax administration makes a prima facie showing that the pricing is inconsistent with the arm’s length principle. Even in such a case, of course, the tax administration might still reasonably oblige the taxpayer to produce its records that would enable the tax administration to undertake its examination. In some jurisdictions, taxpayers have a duty to co-operate with the tax administration imposed on them by law. In the event that a taxpayer fails to co-operate, the tax administration may be given the authority to estimate the taxpayer’s income and to assume relevant facts based on experience. In these cases, tax administrations should not seek to impose such a high level of co-operation that would make it too difficult for reasonable taxpayers to comply.

4.13

In jurisdictions where the burden of proof is on the taxpayer, tax administrations are generally not at liberty to raise assessments against taxpayers which are not soundly based in law. A tax administration in a jurisdiction that applies the arm’s length principle, for example, could not raise an assessment based on a taxable income calculated as a fixed percentage of turnover and simply ignore the arm’s length principle. In the context of litigation in jurisdictions where the burden of proof is on the taxpayer, the burden of proof is often seen as a shifting burden. Where the taxpayer presents to a court a reasonable argument and evidence to suggest that its transfer pricing was arm’s length, the burden of proof may legally or de facto shift to the tax administration to counter the taxpayer’s position and to present argument and evidence as to why the taxpayer’s transfer pricing was not arm’s length and why the assessment is correct. On the other hand, where a taxpayer makes little effort to show that its transfer pricing was arm’s length, the burden imposed on the taxpayer would not be satisfied where a tax administration raised an assessment which was soundly based in law.

4.14

When transfer pricing issues are present, the divergent rules on burden of proof among OECD member countries will present serious problems if the strict legal rights implied by those rules are used as a guide for appropriate behaviour. For example, consider the case where the controlled transaction under examination involves one jurisdiction in which the burden of proof is on the taxpayer and a second jurisdiction in which the burden of proof is on the tax administration. If the burden of proof is guiding behaviour, the tax administration in the first jurisdiction might make an unsubstantiated assertion about the transfer pricing, which the taxpayer might accept, and the tax administration in the second jurisdiction would have the burden of disproving the pricing. It could be that neither the taxpayer in the second jurisdiction nor the tax administration in the first jurisdiction would be making efforts to establish an acceptable arm’s length price. This type of behaviour would set the stage for significant conflict as well as double taxation.

On inRangeExample 10 · Other examples

4.15

Consider the same facts as in the example in the preceding paragraph. If the burden of proof is again guiding behaviour, a taxpayer in the first jurisdiction being a subsidiary of a taxpayer in the second jurisdiction (notwithstanding the burden of proof and these Guidelines), may be unable or unwilling to show that its transfer prices are arm’s length. The tax administration in the first jurisdiction after examination makes an adjustment in good faith based on the information available to it. The parent company in the second jurisdiction is not obliged to provide to its tax administration any information to show that the transfer pricing was arm’s length as the burden of proof rests with the tax administration. This will make it difficult for the two tax administrations to reach agreement in competent authority proceedings.

On inRangeExample 10 · Other examples

4.16

In practice, neither jurisdictions nor taxpayers should misuse the burden of proof in the manner described above. Because of the difficulties with transfer pricing analyses, it would be appropriate for both taxpayers and tax administrations to take special care and to use restraint in relying on the burden of proof in the course of the examination of a transfer pricing case. More particularly, as a matter of good practice, the burden of proof should not be misused by tax administrations or taxpayers as a justification for making groundless or unverifiable assertions about transfer pricing. A tax administration should be prepared to make a good faith showing that its determination of transfer pricing is consistent with the arm’s length principle even where the burden of proof is on the taxpayer, and taxpayers similarly should be prepared to make a good faith showing that their transfer pricing is consistent with the arm’s length principle regardless of where the burden of proof lies.

4.17

The Commentary on paragraph 2 of Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention makes clear that the State from which a corresponding adjustment is requested should comply with the request only if that State “considers that the figure of adjusted profits correctly reflects what the profits would have been if the transactions had been at arm’s length”. This means that in competent authority proceedings the State that has proposed the primary adjustment bears the burden of demonstrating to the other State that the adjustment “is justified both in principle and as regards the amount.” Both competent authorities are expected to take a cooperative approach in resolving mutual agreement cases.

B.3. Penalties

4.18

Penalties are most often directed toward providing disincentives for non-compliance, where the compliance at issue may relate to procedural requirements such as providing necessary information or filing returns, or to the substantive determination of tax liability. Penalties are generally designed to make tax underpayments and other types of non-compliance more costly than compliance. The Committee on Fiscal Affairs has recognised that promoting compliance should be the primary objective of civil tax penalties. OECD Report Taxpayers’ Rights and Obligations (1990). If a mutual agreement results in a withdrawal or reduction of an adjustment, it is important that there exist possibilities to cancel or mitigate a penalty imposed by the tax administrations.

4.19

Care should be taken in comparing different national penalty practices and policies with one another. First, any comparison needs to take into account that there may be different names used in the various jurisdictions for penalties that accomplish the same purposes. Second, the overall compliance measures of a jurisdiction should be taken into account. National tax compliance practices depend, as indicated above, on the overall tax system in the jurisdiction, and they are designed on the basis of domestic need and balance, such as the choice between the use of taxation measures that remove or limit opportunities for noncompliance (e.g. imposing a duty on taxpayers to cooperate with the tax administration or reversing the burden of proof in situations where a taxpayer is found not to have acted in good faith) and the use of monetary deterrents (e.g. additional tax imposed as a consequence of underpayments of tax in addition to the amount of the underpayment). The nature of tax penalties may also be affected by the judicial system of a jurisdiction. Most jurisdictions do not apply no-fault penalties; in some jurisdictions, for example, the imposition of a no-fault penalty would be against the underlying principles of their legal system.

4.20

There are a number of different types of penalties that tax jurisdictions have adopted. Penalties can involve either civil or criminal sanctions – criminal penalties are virtually always reserved for cases of very significant fraud, and they usually carry a very high burden of proof for the party asserting the penalty (i.e. the tax administration). Criminal penalties are not the principal means to promote compliance in any of the OECD member countries. Civil (or administrative) penalties are more common, and they typically involve a monetary sanction (although as discussed above there may be a non-monetary sanction such as a shifting of the burden of proof when, e.g. procedural requirements are not met or the taxpayer is uncooperative and an effective penalty results from a discretionary adjustment).

4.21

Some civil penalties are directed towards procedural compliance, such as timely filing of returns and information reporting. The amount of such penalties is often small and based on a fixed amount that may be assessed for each day in which, e.g. the failure to file continues. The more significant civil penalties are those directed at the understatement of tax liability.

4.22

Although some jurisdictions may refer to a “penalty”, the same or similar imposition by another jurisdiction may be classified as “interest”. Penalty regimes in some jurisdictions may therefore include an “additional tax”, or “interest”, for understatements which result in late payments of tax beyond the due date. This is often designed to ensure the revenue recovers at least the real time value of money (taxes) lost.

4.23

Civil monetary penalties for tax understatement are frequently triggered by one or more of the following: an understatement of tax liability exceeding a threshold amount, negligence of the taxpayer, or wilful intent to evade tax (and also fraud, although fraud can trigger much more serious criminal penalties). Many OECD member countries impose civil monetary penalties for negligence or wilful intent, while only a few countries penalise “no-fault” understatements of tax liability.

4.24

It is difficult to evaluate in the abstract whether the amount of a civil monetary penalty is excessive. Among OECD member countries, civil monetary penalties for tax understatement are frequently calculated as a percentage of the tax understatement, where the percentage most often ranges from 10% to 200%. In most OECD member countries, the rate of the penalty increases as the conditions for imposing the penalty increase. For instance, the higher rate penalties often can be imposed only by showing a high degree of taxpayer culpability, such as a wilful intent to evade. “No-fault” penalties, where used, tend to be at lower rates than those triggered by taxpayer culpability (see paragraph 4.28).

4.25

Improved compliance in the transfer pricing area is of some concern to OECD member countries and the appropriate use of penalties may play a role in addressing this concern. However, owing to the nature of transfer pricing problems, care should be taken to ensure that the administration of a penalty system as applied in such cases is fair and not unduly onerous for taxpayers.

4.26

Because cross-border transfer pricing issues implicate the tax base of two jurisdictions, an overly harsh penalty system in one jurisdiction may give taxpayers an incentive to overstate taxable income in that jurisdiction contrary to Article 9. If this happens, the penalty system fails in its primary objective to promote compliance and instead leads to non-compliance of a different sort – non-compliance with the arm’s length principle and under-reporting in the other jurisdiction. Each OECD member country should ensure that its transfer pricing compliance practices are not enforced in a manner inconsistent with the objectives of the OECD Model Tax Convention, avoiding the distortions noted above.

4.27

It is generally regarded by OECD member countries that the fairness of the penalty system should be considered by reference to whether the penalties are proportionate to the offence. This would mean, for example, that the severity of a penalty would be balanced against the conditions under which it would be imposed, and that the harsher the penalty the more limited the conditions in which it would apply.

4.28

Since penalties are only one of many administrative and procedural aspects of a tax system, it is difficult to conclude whether a particular penalty is fair or not without considering the other aspects of the tax system. Nonetheless, OECD member countries agree that the following conclusions can be drawn regardless of the other aspects of the tax system in place in a particular jurisdiction. First, imposition of a sizable “no-fault” penalty based on the mere existence of an understatement of a certain amount would be unduly harsh when it is attributable to good faith error rather than negligence or an actual intent to avoid tax. Second, it would be unfair to impose sizable penalties on taxpayers that made a reasonable effort in good faith to set the terms of their transactions with associated enterprises in a manner consistent with the arm’s length principle. In particular, it would be inappropriate to impose a transfer pricing penalty on a taxpayer for failing to consider data to which it did not have access, or for failure to apply a transfer pricing method that would have required data that was not available to the taxpayer. Tax administrations are encouraged to take these observations into account in the implementation of their penalty provisions.

C. Corresponding adjustments and the mutual agreement procedure: Articles 9 and 25 of the OECD Model Tax Convention1

Footnote 1
  1. Members of the Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) have agreed to a minimum standard with respect to the resolution of treaty-related disputes. This Section C of Chapter IV is not intended to be an explanation of the minimum standard, and thus there is no implication that all members of the Inclusive Framework are in agreement with the guidance contained in this section, except where a particular statement is explicitly identified as an element of the minimum standard. The minimum standard has three general objectives: (1) jurisdictions should ensure that treaty obligations related to the mutual agreement procedure are fully implemented in good faith and that MAP cases are resolved in a timely manner; (2) jurisdictions should ensure that administrative processes promote the prevention and timely resolution of treaty-related disputes; and (3) jurisdictions should ensure that taxpayers that meet the requirements of paragraph 1 of Article 25 can access the mutual agreement procedure. The detailed elements of the minimum standard are set out in OECD (2015), Making Dispute Resolution Mechanisms More Effective, Action 14 – 2015 Report, OECD/G20 BEPS Project, OECD Publishing, Paris. The minimum standard is complemented by a set of best practices (to which not all members of the Inclusive Framework have committed) that respond to the obstacles that prevent the resolution of treaty-related disputes through the mutual agreement procedure. In addition, although there is currently no consensus among all members of the Inclusive Framework on the adoption of mandatory binding arbitration as a mechanism to ensure the timely resolution of MAP cases, a significant group of countries has committed to adopt and implement mandatory binding arbitration.

C.1. The mutual agreement procedure

4.29

The mutual agreement procedure is a well-established means through which tax administrations consult to resolve disputes regarding the application of double tax conventions. This procedure, described and authorised by Article 25 of the OECD Model Tax Convention, can be used to eliminate double taxation that could arise from a transfer pricing adjustment.

4.30

Article 25 sets out three different areas where mutual agreement procedures are generally used. The first area includes instances of “taxation not in accordance with the provisions of the Convention” and is covered in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Article. Procedures in this area are typically initiated by the taxpayer. The other two areas, which do not necessarily involve the taxpayer, are dealt with in paragraph 3 and involve questions of “interpretation or application of the Convention” and the elimination of double taxation in cases not otherwise provided for in the Convention. Paragraph 10 of the Commentary on Article 25 makes clear that Article 25 is intended to be used by competent authorities in resolving not only problems of juridical double taxation but also those of economic double taxation arising from transfer pricing adjustments made pursuant to paragraph 1 of Article 9.

4.31

Paragraph 5 of Article 25, which was incorporated in the OECD Model Tax Convention in 2008, provides that, in mutual agreement procedure cases in which the competent authorities are unable to reach an agreement within two years of the initiation of the case under paragraph 1 of Article 25, the unresolved issues will, at the request of the person who presented the case, be resolved through an arbitration process. This extension of the mutual agreement procedure ensures that where the competent authorities cannot reach an agreement on one or more issues that prevent the resolution of a case, a resolution of the case will still be possible by submitting those issues to arbitration. Where one or more issues have been submitted to arbitration in accordance with such a provision, and unless a person directly affected by the case does not accept the mutual agreement that implements the arbitration decision, that decision shall be binding on both States, the taxation of any person directly affected by the case will have to conform with the decision reached on the issues submitted to arbitration and the decisions reached in the arbitral process will be reflected in the mutual agreement that will be presented to these persons. Where a particular bilateral treaty does not contain an arbitration provision similar to paragraph 5 of Article 25, the competent authorities are not obliged to reach an agreement to resolve their dispute; paragraph 2 of Article 25 requires only that the competent authorities “endeavour … to resolve the case by mutual agreement”. The competent authorities may be unable to come to an agreement because of conflicting domestic laws or restrictions imposed by domestic law on the tax administration’s power of compromise. Even in the absence of a mandatory binding arbitration provision similar to paragraph 5 of Article 25 in a particular bilateral treaty, however, the competent authorities of the Contracting States may by mutual agreement establish a binding arbitration procedure for general application or to deal with a specific case (see paragraph 69 of the Commentary on Article 25 of the OECD Model Tax Convention). It should also be noted that a multilateral Convention on the elimination of double taxation in connection with the adjustment of profits of associated enterprises2 (the Arbitration Convention) was signed by the Member States of the European Communities on 23 July 1990; the Arbitration Convention, which entered into force on 1 January 1995, provides for an arbitration mechanism to resolve transfer pricing disputes between European Union Member States.

Footnote 2
  1. Convention 90/436/EEC.

C.2. Corresponding adjustments: Paragraph 2 of Article 9

4.32

To eliminate double taxation in transfer pricing cases, tax administrations may consider requests for corresponding adjustments as described in paragraph 2 of Article 9. A corresponding adjustment, which in practice may be undertaken as part of the mutual agreement procedure, can mitigate or eliminate double taxation in cases where one tax administration increases a company’s taxable profits (i.e. makes a primary adjustment) as a result of applying the arm’s length principle to transactions involving an associated enterprise in a second tax jurisdiction. The corresponding adjustment in such a case is a downward adjustment to the tax liability of that associated enterprise, made by the tax administration of the second jurisdiction, so that the allocation of profits between the two jurisdictions is consistent with the primary adjustment and no double taxation occurs. It is also possible that the first tax administration will agree to decrease (or eliminate) the primary adjustment as part of the consultative process with the second tax administration, in which case the corresponding adjustment would be smaller (or perhaps unnecessary). It should be noted that a corresponding adjustment is not intended to provide a benefit to the MNE group greater than would have been the case if the controlled transactions had been undertaken at arm’s length conditions in the first instance.

4.33

Paragraph 2 of Article 9 specifically provides that the competent authorities shall consult each other if necessary to determine appropriate corresponding adjustments. This confirms that the mutual agreement procedure of Article 25 may be used to consider corresponding adjustment requests. See also paragraph 10 of the Commentary on Article 25 of the OECD Model Tax Convention (“… the corresponding adjustments to be made in pursuance of paragraph 2 of [Article 9] … fall within the scope of mutual agreement procedure, both as concerns assessing whether they are well-founded and for determining their amount.” However, the overlap between the two Articles has caused OECD member countries to consider whether the mutual agreement procedure can be used to achieve corresponding adjustments where the bilateral income tax convention between two Contracting States does not include a provision comparable to paragraph 2 of Article 9. Paragraphs 11 and 12 of the Commentary on Article 25 of the OECD Model Tax Convention expressly state the view of most OECD member countries that the mutual agreement procedure is considered to apply to transfer pricing adjustment cases, including issues of whether a corresponding adjustment should be provided, even in the absence of a provision comparable to paragraph 2 of Article 9. Paragraph 12 notes that those States that do not agree with this view in practice find means of remedying economic double taxation in most cases involving bona fide companies by making use of provisions in their domestic laws.

4.34

Under paragraph 2 of Article 9, a corresponding adjustment may be made by a Contracting State either by recalculating the profits subject to tax for the associated enterprise in that jurisdiction using the relevant revised price or by letting the calculation stand and giving the associated enterprise relief against its own tax paid in that State for the additional tax charged to the associated enterprise by the adjusting State as a consequence of the revised transfer price. The former method is by far the more common among OECD member countries.

4.35

In the absence of an arbitration decision arrived at pursuant to an arbitration procedure comparable to that provided for under paragraph 5 of Article 25 which provides for a corresponding adjustment, corresponding adjustments are not mandatory, mirroring the rule that tax administrations are not obliged to reach agreement under the mutual agreement procedure. Under paragraph 2 of Article 9, a tax administration should make a corresponding adjustment only insofar as it considers the primary adjustment to be justified both in principle and in amount. The non-mandatory nature of corresponding adjustments is necessary so that one tax administration is not forced to accept the consequences of an arbitrary or capricious adjustment by another State. It also is important to maintaining the fiscal sovereignty of each OECD member country.

4.36

Once a tax administration has agreed to make a corresponding adjustment it is necessary to establish whether the adjustment is to be attributed to the year in which the controlled transactions giving rise to the adjustment took place or to an alternative year, such as the year in which the primary adjustment is determined. This issue also often raises the question of a taxpayer’s entitlement to interest on the overpayment of tax in the jurisdiction which has agreed to make the corresponding adjustment (discussed in paragraphs 4.65-4.67). The first approach is more appropriate because it achieves a matching of income and expenses and better reflects the economic situation as it would have been if the controlled transactions had been at arm’s length. However, in cases involving lengthy delays between the year covered by the adjustment and the year of its acceptance by the taxpayer or a final court decision, the tax administration should have the flexibility to agree to make corresponding adjustments for the year of acceptance of or decision on the primary adjustment. This approach would need to rely on domestic law for implementation. While not ordinarily preferred, it could be appropriate as an equitable measure in exceptional cases to facilitate implementation and to avoid time limit barriers.

4.37

Corresponding adjustments can be a very effective means of obtaining relief from double taxation resulting from transfer pricing adjustments. OECD member countries generally strive in good faith to reach agreement whenever the mutual agreement procedure is invoked. Through the mutual agreement procedure, tax administrations can address issues in a non-adversarial proceeding, often achieving a negotiated settlement in the interests of all parties. It also allows tax administrations to take into account other taxing rights issues, such as withholding taxes.

4.38

At least one OECD member country has a procedure that may reduce the need for primary adjustments by allowing the taxpayer to report a transfer price for tax purposes that is, in the taxpayer’s opinion, an arm’s length price for a controlled transaction, even though this price differs from the amount actually charged between the associated enterprises. This adjustment, sometimes known as a “compensating adjustment”, would be made before the tax return is filed. Compensating adjustments may facilitate the reporting of taxable income by taxpayers in accordance with the arm’s length principle, recognising that information about comparable uncontrolled transactions may not be available at the time associated enterprises establish the prices for their controlled transactions. Thus, for the purpose of lodging a correct tax return, a taxpayer would be permitted to make a compensating adjustment that would record the difference between the arm’s length price and the actual price recorded in its books and records.

4.39

However, compensating adjustments are not recognised by most OECD member countries, on the grounds that the tax return should reflect the actual transactions. If compensating adjustments are permitted (or required) in the jurisdiction of one associated enterprise but not permitted in the jurisdiction of the other associated enterprise, double taxation may result because corresponding adjustment relief may not be available if no primary adjustment is made. The mutual agreement procedure is available to resolve difficulties presented by compensating adjustments, and competent authorities are encouraged to use their best efforts to resolve any double taxation which may arise from different jurisdictional approaches to such year-end adjustments.

C.3. Concerns with the procedures

4.40

While corresponding adjustment and mutual agreement procedures have proved to be able to resolve most transfer pricing conflicts, serious concerns have been expressed by taxpayers. For example, because transfer pricing issues are so complex, taxpayers have expressed concerns that there may not be sufficient safeguards in the procedures against double taxation. These concerns are mainly addressed with the introduction in the 2008 update of the OECD Model Tax Convention of a new paragraph 5 to Article 25 which introduces a mechanism that allows taxpayers to request arbitration of unresolved issues that have prevented competent authorities from reaching a mutual agreement within two years. There is also in the Commentary on Article 25 a favourable discussion of the use of supplementary dispute resolution mechanisms in addition to arbitration, including mediation and the referral of factual disputes to third party experts.

4.41

Taxpayers have also expressed fears that their cases may be settled not on their individual merits but by reference to a balance of the results in other cases. An established good practice is that, in the resolution of mutual agreement cases, a competent authority should engage in discussions with other competent authorities in a principled, fair, and objective manner, with each case being decided on its own merits and not by reference to any balance of results in other cases. To the extent applicable, these Guidelines and proposals detailed in the Report on BEPS Action 14 (bearing in mind the difference between the minimum standard and best practices) are an appropriate basis for the development of a principled approach. Similarly, there may be a fear of retaliation or offsetting adjustments by the jurisdiction from which the corresponding adjustment has been requested. It is not the intention of tax administrations to take retaliatory action; the fears of taxpayers may be a result of inadequate communication of this fact. Tax administrations should take steps to assure taxpayers that they need not fear retaliatory action and that, consistent with the arm’s length principle, each case is resolved on its own merits. Taxpayers should not be deterred from initiating mutual agreement procedures where Article 25 is applicable.

4.42

Concerns that have been expressed regarding the mutual agreement procedure, as it affects corresponding adjustments, include the following, which are discussed separately in the sections below:

1. Taxpayers may be denied access to the mutual agreement procedure in transfer pricing cases;

2. Time limits under domestic law for the amendments of tax assessments may make corresponding adjustments unavailable if the relevant tax treaty does not override those limits;

3. Mutual agreement procedure cases may take a long time;

4. Taxpayer participation may be limited;

5. Published guidance may not be readily available to instruct taxpayers on how the mutual agreement procedure may be used; and

6. There may be no procedures to suspend the collection of tax deficiencies or the accrual of interest pending resolution of the mutual agreement procedure case.

C.4. Guidance, approaches and actions taken to address concerns with the mutual agreement procedure

C.4.1. Denial of access to the mutual agreement procedure in transfer pricing cases

4.43

A fundamental concern with respect to the mutual agreement procedure as it relates to corresponding adjustments is the failure to grant access to the mutual agreement procedure for transfer pricing cases. The undertaking to resolve by mutual agreement cases of taxation not in accordance with the Convention is an integral part of the obligations assumed by a Contracting State in entering into a tax treaty and must be performed in good faith. The failure to grant mutual agreement procedure access with respect to a treaty partner’s transfer pricing adjustments, may frustrate a primary objective of tax treaties. The work on Action 14 of the BEPS Action Plan directly addressed concerns related to the denial of access to the mutual agreement procedure with respect to a treaty partner’s transfer pricing adjustments by including, as element 1.1 of the Action 14 minimum standard, a commitment to provide access to the mutual agreement procedure in transfer pricing cases.

4.44

The Action 14 minimum standard also comprises a number of other elements intended to address more generally concerns related to the denial of access to the mutual agreement procedure. These include: a commitment to provide access to the mutual agreement procedure in cases in which there is a disagreement between the taxpayer and the tax authorities making an adjustment as to whether the conditions for the application of a treaty anti-abuse provision have been met or as to whether the application of a domestic law anti-abuse provision is in conflict with the provisions of a treaty (element 1.2); a commitment to publish rules, guidelines and procedures regarding the mutual agreement procedure (element 2.1) and to identify in that guidance the specific information and documentation that a taxpayer is required to submit with a request for mutual agreement procedure assistance (element 3.2); a commitment to clarify that audit settlements between tax authorities and taxpayers do not preclude access to the mutual agreement procedure (element 2.6); and a commitment to ensure that both competent authorities are made aware of requests for mutual agreement procedure assistance by either (i) amending Article 25(1) to permit requests to be made to the competent authority of either Contracting State or (ii) implementing a bilateral notification or consultation process for cases in which the competent authority to whom the case is presented does not consider the taxpayer’s objection to be justified (element 3.1).

C.4.2. Time limits

4.45

Relief under paragraph 2 of Article 9 may be unavailable if the time limit provided by treaty or domestic law for making corresponding adjustments has expired. Paragraph 2 of Article 9 does not specify whether there should be a time limit after which corresponding adjustments should not be made. Some jurisdictions prefer an open-ended approach so that double taxation may be mitigated. Other jurisdictions consider the open-ended approach to be unreasonable for administrative purposes. Thus, relief may depend on whether the applicable treaty overrides domestic time limitations, establishes other time limits, or links the implementation of relief to the time limits prescribed by domestic law.

4.46

Time limits for finalising a taxpayer’s tax liability are necessary to provide certainty for taxpayers and tax administrations. In a transfer pricing case a jurisdiction may under its domestic law be legally unable to make a corresponding adjustment if the time has expired for finalising the tax liability of the relevant associated enterprise. Thus, the existence of such time limits and the fact that they vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction should be considered in order to minimise double taxation.

4.47

Paragraph 2 of Article 25 of the OECD Model Tax Convention addresses the time limit issue by requiring that any agreement reached by the competent authorities pursuant to the mutual agreement procedure shall be implemented notwithstanding the time limits in the domestic law of the Contracting States. Paragraph 29 of the Commentary on Article 25 recognises that the last sentence of Article 25(2) unequivocally states the obligation to implement such agreements (and notes that impediments to implementation that exist at the time a tax treaty is entered into should generally be built into the terms of the agreement itself). Time limits therefore do not impede the making of corresponding adjustments where a bilateral treaty includes this provision. Some jurisdictions, however, may be unwilling or unable to override their domestic time limits in this way and have entered explicit reservations on this point. OECD member countries therefore are encouraged as far as possible to extend domestic time limits for purposes of making corresponding adjustments when mutual agreement procedures have been invoked.

4.48

Where a bilateral treaty does not override domestic time limits for the purposes of the mutual agreement procedure, tax administrations should be ready to initiate discussions quickly upon the taxpayer’s request, well before the expiration of any time limits that would preclude the making of an adjustment. Furthermore, OECD member countries are encouraged to adopt domestic law that would allow the suspension of time limits on determining tax liability until the discussions have been concluded.

4.49

The work on Action 14 of the BEPS Action Plan directly addresses the obstacle that domestic law time limits may present to effective mutual agreement procedures. Element 3.3 of the Action 14 minimum standard includes a recommendation that jurisdictions should include the second sentence of paragraph 2 of Article 25 in their tax treaties to ensure that domestic law time limits (1) do not prevent the implementation of competent authority mutual agreements and (2) do not thereby frustrate the objective of resolving cases of taxation not in accordance with the Convention.

4.50

Where a jurisdiction cannot include the second sentence of paragraph 2 of Article 25 in its tax treaties, element 3.3 of the Action 14 minimum standard states that it should be willing to accept an alternative treaty provision that limits the time during which a Contracting State may make an adjustment pursuant to Article 9(1), in order to avoid late adjustments with respect to which mutual agreement procedure relief will not be available. Such a jurisdiction would satisfy this element of the minimum standard where the alternative treaty provision was drafted to reflect the time limits for adjustments provided for in that country’s domestic law. That alternative provision, as presented in the Report on BEPS Action 14, reads as follows:

[In Article 9]:

3. A Contracting State shall not include in the profits of an enterprise, and tax accordingly, profits that would have accrued to the enterprise but by reason of the conditions referred to in paragraph 1 have not so accrued, after [bilaterally agreed period] from the end of the taxable year in which the profits would have accrued to the enterprise. The provisions of this paragraph shall not apply in the case of fraud, gross negligence or wilful default.

Element 3.3 of the Action 14 minimum standard also states that such a jurisdiction accept a similar alternative provision in Article 7 with respect to adjustments to the profits that are attributable to a permanent establishment.

4.51

While it is not possible to recommend generally a time limit on initial assessments, tax administrations are encouraged to make these assessments within their own domestic time limits without extension. If the complexity of the case or lack of cooperation from the taxpayer necessitates an extension, the extension should be made for a minimum and specified time period. Further, where domestic time limits can be extended with the agreement of the taxpayer, such an extension should be made only when the taxpayer’s consent is truly voluntary. Tax examiners are encouraged to indicate to taxpayers at an early stage their intent to make an assessment based on cross-border transfer pricing, so that the taxpayer can, if it so chooses, inform the tax administration in the other interested State, which could accordingly begin to consider the relevant issues with a view to a possible mutual agreement procedure.

4.52

Another time limit that must be considered is the three-year time limit within which a taxpayer must invoke the mutual agreement procedure under Article 25 of the OECD Model Tax Convention. The three-year period begins to run from the first notification of the action resulting in taxation not in accordance with the provisions of the Convention, which can be the time when the tax administration first notifies the taxpayer of the proposed adjustment, described as the “adjustment action” or “act of taxation”, or an earlier date as discussed in paragraphs 21-24 of the Commentary on Article 25. Although some jurisdictions consider three years too short a period for invoking the procedure, other countries consider it too long and have entered reservations on this point. The Commentary on Article 25 indicates that the time limit “must be regarded as a minimum so that Contracting States are left free to agree in their bilateral conventions upon a longer period in the interests of taxpayers”. In this regard, it should be noted that element 1.1 of the Action 14 minimum standard includes a recommendation that jurisdictions include in their tax treaties paragraphs 1 through 3 of Article 25, as interpreted in the Commentary.

4.53

The three-year time limit raises the issue of determining its starting date, which is addressed in paragraphs 21-24 of the Commentary on Article 25. In particular, paragraph 21 states that the three-year time period “should be interpreted in the way most favourable to the taxpayer”. Paragraph 22 contains guidance on the determination of the date of the act of taxation. Paragraph 23 discusses self-assessment cases. Paragraph 24 clarifies that “where it is the combination of decisions or actions taken in both Contracting States resulting in taxation not in accordance with the Convention, the time limit begins to run only from the first notification of the most recent decision or action.”

4.54

In order to minimise the possibility that time limits may prevent the mutual agreement procedure from effectively ensuring relief from or avoidance of double taxation, taxpayers should be permitted to avail themselves of the procedure at the earliest possible stage, which is as soon as an adjustment appears likely. Early competent authority consultation, before any irrevocable steps are taken by either tax administration, may ensure that there are as few procedural obstacles as possible in the way of achieving a mutually acceptable conclusion to the discussions. Some competent authorities, however, may not like to be involved at such an early stage because a proposed adjustment may not result in final action or may not trigger a claim for a corresponding adjustment. Consequently, too early an invocation of the mutual agreement process may create unnecessary work.

C.4.3. Duration of mutual agreement proceedings

4.55

Once discussions under the mutual agreement procedure have commenced, the proceedings may turn out to be lengthy. The complexity of transfer pricing cases may make it difficult for the competent authorities to reach a swift resolution. Distance may make it difficult for the competent authorities to meet frequently, and correspondence is often an unsatisfactory substitute for face-to-face discussions. Difficulties also arise from differences in language, procedures, and legal and accounting systems, and these may lengthen the duration of the process. The process also may be prolonged if the taxpayer delays providing all of the information the competent authorities require for a full understanding of the transfer pricing issue or issues.

4.56

Whilst the time taken to resolve a mutual agreement procedure case may vary according to its complexity, most competent authorities endeavour to reach bilateral agreement for the resolution of a mutual agreement procedure case within 24 months. Accordingly, in order to ensure the timely, effective and efficient resolution of treaty-related disputes, the minimum standard that was adopted in the context of the work on Action 14 of the BEPS Action Plan includes a commitment to seek to resolve mutual agreement procedure cases within an average timeframe of 24 months (element 1.3). Jurisdictions’ progress toward meeting that target will be periodically reviewed on the basis of the agreed reporting framework for mutual agreement procedure statistics3 that was developed to provide a tangible measure to evaluate the effects of the implementation of the Action 14 minimum standard (see elements 1.5 and 1.6). Moreover, other elements of the Action 14 minimum standard related to the authority of staff in charge of mutual agreement processes (element 2.3), performance indicators for competent authority functions (element 2.4) and adequate competent authority resources (element 2.5) are expected to contribute to the timely resolution of mutual agreement procedure cases.

Footnote 3
  1. See OECD (2016), BEPS Action 14 on More Effective Dispute Resolution Mechanisms – Peer Review Documents, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, OECD, Paris.
4.57

More fundamentally, the adoption in tax treaties of a mandatory binding arbitration provision similar to paragraph 5 of Article 25 to resolve issues that the competent authorities have been unable to resolve within the two year period referred to in that provision should considerably reduce the risk of lengthy mutual agreement procedures. See paragraphs 4.177-4.179.

C.4.4. Taxpayer participation

4.58

Paragraph 1 of Article 25 of the OECD Model Tax Convention gives taxpayers the right to submit a request to initiate a mutual agreement procedure. Although the taxpayer has the right to initiate the procedure, the taxpayer has no specific right to participate in the process. It has been argued that the taxpayer also should have a right to take part in the mutual agreement procedure, including the right at least to present its case to both competent authorities, and to be informed of the progress of the discussions. It should be noted in this respect that implementation of a mutual agreement in practice is subject to the taxpayer’s acceptance. Some taxpayer representatives have suggested that the taxpayer also should have a right to be present at face-to-face discussions between the competent authorities. The purpose would be to ensure that there is no misunderstanding by the competent authorities of the facts and arguments that are relevant to the taxpayer’s case.

4.59

The mutual agreement procedure envisaged in Article 25 of the OECD Model Tax Convention and adopted in many bilateral agreements is not a process of litigation. While input from the taxpayer in some cases can be helpful to the procedure, it must be recalled that the mutual agreement procedure is a government-to-government process and that any taxpayer participation in that process should be subject to the discretion and mutual agreement of the competent authorities.

4.60

Outside the context of the actual discussions between the competent authorities, it is essential for the taxpayer to give the competent authorities all the information that is relevant to the issue in a timely manner. Competent authorities have limited resources and taxpayers should make every effort to facilitate the process, particularly in complex, fact-intensive transfer pricing cases in which it may be challenging for the competent authorities to develop a complete and accurate understanding of the associated enterprises’ activities. Further, because the mutual agreement procedure is fundamentally designed as a means of providing assistance to a taxpayer, competent authorities should allow taxpayers every reasonable opportunity to present the relevant facts and arguments to them to ensure as far as possible that the matter is not subject to misunderstanding.

4.61

In practice, the competent authorities of many OECD member countries routinely give taxpayers such opportunities, keep them informed of the progress of the discussions, and often ask them during the course of the discussions whether they can accept the settlements contemplated by the competent authorities. These practices, already standard procedure in most jurisdictions, should be adopted as widely as possible. They are reflected in the OECD’s Manual for Effective Mutual Agreement Procedures.

C.4.5. Publication of mutual agreement procedure programme guidance

4.62

Taxpayers’ contributions to the mutual agreement procedure process are of course facilitated where public guidance on applicable procedures is readily accessible. The work on Action 14 of the BEPS Action Plan directly recognised the importance of providing such guidance. Element 2.1 of the Action 14 minimum standard states that jurisdictions should develop and publish rules, guidelines and procedures regarding the mutual agreement procedure and take appropriate measures to make such information available to taxpayers. Such guidance should include information on how taxpayers may make requests for competent authority assistance. It should be drafted in clear and plain language and should be readily available to the public. The Report on BEPS Action 14 also notes that such information may be of particular relevance where an adjustment may potentially involve issues within the scope of a tax treaty, such as where a transfer pricing adjustment is made with respect to a controlled transaction with an associated enterprise in a treaty partner jurisdiction, and that jurisdictions should appropriately seek to ensure that mutual agreement procedure programme guidance is available to taxpayers in such cases. To promote the transparency and dissemination of such published guidance, element 2.2 of the Action 14 minimum standard includes the publication of country mutual agreement procedure profiles on a shared public platform, in order to make broadly available competent authority contact details, links to relevant domestic guidance and other useful country-specific information. These country profiles, prepared by the members of the Inclusive Framework on BEPS4 pursuant to an agreed reporting template developed for that purpose, are published on the OECD website.5

Footnotes 4, 5
  1. See www.oecd.org/tax/beps/beps-about.htm#membership.
  2. See www.oecd.org/tax/beps/country-map-profiles.htm.
4.63

The work on Action 14 also addresses a number of other aspects related to the content of mutual agreement procedure programme guidance:

  • Element 3.2 of the Action 14 minimum standard states that jurisdictions should identify in their mutual agreement procedure programme guidance the specific information and documentation that a taxpayer is required to submit with a request for competent authority assistance. Pursuant to element 3.2, jurisdictions should not deny access to the mutual agreement procedure based on the argument that a taxpayer has provided insufficient information where the taxpayer has provided the required information and documentation consistent with such guidance.
  • Element 2.6 of the Action 14 minimum standard states that jurisdictions should clarify in their mutual agreement procedure programme guidance that audit settlements between tax authorities and taxpayers do not preclude access to the mutual agreement procedure.
  • Certain of the non-binding Action 14 best practices additionally recommend that jurisdictions’ mutual agreement procedure programme guidance should include: an explanation of the relationship between the mutual agreement procedure and domestic law administrative and judicial remedies (best practice 8); guidance on the consideration of interest and penalties in the mutual agreement procedure (best practice 10); and guidance on multilateral mutual agreement procedures and advance pricing arrangements (best practice 11). Best practice 9 recommends that this guidance provide that taxpayers will be allowed access to the mutual agreement procedure so that the competent authorities can resolve through consultation the double taxation that can arise in the case of bona fide taxpayer initiated foreign adjustments.
4.64

There is no need for the competent authorities to agree to rules or guidelines governing the procedure, since the rules or guidelines would be limited in effect to the competent authority’s relationship with taxpayers seeking its assistance. However, competent authorities should routinely communicate such unilateral rules or guidelines to the competent authorities of their treaty partners and ensure that their country mutual agreement procedure profiles (see paragraph 4.62 above) are kept up-to-date.

C.4.6. Problems concerning collection of tax deficiencies and accrual of interest

4.65

The process of obtaining relief from double taxation through a corresponding adjustment can be complicated by issues relating to the collection of tax deficiencies and the assessment of interest on those deficiencies or overpayment. A first problem is that the assessed deficiency may be collected before the corresponding adjustment proceeding is completed, because of a lack of domestic procedures allowing the collection to be suspended. This may cause the MNE group to pay the same tax twice until the issues can be resolved. This problem arises not only in the context of the mutual agreement procedure but also for internal appeals. The work on Action 14 of the BEPS Action Plan recognised that the collection of tax by both Contracting States pending the resolution of a case through the mutual agreement procedure may have a significant impact on a taxpayer’s business (for example, as a result of cash flow problems). Such collection of tax may also make it more difficult for a competent authority to engage in good faith mutual agreement procedure discussions when it considers that it may likely have to refund taxes already collected. The Report on BEPS Action 14 accordingly includes as best practice 6 a recommendation that jurisdictions should take appropriate measures to provide for a suspension of collection procedures during the period in which a mutual agreement procedure case is pending; such a suspension of collections should be available, at a minimum, under the same conditions as apply to a person pursuing a domestic administrative or judicial remedy. In this regard, it should be noted that the country mutual agreement procedure profiles prepared pursuant to element 2.2 of the Action 14 minimum standard (see paragraph 4.62) include information on the availability of procedures for the suspension of collections in specific jurisdictions.

4.66

Whether or not collection of the deficiency is suspended or partially suspended, other complications may arise. Because of the lengthy time period for processing many transfer pricing cases, the interest due on a deficiency or, if a corresponding adjustment is allowed, on the overpayment of tax in the other jurisdiction can equal or exceed the amount of the tax itself. Jurisdictions should take into account in their mutual agreement procedures that inconsistent interest rules across the two jurisdictions may result in additional cost for the MNE group, or in other cases provide a benefit to the MNE group (e.g. where the interest paid in the jurisdiction making the corresponding adjustment exceeds the interest imposed in the jurisdictions making the primary adjustment) that would not have been available if the controlled transactions had been undertaken on an arm’s length basis originally. As noted above, the Report on BEPS Action 14 includes as best practice 10 a recommendation that jurisdictions’ published mutual agreement procedure guidance should provide guidance on the consideration of interest in the mutual agreement procedure. In addition, the country mutual agreement procedure profiles prepared pursuant to element 2.2 of the Action 14 minimum standard include information on how interest and penalties are dealt with by specific jurisdictions in the context of the mutual agreement procedure.

4.67

The amount of interest (as distinct from the rate at which it is applied) may also have more to do with the year to which the jurisdiction making the corresponding adjustment attributes the corresponding adjustment. The jurisdiction making the corresponding adjustment may decide to make the adjustment for the year in which the primary adjustment is determined, in which case relatively little interest is likely to be payable (regardless of the rate of interest), whereas the jurisdiction making the primary adjustment may seek to impose interest on the understated and uncollected tax liability from the year in which the controlled transactions took place (notwithstanding that a relatively low rate of interest may be imposed). The issue of the year to which a corresponding adjustment is attributed is raised in paragraph 4.36. It may be appropriate in certain cases for both competent authorities to agree not to assess or pay interest in connection with the adjustment at issue, but this may not be possible in the absence of a specific provision addressing this issue in the relevant bilateral treaty. This approach would also reduce administrative complexities. However, as the interest on the deficiency and the interest on the overpayment are attributable to different taxpayers in different jurisdictions, there would be no assurance under such an approach that a proper economic result would be achieved.

C.5. Secondary adjustments

4.68

Corresponding adjustments are not the only adjustments that may be triggered by a primary transfer pricing adjustment. Primary transfer pricing adjustments and their corresponding adjustments change the allocation of taxable profits of an MNE group for tax purposes but they do not alter the fact that the excess profits represented by the adjustment are not consistent with the result that would have arisen if the controlled transactions had been undertaken on an arm’s length basis. To make the actual allocation of profits consistent with the primary transfer pricing adjustment, some jurisdictions having proposed a transfer pricing adjustment will assert under their domestic legislation a constructive transaction (a secondary transaction), whereby the excess profits resulting from a primary adjustment are treated as having been transferred in some other form and taxed accordingly. Ordinarily, the secondary transactions will take the form of constructive dividends, constructive equity contributions, or constructive loans. For example, a jurisdiction making a primary adjustment to the income of a subsidiary of a foreign parent may treat the excess profits in the hands of the foreign parent as having been transferred as a dividend, in which case withholding tax may apply. It may be that the subsidiary paid an excessive transfer price to the foreign parent as a means of avoiding that withholding tax. Thus, secondary adjustments attempt to account for the difference between the re-determined taxable profits and the originally booked profits. The subjecting to tax of a secondary transaction gives rise to a secondary transfer pricing adjustment (a secondary adjustment). Thus, secondary adjustments may serve to prevent tax avoidance. The exact form that a secondary transaction takes and of the consequent secondary adjustment will depend on the facts of the case and on the tax laws of the jurisdiction that asserts the secondary adjustment.

4.69

Another example of a tax administration seeking to assert a secondary transaction may be where the tax administration making a primary adjustment treats the excess profits as being a constructive loan from one associated enterprise to the other associated enterprise. In this case, an obligation to repay the loan would be deemed to arise. The tax administration making the primary adjustment may then seek to apply the arm’s length principle to this secondary transaction to impute an arm’s length rate of interest. The interest rate to be applied, the timing to be attached to the making of interest payments, if any, and whether interest is to be capitalised would generally need to be addressed. The constructive loan approach may have an effect not only for the year to which a primary adjustment relates but to subsequent years until such time as the constructive loan is considered by the tax administration asserting the secondary adjustment to have been repaid.

4.70

A secondary adjustment may result in double taxation unless a corresponding credit or some other form of relief is provided by the other country for the additional tax liability that may result from a secondary adjustment. Where a secondary adjustment takes the form of a constructive dividend any withholding tax which is then imposed may not be relievable because there may not be a deemed receipt under the domestic legislation of the other jurisdiction.

4.71

The Commentary on paragraph 2 of Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention notes that the Article does not deal with secondary adjustments, and thus it neither forbids nor requires tax administrations to make secondary adjustments. In a broad sense, the purpose of double tax agreements can be stated as being for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income and capital. Many jurisdictions do not make secondary adjustments either as a matter of practice or because their respective domestic provisions do not permit them to do so. Some jurisdictions might refuse to grant relief in respect of other jurisdictions’ secondary adjustments and indeed they are not required to do so under Article 9.

4.72

Secondary adjustments are rejected by some jurisdictions because of the practical difficulties they present. For example, if a primary adjustment is made between brother-sister companies, the secondary adjustment may involve a hypothetical dividend from one of those companies up a chain to a common parent, followed by constructive equity contributions down another chain of ownership to reach the other company involved in the transaction. Many hypothetical transactions might be created, raising questions whether tax consequences should be triggered in other jurisdictions besides those involved in the transaction for which the primary adjustment was made. This might be avoided if the secondary transaction were a loan, but constructive loans are not used by most jurisdictions for this purpose and they carry their own complications because of issues relating to imputed interest. It would be inappropriate for minority shareholders that are not parties to the controlled transactions and that have accordingly not received excess cash to be considered recipients of a constructive dividend, even though a non-pro-rata dividend might be considered inconsistent with the requirements of applicable corporate law. In addition, as a result of the interaction with the foreign tax credit system, a secondary adjustment may excessively reduce the overall tax burden of the MNE group.

4.73

In light of the foregoing difficulties, tax administrations, when secondary adjustments are considered necessary, are encouraged to structure such adjustments in a way that the possibility of double taxation as a consequence thereof would be minimised, except where the taxpayer’s behaviour suggests an intent to disguise a dividend for purposes of avoiding withholding tax. In addition, jurisdictions in the process of formulating or reviewing policy on this matter are recommended to take into consideration the above-mentioned difficulties.

4.74

Some jurisdictions that have adopted secondary adjustments also give the taxpayer receiving the primary adjustment another option that allows the taxpayer to avoid the secondary adjustment by having the taxpayer arrange for the MNE group of which it is a member to repatriate the excess profits to enable the taxpayer to conform its accounts to the primary adjustment. The repatriation could be effected either by setting up an account receivable or by reclassifying other transfers, such as dividend payments where the adjustment is between parent and subsidiary, as a payment of additional transfer price (where the original price was too low) or as a refund of transfer price (where the original price was too high).

4.75

Where a repatriation involves reclassifying a dividend payment, the amount of the dividend (up to the amount of the primary adjustment) would be excluded from the recipient’s gross income (because it would already have been accounted for through the primary adjustment). The consequences would be that the recipient would lose any indirect tax credit (or benefit of a dividend exemption in an exemption system) and a credit for withholding tax that had been allowed on the dividend.

4.76

When the repatriation involves establishing an account receivable, the adjustments to actual cash flow will be made over time, although domestic law may limit the time within which the account can be satisfied. This approach is identical to using a constructive loan as a secondary transaction to account for excess profits in the hands of one of the parties to the controlled transaction. The accrual of interest on the account could have its own tax consequences, however, and this may complicate the process, depending upon when interest begins to accrue under domestic law (as discussed in paragraph 4.69). Some jurisdictions may be willing to waive the interest charge on these accounts as part of a competent authority agreement.

4.77

Where a repatriation is sought, a question arises about how such payments or arrangements should be recorded in the accounts of the taxpayer repatriating the payment to its associated enterprise so that both it and the tax administration of that jurisdiction are aware that a repatriation has occurred or has been set up. The actual recording of the repatriation in the accounts of the enterprise from whom the repatriation is sought will ultimately depend on the form the repatriation takes. For example, where a dividend receipt is to be regarded by the tax administration making the primary adjustment and the taxpayer receiving the dividend as the repatriation, then this type of arrangement may not need to be specially recorded in the accounts of the associated enterprise paying the dividend, as such an arrangement may not affect the amount or characterisation of the dividend in its hands. On the other hand, where an account payable is set up, both the taxpayer recording the account payable and the tax administration of that jurisdiction will need to be aware that the account payable relates to a repatriation so that any repayments from the account or of interest on the outstanding balance in the account are clearly able to be identified and treated according to the domestic laws of that jurisdiction. In addition, issues may be presented in relation to currency exchange gains and losses.

4.78

As most OECD member countries at this time have not had much experience with the use of repatriation, it is recommended that agreements between taxpayers and tax administrations for a repatriation to take place be discussed in the mutual agreement proceeding where it has been initiated for the related primary adjustment.

D. Simultaneous tax examinations

D.1. Definition and background

4.79

A simultaneous tax examination is a form of mutual assistance, used in a wide range of international issues, that allows two or more jurisdictions to co-operate in tax investigations. Simultaneous tax examinations can be particularly useful where information based in a third jurisdiction is a key to a tax investigation, since they generally lead to more timely and more effective exchanges of information. Historically, simultaneous tax examinations of transfer pricing issues have focused on cases where the true nature of transactions was obscured by the interposition of tax havens. However, in complex transfer pricing cases, it is suggested that simultaneous examinations could serve a broader role since they may improve the adequacy of data available to the participating tax administrations for transfer pricing analyses. It has also been suggested that simultaneous examinations could help reduce the possibilities for economic double taxation, reduce the compliance cost to taxpayers, and speed up the resolution of issues. In a simultaneous examination, if a reassessment is made, both jurisdictions involved should endeavour to reach a result that avoids double taxation for the MNE group.

4.80

Simultaneous tax examinations are defined in Part A of the OECD Model Agreement for the Undertaking of Simultaneous Tax Examinations (OECD Model Agreement). According to this agreement, a simultaneous tax examination means an “arrangement between two or more parties to examine simultaneously and independently, each on its own territory, the tax affairs of (a) taxpayer(s) in which they have a common or related interest with a view to exchanging any relevant information which they so obtain”. This form of mutual assistance is not meant to be a substitute for the mutual agreement procedure. Any exchange of information as a result of the simultaneous tax examination continues to be exchanged via the competent authorities, with all the safeguards that are built into such exchanges. Practical information on simultaneous examinations can be found in the relevant module of the Manual on Information Exchange that was adopted by the Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 23 January 2006 (see www.oecd.org/ctp/eoi/manual).

4.81

While provisions that follow Article 26 of the OECD Model Tax Convention may provide the legal basis for conducting simultaneous examinations, competent authorities frequently conclude working arrangements that lay down the objectives of their simultaneous tax examination programmes and practical procedures connected with the simultaneous tax examination and exchange of information. Once such an agreement has been reached on the general lines to be followed and specific cases have been selected, tax examiners and inspectors of each state will separately carry out their examination within their own jurisdiction and pursuant to their domestic law and administrative practice.

D.2. Legal basis for simultaneous tax examinations

4.82

Simultaneous tax examinations are within the scope of the exchange of information provision based on Article 26 of the OECD Model Tax Convention. Article 26 provides for co-operation between the competent authorities of the Contracting States in the form of exchanges of information necessary for carrying out the provisions of the Convention or of their domestic laws concerning taxes covered by the Convention. Article 26 and the Commentary do not restrict the possibilities of assistance to the three methods of exchanging information mentioned in the Commentary (exchange on request, spontaneous exchanges, and automatic exchanges).

4.83

Simultaneous tax examinations may be authorised outside the context of double tax treaties. For example, Article 12 of the Nordic Convention on Mutual Assistance in Tax Matters governs exchange of information and assistance in tax collection between the Nordic countries and provides for the possibility of simultaneous tax examinations. This convention gives common guidelines for the selection of cases and for carrying out such examinations. Article 8 of the joint Council of Europe and OECD Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters also provides expressly for the possibility of simultaneous tax examinations.

4.84

In all cases the information obtained by the tax administration of a state has to be treated as confidential under its domestic legislation and may be used only for certain tax purposes and disclosed only to certain persons and authorities involved in specifically defined tax matters covered by the tax treaty or mutual assistance agreement. The taxpayers affected are normally notified of the fact that they have been selected for a simultaneous examination and in some jurisdictions they may have the right to be informed when the tax administrations are considering a simultaneous tax examination or when information will be transmitted in conformity with Article 26. In such cases, the competent authority should inform its counterpart in the foreign state that such disclosure will occur.

D.3. Simultaneous tax examinations and transfer pricing

4.85

In selecting transfer pricing cases for simultaneous examinations, there may be major obstacles caused by the differences in time limits for conducting examinations or making assessments in different jurisdictions and the different tax periods open for examination. However, these problems may be mitigated by an early exchange of examination schedules between the relevant competent authorities to find out in which cases the tax examination periods coincide and to synchronise future examination periods. While at first glance an early exchange of examination schedules would seem beneficial, some jurisdictions have found that the chances of a treaty partner accepting a proposal are considerably better when one is able to present issues more comprehensively to justify a simultaneous examination.

4.86

Once a case is selected for a simultaneous examination it is customary for tax inspectors or examiners to meet, to plan, to co-ordinate and to follow closely the progress of the simultaneous tax examination. Especially in complex cases, meetings of the tax inspectors or examiners concerned may also be held with taxpayer participation to clarify factual issues. In those jurisdictions where the taxpayer has the right to be consulted before information is transferred to another tax administration, this procedure should also be followed in the context of a simultaneous examination. In this situation, that tax administration should inform in advance its treaty partners that it is subject to this requirement before the simultaneous examination is begun.

4.87

Simultaneous tax examinations may be a useful instrument to determine the correct tax liability of associated enterprises in cases where, for example, costs are shared or charged and profits are allocated between taxpayers in different taxing jurisdictions or more generally where transfer pricing issues are involved. Simultaneous tax examinations may facilitate an exchange of information on multinational business practices, complex transactions, cost contribution arrangements, and profit allocation methods in special fields such as global trading and innovative financial transactions. As a result, tax administrations may acquire a better understanding of and insight into the overall activities of an MNE and obtain extended possibilities of comparison and checking international transactions. Simultaneous tax examinations may also support the industry-wide exchange of information, which is aimed at developing knowledge of taxpayer behaviour, practices and trends within an industry, and other information that might be suitable beyond the specific cases examined.

4.88

One objective of simultaneous tax examinations is to promote compliance with transfer pricing regulations. Obtaining the necessary information and determining the facts and circumstances about such matters as the transfer pricing conditions of controlled transactions between associated enterprises in two or more tax jurisdictions may be difficult for a tax administration, especially in cases where the taxpayer in its jurisdiction does not co-operate or fails to provide the necessary information in due time. The simultaneous tax examination process can help tax administrations to establish these facts faster and more effectively and economically.

4.89

The process also might allow for the identification of potential transfer pricing disputes at an early stage, thereby minimising litigation with taxpayers. This could happen when, based upon the information obtained in the course of a simultaneous tax examination, the participating tax examiners or inspectors have the opportunity to discuss any differences in opinion with regard to the transfer pricing conditions which exist between the associated enterprises and are able to reconcile these contentions. When such a process is undertaken, the tax examiners or inspectors concerned should, as far as possible, arrive at concurring statements as to the determination and evaluation of the facts and circumstances of the controlled transactions between the associated enterprises, stating any disagreements about the evaluation of facts, and any differences with respect to the legal treatment of the transfer pricing conditions which exist between the associated enterprises. Such statements could then serve as a basis for subsequent mutual agreement procedures and perhaps obviate the problems caused by one jurisdiction examining the affairs of a taxpayer long after the treaty partner country has finally settled the tax liability of the relevant associated enterprise. For example, such an approach could minimise mutual agreement procedure difficulties due to the lack of relevant information.

4.90

In some cases the simultaneous tax examination procedure may allow the participating tax administrations to reach an agreement on the transfer pricing conditions of a controlled transaction between the associated enterprises. Where an agreement is reached, corresponding adjustments may be made at an early stage, thus avoiding time-limit impediments and economic double taxation to the extent possible. In addition, if the agreement about the associated enterprises’ transfer pricing is reached with the taxpayers’ consent, time-consuming and expensive litigation may be avoided.

4.91

Even if no agreement between the tax administrations can be reached in the course of a simultaneous tax examination with respect to the associated enterprises’ transfer pricing, the OECD Model Agreement envisions that either associated enterprise may be able to present a request for the opening of a mutual agreement procedure to avoid economic double taxation at an earlier stage than it would have if there were no simultaneous tax examination. If this is the case, then simultaneous tax examinations may significantly reduce the time span between a tax administration’s adjustments made to a taxpayer’s tax liability and the implementation of a mutual agreement procedure. Moreover, the OECD Model Agreement envisions that simultaneous tax examinations may facilitate mutual agreement procedures, because tax administrations will be able to build up more complete factual evidence for those tax adjustments for which a mutual agreement procedure may be requested by a taxpayer. Based upon the determination and evaluation of facts and the proposed tax treatment of the transfer pricing issues concerned as set forth in the tax administrations’ statements described above, the practical operation of the mutual agreement procedure may be improved significantly, allowing the competent authorities to reach an agreement more easily.

4.92

The associated enterprises may also benefit from simultaneous tax examinations from the savings of time and resources due to the co-ordination of inquiries from the tax administrations involved and the avoidance of duplication. In addition, the simultaneous involvement of two or more tax administrations in the examination of transfer pricing between associated enterprises may provide the opportunity for an MNE to take a more active role in resolving its transfer pricing issues. By presenting the relevant facts and arguments to each of the participating tax administrations during the simultaneous tax examination the associated enterprises may help avoid misunderstandings and facilitate the tax administrations’ concurring determination and evaluation of their transfer pricing conditions. Thus, the associated enterprises may obtain certainty with regard to their transfer pricing at an early stage. See paragraph 4.79.

D.4. Recommendation on the use of simultaneous tax examinations

4.93

As a result of the increased use of simultaneous tax examinations among OECD member countries, the Committee on Fiscal Affairs decided it would be useful to draft the OECD Model Agreement for those countries that are able and wish to engage in this type of co-operation. On 23 July 1992, the Council of the OECD made a recommendation to member countries to use this Model Agreement, which provides guidelines on the legal and practical aspects of this form of co-operation.

4.94

With the increasing internationalisation of trade and business and the complexity of transactions of MNEs, transfer pricing issues have become more and more important. Simultaneous tax examinations can alleviate the difficulties experienced by both taxpayers and tax administrations connected with the transfer pricing of MNEs. A greater use of simultaneous tax examinations is therefore recommended in the examination of transfer pricing cases and to facilitate exchange of information and the operation of mutual agreement procedures. In a simultaneous examination, if a reassessment is made, both jurisdictions involved should endeavour to reach a result that avoids double taxation for the MNE group.

E. Safe harbours

E.1. Introduction

4.95

Applying the arm’s length principle can be a resource-intensive process. It may impose a heavy administrative burden on taxpayers and tax administrations that can be exacerbated by both complex rules and resulting compliance demands. These facts have led OECD member countries to consider whether and when safe harbour rules would be appropriate in the transfer pricing area.

4.96

When these Guidelines were adopted in 1995, the view expressed regarding safe harbour rules was generally negative. It was suggested that while safe harbours could simplify transfer pricing compliance and administration, safe harbour rules may raise fundamental problems that could potentially have perverse effects on the pricing decisions of enterprises engaged in controlled transactions. It was suggested that unilateral safe harbours may have a negative impact on the tax revenues of the jurisdiction implementing the safe harbour, as well as on the tax revenues of jurisdictions whose associated enterprises engage in controlled transactions with taxpayers electing a safe harbour. It was further suggested that safe harbours may not be compatible with the arm’s length principle. Therefore, it was concluded that transfer pricing safe harbours are not generally advisable, and consequently the use of safe harbours was not recommended.

4.97

Despite these generally negative conclusions, a number of jurisdictions have adopted safe harbour rules. Those rules have generally been applied to smaller taxpayers and/or less complex transactions. They are generally evaluated favourably by both tax administrations and taxpayers, who indicate that the benefits of safe harbours outweigh the related concerns when such rules are carefully targeted and prescribed and when efforts are made to avoid the problems that could arise from poorly considered safe harbour regimes.

4.98

The appropriateness of safe harbours can be expected to be most apparent when they are directed at taxpayers and/or transactions which involve low transfer pricing risks and when they are adopted on a bilateral or multilateral basis. It should be recognised that a safe harbour provision does not bind or limit in any way any tax administration other than the tax administration that has expressly adopted the safe harbour.

4.99

Although safe harbours primarily benefit taxpayers, by providing for a more optimal use of resources, they can benefit tax administrations as well. Tax administrations can shift audit and examination resources from smaller taxpayers and less complex transactions (which may typically be resolved in practice on a consistent basis as to both transfer pricing methodology and actual results) to more complex, higher-risk cases. At the same time, taxpayers can price eligible transactions and file their tax returns with more certainty and with lower compliance burdens. However, the design of safe harbours requires careful attention to concerns about the degree of approximation to arm’s length prices that would be permitted in determining transfer prices under safe harbour rules for eligible taxpayers, the potential for creating inappropriate tax planning opportunities including double non-taxation of income, equitable treatment of similarly situated taxpayers, and the potential for double taxation resulting from the possible incompatibility of the safe harbours with the arm’s length principle or with the practices of other jurisdictions.

4.100

The following discussion considers the benefits of, and concerns regarding, safe harbour provisions and provides guidance regarding the circumstances in which safe harbours may be applied in a transfer pricing system based on the arm’s length principle.

E.2. Definition and concept of safe harbours

4.101

Some of the difficulties that arise in applying the arm’s length principle may be avoided by providing circumstances in which eligible taxpayers may elect to follow a simple set of prescribed transfer pricing rules in connection with clearly and carefully defined transactions, or may be exempted from the application of the general transfer pricing rules. In the former case, prices established under such rules would be automatically accepted by the tax administrations that have expressly adopted such rules. These elective provisions are often referred to as “safe harbours”.

4.102

A safe harbour in a transfer pricing regime is a provision that applies to a defined category of taxpayers or transactions and that relieves eligible taxpayers from certain obligations otherwise imposed by a jurisdiction’s general transfer pricing rules. A safe harbour substitutes simpler obligations for those under the general transfer pricing regime. Such a provision could, for example, allow taxpayers to establish transfer prices in a specific way, e.g. by applying a simplified transfer pricing approach provided by the tax administration. Alternatively, a safe harbour could exempt a defined category of taxpayers or transactions from the application of all or part of the general transfer pricing rules. Often, eligible taxpayers complying with the safe harbour provision will be relieved from burdensome compliance obligations, including some or all associated transfer pricing documentation requirements.

4.103

For purposes of the discussion in this Section, safe harbours do not include administrative simplification measures which do not directly involve determination of arm’s length prices, e.g. simplified, or exemption from, documentation requirements (in the absence of a pricing determination), and procedures whereby a tax administration and a taxpayer agree on transfer pricing in advance of the controlled transactions (advance pricing arrangements), which are discussed in Section F of this chapter. The discussion in this section also does not extend to tax provisions designed to prevent “excessive” debt in a foreign subsidiary (“thin capitalisation” rules).

4.104

Although they would not fully meet the foregoing description of a safe harbour, it may be the case that some jurisdictions adopt other administrative simplification measures that use presumptions to realise some of the benefits discussed in this Section. For example, a rebuttable presumption might be established under which a mandatory pricing target would be established by a tax authority, subject to a taxpayer’s right to demonstrate that its transfer price is consistent with the arm’s length principle. Under such a system, it would be essential that the taxpayer does not bear a higher burden to demonstrate its price is consistent with the arm’s length principle than it would if no such system were in place. In any such system, it would be essential to permit resolution of cases of double taxation arising from application of the mandatory presumption through the mutual agreement process.

E.3. Benefits of safe harbours

4.105

The basic benefits of safe harbours are as follows:

1. Simplifying compliance and reducing compliance costs for eligible taxpayers in determining and documenting appropriate conditions for qualifying controlled transactions;

2. Providing certainty to eligible taxpayers that the price charged or paid on qualifying controlled transactions will be accepted by the tax administrations that have adopted the safe harbour with a limited audit or without an audit beyond ensuring the taxpayer has met the eligibility conditions of, and complied with, the safe harbour provisions;

3. Permitting tax administrations to redirect their administrative resources from the examination of lower risk transactions to examinations of more complex or higher risk transactions and taxpayers.

E.3.1. Compliance relief

4.106

Application of the arm’s length principle may require collection and analysis of data that may be difficult or costly to obtain and/or evaluate. In certain cases, such compliance burdens may be disproportionate to the size of the taxpayer, its functions performed, and the transfer pricing risks inherent in its controlled transactions.

4.107

Properly designed safe harbours may significantly ease compliance burdens by eliminating data collection and associated documentation requirements in exchange for the taxpayer pricing qualifying transactions within the parameters set by the safe harbour. Especially in areas where transfer pricing risks are small, and the burden of compliance and documentation is disproportionate to the transfer pricing exposure, such a trade-off may be mutually advantageous to taxpayers and tax administrations. Under a safe harbour, taxpayers would be able to establish transfer prices which will not be challenged by tax administrations providing the safe harbour without being obligated to search for comparable transactions or expend resources to demonstrate transfer pricing compliance to such tax administrations.

E.3.2. Certainty

4.108

Another advantage provided by a safe harbour is the certainty that the taxpayer’s transfer prices will be accepted by the tax administration providing the safe harbour, provided they have met the eligibility conditions of, and complied with, the safe harbour provisions. The tax administration would accept, with limited or no scrutiny, transfer prices within the safe harbour parameters. Taxpayers could be provided with relevant parameters which would provide a transfer price deemed appropriate by the tax administration for the qualifying transaction.

E.3.3. Administrative simplicity

4.109

A safe harbour would result in a degree of administrative simplicity for the tax administration. Although the eligibility of particular taxpayers or transactions for the safe harbour would need to be carefully evaluated, depending on the specific safe harbour provision, such evaluations would not necessarily have to be performed by auditors with transfer pricing expertise. Once eligibility for the safe harbour has been established, qualifying taxpayers would require minimal examination with respect to the transfer prices of controlled transactions qualifying for the safe harbour. This would enable tax administrations to secure tax revenues in low risk situations with a limited commitment of administrative resources and to concentrate their efforts on the examination of more complex or higher risk transactions and taxpayers. A safe harbour may also increase the level of compliance among small taxpayers that may otherwise believe their transfer pricing practices will escape scrutiny.

E.4. Concerns over safe harbours

4.110

The availability of safe harbours for a given category of taxpayers or transactions may have adverse consequences. These concerns stem from the fact that:

1. The implementation of a safe harbour in a given jurisdiction may lead to taxable income being reported that is not in accordance with the arm’s length principle;

2. Safe harbours may increase the risk of double taxation or double non-taxation when adopted unilaterally;

3. Safe harbours potentially open avenues for inappropriate tax planning, and

4. Safe harbours may raise issues of equity and uniformity.

E.4.1. Divergence from the arm’s length principle

4.111

Where a safe harbour provides a simplified transfer pricing approach, it may not correspond in all cases to the most appropriate method applicable to the facts and circumstances of the taxpayer under the general transfer pricing provisions. For example, a safe harbour might require the use of a particular method when the taxpayer could otherwise have determined that another method was the most appropriate method under the facts and circumstances. Such an occurrence could be considered as inconsistent with the arm’s length principle, which requires the use of the most appropriate method.

4.112

Safe harbours involve a trade-off between strict compliance with the arm’s length principle and administrability. They are not tailored to fit exactly the varying facts and circumstances of individual taxpayers and transactions. The degree of approximation of prices determined under the safe harbour with prices determined in accordance with the arm’s length principle could be improved by collecting, collating, and frequently updating a pool of information regarding prices and pricing developments in respect of the relevant types of transactions between uncontrolled parties of the relevant nature. However, such efforts to set safe harbour parameters accurately enough to satisfy the arm’s length principle could erode the administrative simplicity of the safe harbour.

4.113

Any potential disadvantages to taxpayers from safe harbours diverging from arm’s length pricing are avoided when taxpayers have the option to either elect the safe harbour or price transactions in accordance with the arm’s length principle. With such an approach, taxpayers that believe the safe harbour would require them to report an amount of income exceeding the arm’s length amount could apply the general transfer pricing rules. While such an approach can limit the divergence from arm’s length pricing under a safe harbour regime, it would also limit the administrative benefits of the safe harbour to the tax administration. Moreover, tax administrations would need to consider the potential loss of tax revenue from such an approach where taxpayers will pay tax only on the lesser of the safe harbour amount or the arm’s length amount. Jurisdictions may also be concerned over the ability of taxpayers to opt in and out of a safe harbour, depending on whether the use of the safe harbour is favourable to the taxpayer in a particular year. Jurisdictions may be able to gain greater comfort regarding this risk by controlling the conditions under which a taxpayer can be eligible for the safe harbour, for example by requiring taxpayers to notify the tax authority in advance of using the safe harbour or to commit to its use for a certain number of years.

E.4.2. Risk of double taxation, double non-taxation, and mutual agreement concerns

4.114

One major concern raised by a safe harbour is that it may increase the risk of double taxation. If a tax administration sets safe harbour parameters at levels either above or below arm’s length prices in order to increase reported profits in its jurisdiction, it may induce taxpayers to modify the prices that they would otherwise have charged or paid to controlled parties, in order to avoid transfer pricing scrutiny in the safe harbour jurisdiction. The concern of possible overstatement of taxable income in the jurisdiction providing the safe harbour is greater where that jurisdiction imposes significant penalties for understatement of tax or failure to meet documentation requirements, with the result that there may be added incentives to ensure that the transfer pricing is accepted in that jurisdiction without further review.

4.115

If the safe harbour causes taxpayers to report income above arm’s length levels, it would work to the benefit of the tax administration providing the safe harbour, as more taxable income would be reported by such domestic taxpayers. On the other hand, the safe harbour may lead to less taxable income being reported in the tax jurisdiction of the foreign associated enterprise that is the other party to the transaction. The other tax administrations may then challenge prices derived from the application of a safe harbour, with the result that the taxpayer would face the prospect of double taxation. Accordingly, any administrative benefits gained by the tax administration of the safe harbour jurisdiction would potentially be obtained at the expense of other jurisdictions which, in order to protect their own tax base, would have to determine systematically whether the prices or results permitted under the safe harbour are consistent with what would be obtained by the application of their own transfer pricing rules. The administrative burden saved by the jurisdiction offering the safe harbour would therefore be shifted to the foreign jurisdictions.

4.116

In cases involving smaller taxpayers or less complex transactions, the benefits of safe harbours may outweigh the problems raised by such provisions. Provided the safe harbour is elective, taxpayers may consider that a moderate level of double taxation, if any arises because of the safe harbour, is an acceptable price to be paid in order to obtain relief from the necessity of complying with complex transfer pricing rules. One may argue that the taxpayer is capable of making its own decision in electing the safe harbour as to whether the possibility of double taxation is acceptable or not.

4.117

Where safe harbours are adopted unilaterally, care should be taken in setting safe harbour parameters to avoid double taxation, and the jurisdiction adopting the safe harbour should generally be prepared to consider modification of the safe-harbour outcome in individual cases under mutual agreement procedures to mitigate the risk of double taxation. At a minimum, in order to ensure that taxpayers make decisions on a fully informed basis, the jurisdiction offering the safe harbour would need to make it explicit in advance whether or not it would attempt to alleviate any eventual double taxation resulting from the use of the safe harbour. Obviously, if a safe harbour is not elective and if the jurisdiction in question refuses to consider double tax relief, the risk of double taxation arising from the safe harbour would be unacceptably high and inconsistent with double tax relief provisions of treaties.

4.118

On the other hand, if a unilateral safe harbour permits taxpayers to report income below arm’s length levels in the jurisdiction providing the safe harbour, taxpayers would have an incentive to elect application of the safe harbour. In such a case, there would be no assurance that the taxpayer would report income in other jurisdictions on a consistent basis or at levels above arm’s length levels based on the safe harbour. Moreover it is unlikely that other tax administrations would have the authority to require that income be reported above arm’s length levels. While the burden of under-taxation in such situations would fall exclusively upon the jurisdiction adopting the safe harbour provision, and should not adversely affect the ability of other jurisdictions to tax arm’s length amounts of income, double non-taxation would be unavoidable and could result in distortions of investment and trade.

4.119

It is important to observe that the problems of non-arm’s length results and potential double taxation and double non-taxation arising under safe harbours could be largely eliminated if safe harbours were adopted on a bilateral or multilateral basis by means of competent authority agreements between jurisdictions. Under such a procedure, two or more jurisdictions could, by agreement, define a category of taxpayers and/or transactions to which a safe harbour provision would apply and by agreement establish pricing parameters that would be accepted by each of the contracting jurisdictions if consistently applied in each of the jurisdictions. Such agreements could be published in advance and taxpayers could consistently report results in each of the affected jurisdictions in accordance with the agreement.

4.120

The rigor of having two or more jurisdictions with potentially divergent interests agree to such a safe harbour should serve to limit some of the arbitrariness that otherwise might characterise a unilateral safe harbour and would largely eliminate safe harbour-created double taxation and double non-taxation concerns. Particularly for some smaller taxpayers and/or less complex transactions, creation of bilateral or multilateral safe harbours by competent authority agreement may provide a worthwhile approach to transfer pricing simplification that would avoid some of the potential pitfalls of unilateral safe harbour regimes.

4.121

The Annex I to Chapter IV of these Guidelines contains sample memoranda of understanding that competent authorities might use to establish bilateral or multilateral safe harbours in appropriate situations for common classes of transfer pricing cases. The use of these sample memoranda of understanding should not be considered as either mandatory or prescriptive in establishing bilateral or multilateral safe harbours. Rather, they are intended to provide a possible framework for adaptation to the particular needs of the tax authorities of the jurisdictions concerned.

E.4.3. Possibility of opening avenues for tax planning

4.122

Safe harbours may also provide taxpayers with tax planning opportunities. Enterprises may have an incentive to modify their transfer prices in order to shift taxable income to other jurisdictions. This may also possibly induce tax avoidance, to the extent that artificial arrangements are entered into for the purpose of exploiting the safe harbour provisions. For instance, if safe harbours apply to “simple” or “small” transactions, taxpayers may be tempted to break transactions up into parts to make them seem simple or small.

4.123

If a safe harbour were based on an industry average, tax planning opportunities might exist for taxpayers with better than average profitability. For example, a cost-efficient company selling at the arm’s length price may be earning a mark-up of 15% on controlled sales. If a jurisdiction adopts a safe harbour requiring a 10% mark-up, the company might have an incentive to comply with the safe harbour and shift the remaining 5% to a lower tax jurisdiction. Consequently, taxable income would be shifted out of the jurisdiction. When applied on a large scale, this could mean significant revenue loss for the jurisdiction offering the safe harbour.

4.124

This concern may largely be avoided by the solution noted in paragraph 4.119 of adopting safe harbours on a bilateral or multilateral basis, thus limiting application of safe harbours to transactions involving jurisdictions with similar transfer pricing concerns. In adopting bilateral and multilateral safe harbours, tax administrations would need to be aware that the establishment of an extensive network of such arrangements could potentially encourage “safe harbour shopping” via the routing of transactions through territories with more favourable safe harbours and take appropriate steps to avoid that possibility. Similarly, jurisdictions adopting bilateral safe harbours would be well advised to target fairly narrow ranges of acceptable results and to require consistent reporting of income in each jurisdiction that is a party to the safe harbour arrangement. Treaty exchange of information provisions could be used by jurisdictions where necessary to confirm the use of consistent reporting under such a bilateral safe harbour.

4.125

Whether a jurisdiction is prepared to possibly suffer some erosion of its own tax base in implementing a safe harbour is for that jurisdiction to decide. The basic trade-off in making such a policy decision is between the certainty and administrative simplicity of the safe harbour for taxpayers and tax administrations on the one hand, and the possibility of tax revenue erosion on the other.

E.4.4. Equity and uniformity issues

4.126

Safe harbours may raise equity and uniformity issues. By implementing a safe harbour, one would create two distinct sets of rules in the transfer pricing area. Clearly and carefully designed criteria are required to differentiate those taxpayers or transactions eligible for the safe harbour to minimise the possibility of similar and possibly competing taxpayers finding themselves on opposite sides of the safe harbour threshold or, conversely, of allowing application of the safe harbour to unintended taxpayers or transactions. Insufficiently precise criteria could result in similar taxpayers receiving different tax treatment: one being permitted to meet the safe harbour rules and thus to be relieved from general transfer pricing compliance provisions, and the other being obliged to price its transactions in conformity with the general transfer pricing compliance provisions. Preferential tax treatment under safe harbour regimes for a specific category of taxpayers could potentially entail discrimination and competitive distortions. The adoption of bilateral or multilateral safe harbours could, in some circumstances, increase the potential of a divergence in tax treatment, not merely between different but similar taxpayers but also between similar transactions carried out by the same taxpayer with associated enterprises in different jurisdictions.

E.5. Recommendations on use of safe harbours

4.127

Transfer pricing compliance and administration is often complex, time consuming and costly. Properly designed safe harbour provisions, applied in appropriate circumstances, can help to relieve some of these burdens and provide taxpayers with greater certainty.

4.128

Safe harbour provisions may raise issues such as potentially having perverse effects on the pricing decisions of enterprises engaged in controlled transactions and a negative impact on the tax revenues of the jurisdiction implementing the safe harbour as well as on the jurisdictions whose associated enterprises engage in controlled transactions with taxpayers electing a safe harbour. Further, unilateral safe harbours may lead to the potential for double taxation or double non-taxation.

4.129

However, in cases involving smaller taxpayers or less complex transactions, the benefits of safe harbours may outweigh the problems raised by such provisions. Making such safe harbours elective to taxpayers can further limit the divergence from arm’s length pricing. Where jurisdictions adopt safe harbours, willingness to modify safe-harbour outcomes in mutual agreement proceedings to limit the potential risk of double taxation is advisable.

4.130

Where safe harbours can be negotiated on a bilateral or multilateral basis, they may provide significant relief from compliance burdens and administrative complexity without creating problems of double taxation or double non-taxation. Therefore, the use of bilateral or multilateral safe harbours under the right circumstances should be encouraged.

4.131

It should be clearly recognised that a safe harbour, whether adopted on a unilateral or bilateral basis, is in no way binding on or precedential for jurisdictions which have not themselves adopted the safe harbour.

4.132

For more complex and higher risk transfer pricing matters, it is unlikely that safe harbours will provide a workable alternative to a rigorous, case by case application of the arm’s length principle under the provisions of these Guidelines.

4.133

Tax administrations in each jurisdiction should carefully weigh the benefits of and concerns regarding safe harbours, making use of such provisions where they deem it appropriate.

F. Advance pricing arrangements6

Footnote 6
  1. Additional guidance for conducting Advance Pricing Arrangements under the Mutual Agreement Procedure is found in Annex II to Chapter IV.

F.1. Definition and concept of advance pricing arrangements

4.134

An advance pricing arrangement (APA) is an arrangement that determines, in advance of controlled transactions, an appropriate set of criteria (e.g. method, comparables and appropriate adjustments thereto, critical assumptions as to future events) for the determination of the transfer pricing for those transactions over a fixed period of time. An APA is formally initiated by a taxpayer and requires negotiations between the taxpayer, one or more associated enterprises, and one or more tax administrations. APAs are intended to supplement the traditional administrative, judicial, and treaty mechanisms for resolving transfer pricing issues. They may be most useful when traditional mechanisms fail or are difficult to apply. Detailed guidelines for conducting advance pricing arrangements under the mutual agreement procedure (MAP APAs) were adopted in October 1999 and are found as an Annex to this chapter. The work pursuant to Action 14 of the BEPS Action Plan to ensure the timely, effective and efficient resolution of treaty-related disputes recommended, as non-binding best practice 4, that jurisdictions should implement bilateral APA programmes as soon as they have the capacity to do so, recognising that APAs provide a greater level of certainty in both treaty partner jurisdictions, lessen the likelihood of double taxation and may proactively prevent transfer pricing disputes. In this regard, it should be noted that the country mutual agreement procedure profiles prepared pursuant to element 2.2 of the Action 14 minimum standard include information on the bilateral APA programmes.

4.135

One key issue in the concept of APAs is how specific they can be in prescribing a taxpayer’s transfer pricing over a period of years, for example whether only the transfer pricing methodology or more particular results can be fixed in a particular case. In general, great care must be taken if the APA goes beyond the methodology, the way it will be applied, and the critical assumptions, because more specific conclusions rely on predictions about future events.

4.136

The reliability of any prediction used in an APA depends both on the nature of the prediction and the critical assumptions on which the prediction is based. For example, it would not be reasonable to assert that the arm’s length short-term borrowing rate for a certain corporation on intra-group borrowings will remain at 6% during the entire coming three years. It would be more plausible to predict that the rate will be LIBOR plus a fixed percentage. The prediction would become even more reliable if an appropriate critical assumption were added regarding the company’s credit rating (e.g. the addition to LIBOR will change if the credit rating changes).

4.137

As another example, it would not be appropriate to specify a profit split formula between associated enterprises if it is expected that the allocation of functions between the enterprises will be unstable. It would, however, be possible to prescribe a profit split formula if the role of each enterprise were articulated in critical assumptions. In certain cases, it might even be possible to make a reasonable prediction on the appropriateness of an actual profit split ratio if enough assumptions were provided.

4.138

In deciding how specific an APA can be in a particular case, tax administrations should recognise that predictions of absolute future profit experience seems least plausible. It may be possible to use profit ratios of independent enterprises as comparables, but these also are often volatile and hard to predict. Use of appropriate critical assumptions and use of ranges may enhance the reliability of predictions. Historical data in the industry in question can also be a guide.

4.139

In sum, the reliability of a prediction depends on the facts and circumstances of each actual case. Taxpayers and tax administrations need to pay close attention to the reliability of a prediction when considering the scope of an APA. Unreliable predictions should not be included in APAs. The appropriateness of a method and its application can usually be predicted, and the relevant critical assumptions made, with more reliability than future results (price or profit level).

4.140

Some jurisdictions allow for unilateral arrangements where the tax administration and the taxpayer in its jurisdiction establish an arrangement without the involvement of other interested tax administrations. However, a unilateral APA may affect the tax liability of associated enterprises in other tax jurisdictions. Where unilateral APAs are permitted, the competent authorities of other interested jurisdictions should be informed about the procedure as early as possible to determine whether they are willing and able to consider a bilateral arrangement under the mutual agreement procedure. In any event, jurisdictions should not include in any unilateral APA they may conclude with a taxpayer a requirement that the taxpayer waive access to the mutual agreement procedure if a transfer pricing dispute arises, and if another jurisdiction raises a transfer pricing adjustment with respect to a transaction or issue covered by the unilateral APA, the first jurisdiction is encouraged to consider the appropriateness of a corresponding adjustment and not to view the unilateral APA as an irreversible settlement.

4.141

Because of concerns over double taxation, most jurisdictions prefer bilateral or multilateral APAs (i.e. an arrangement in which two or more jurisdictions concur), and indeed some jurisdictions will not grant a unilateral APA (i.e. an arrangement between the taxpayer and one tax administration) to taxpayers in their jurisdiction. The bilateral (or multilateral) approach is far more likely to ensure that the arrangements will reduce the risk of double taxation, will be equitable to all tax administrations and taxpayers involved, and will provide greater certainty to the taxpayers concerned. It is also the case in some jurisdictions that domestic provisions do not permit the tax administrations to enter into binding agreements directly with the taxpayers, so that APAs can be concluded with the competent authority of a treaty partner only under the mutual agreement procedure. For purposes of the discussion in this section, an APA is not intended to include a unilateral arrangement except where specific reference to a unilateral APA is made.

4.142

Tax administrations may find APAs particularly useful in profit allocation or income attribution issues arising in the context of global securities and commodity trading operations, and also in handling multilateral cost contribution arrangements. The concept of APAs also may be useful in resolving issues raised under Article 7 of the OECD Model Tax Convention relating to allocation problems, permanent establishments, and branch operations.

4.143

APAs, including unilateral ones, differ in some ways from more traditional private rulings that some tax administrations issue to taxpayers. An APA generally deals with factual issues, whereas more traditional private rulings tend to be limited to addressing questions of a legal nature based on facts presented by a taxpayer. The facts underlying a private ruling request may not be questioned by the tax administration, whereas in an APA the facts are likely to be thoroughly analysed and investigated. In addition, an APA usually covers several transactions, several types of transactions on a continuing basis, or all of a taxpayer’s international transactions for a given period of time. In contrast, a private ruling request usually is binding only for a particular transaction.

4.144

The co-operation of the associated enterprises is vital to a successful APA negotiation. For example, the associated enterprises ordinarily would be expected to provide the tax administrations with the methodology that they consider most reasonable under the particular facts and circumstances. The associated enterprises also should submit documentation supporting the reasonableness of their proposal, which would include, for example, data relating to the industry, markets, and jurisdictions to be covered by the agreement. In addition, the associated enterprises may identify uncontrolled businesses that are comparable or similar to the associated enterprises’ businesses in terms of the economic activities performed and the transfer pricing conditions, e.g. economic costs and risks incurred, and perform a functional analysis as described in Chapter I of these Guidelines.

4.145

Typically, associated enterprises are allowed to participate in the process of obtaining an APA, by presenting the case to and negotiating with the tax administrations concerned, providing necessary information, and reaching agreement on the transfer pricing issues. From the associated enterprises’ perspective, this ability to participate may be seen as an advantage over the conventional mutual agreement procedure.

4.146

At the conclusion of an APA process, the tax administrations should provide confirmation to the associated enterprises in their jurisdiction that no transfer pricing adjustment will be made as long as the taxpayer follows the terms of the arrangements. There should also be a provision in an APA (perhaps by reference to a range) that provides for possible revision or cancellation of the arrangement for future years when business operations change significantly, or when uncontrolled economic circumstances (e.g. significant changes in currency exchange rates) critically affect the reliability of the methodology in a manner that independent enterprises would consider significant for purposes of their transfer pricing.

4.147

An APA may cover all of the transfer pricing issues of a taxpayer (as is preferred by some jurisdictions) or may provide a flexibility to the taxpayer to limit the APA request to specified affiliates and intercompany transactions. An APA would apply to prospective years and transactions and the actual term would depend on the industry, products or transactions involved. The associated enterprises may limit their request to specified prospective tax years. An APA can provide an opportunity to apply the agreed transfer pricing methodology to resolve similar transfer pricing issues in open prior years. However, this application would require the agreement of the tax administration, the taxpayer, and, where appropriate, the treaty partner. Element 2.7 of the Action 14 minimum standard states that jurisdictions with bilateral APA programmes should provide for the roll-back of APAs (to previous filed tax years not included within the original scope of the APA) in appropriate cases, subject to the applicable time limits (such as domestic law statutes of limitation for assessments) where the relevant facts and circumstances in the earlier tax years are the same and subject to the verification of these facts and circumstances on audit.

4.148

Each tax administration involved in the APA will naturally wish to monitor compliance with the APA by the taxpayers in its jurisdiction, and this is generally done in two ways. First, it may require a taxpayer that has entered into an APA to file annual reports demonstrating the extent of its compliance with the terms and conditions of the APA and that critical assumptions remain relevant. Second, the tax administration may continue to examine the taxpayer as part of the regular audit cycle but without re-evaluating the methodology. Instead, the tax administration may limit the examination of the transfer pricing to verifying the initial data relevant to the APA proposal and determining whether or not the taxpayer has complied with the terms and conditions of the APA. With regard to transfer pricing, a tax administration may also examine the reliability and accuracy of the representations in the APA and annual reports and the accuracy and consistency of how the particular methodology has been applied. All other issues not associated with the APA fall under regular audit jurisdiction.

4.149

An APA should be subject to cancellation, even retroactively, in the case of fraud or misrepresentation of information during an APA negotiation, or when a taxpayer fails to comply with the terms and conditions of an APA. Where an APA is proposed to be cancelled or revoked, the tax administration proposing the action should notify the other tax administrations of its intention and of the reasons for such action.

F.2. Possible approaches for legal and administrative rules governing advance pricing arrangements

4.150

APAs involving the competent authority of a treaty partner should be considered within the scope of the mutual agreement procedure under Article 25 of the OECD Model Tax Convention, even though such arrangements are not expressly mentioned there. Paragraph 3 of that Article provides that the competent authorities shall endeavour to resolve by mutual agreement any difficulties or doubts arising as to the interpretation or application of the Convention. Although paragraph 50 of the Commentary indicates that the matters covered by this paragraph are difficulties of a general nature concerning a category of taxpayers, it specifically acknowledges that the issues may arise in connection with an individual case. In a number of cases, APAs arise from cases where the application of transfer pricing to a particular category of taxpayer gives rise to doubts and difficulties. Paragraph 3 of Article 25 also indicates that the competent authorities may consult together for the elimination of double taxation in cases not provided for in the Convention. Bilateral APAs should fall within this provision because they have as one of their objectives the avoidance of double taxation. Even though the Convention provides for transfer pricing adjustments, it specifies no particular methodologies or procedures other than the arm’s length principle as set out in Article 9. Thus, it could be considered that APAs are authorised by paragraph 3 of Article 25 because the specific transfer pricing cases subject to an APA are not otherwise provided for in the Convention. The exchange of information provision in Article 26 also could facilitate APAs, as it provides for co-operation between competent authorities in the form of exchanges of information.

4.151

Tax administrations might additionally rely on general domestic authority to administer taxes as the authority for entering into APAs. In some jurisdictions tax administrations may be able to issue specific administrative or procedural guidelines to taxpayers describing the appropriate tax treatment of transactions and the appropriate pricing methodology. As mentioned above, the tax codes of some OECD member countries include provisions that allow taxpayers to obtain specific rulings for different purposes. Even though these rulings were not designed specifically to cover APAs, they may be broad enough to be used to include APAs.

4.152

Some jurisdictions lack the basis in their domestic law to enter into APAs. However, when a tax convention contains a clause regarding the mutual agreement procedure similar to Article 25 of the OECD Model Tax Convention, the competent authorities generally should be allowed to conclude an APA, if transfer pricing issues were otherwise likely to result in double taxation, or would raise difficulties or doubts as to the interpretation or application of the Convention. Such an arrangement would be legally binding for both States and would create rights for the taxpayers involved. Inasmuch as double tax treaties take precedence over domestic law, the lack of a basis in domestic law to enter into APAs would not prevent application of APAs on the basis of a mutual agreement procedure.

F.3. Advantages of advance pricing arrangements

4.153

An APA programme can assist taxpayers by eliminating uncertainty through enhancing the predictability of tax treatment in international transactions. Provided the critical assumptions are met, an APA can provide the taxpayers involved with certainty in the tax treatment of the transfer pricing issues covered by the APA for a specified period of time. In some cases, an APA may also provide an option to extend the period of time to which it applies. When the term of an APA expires, the opportunity may also exist for the relevant tax administrations and taxpayers to renegotiate the APA. Because of the certainty provided by an APA, a taxpayer may be in a better position to predict its tax liabilities, thereby providing a tax environment that is favourable for investment.

4.154

APAs can provide an opportunity for both tax administrations and taxpayers to consult and co-operate in a non-adversarial spirit and environment. The opportunity to discuss complex tax issues in a less confrontational atmosphere than in a transfer pricing examination can stimulate a free flow of information among all parties involved for the purpose of coming to a legally correct and practicably workable result. The non-adversarial environment may also result in a more objective review of the submitted data and information than may occur in a more adversarial context (e.g. litigation). The close consultation and co-operation required between the tax administrations in an APA programme also leads to closer relations with treaty partners on transfer pricing issues.

4.155

An APA may prevent costly and time-consuming examinations and litigation of major transfer pricing issues for taxpayers and tax administrations. Once an APA has been agreed, less resources may be needed for subsequent examination of the taxpayer’s return, because more information is known about the taxpayer. It may still be difficult, however, to monitor the application of the arrangement. The APA process itself may also present time savings for both taxpayers and tax administrations over the time that would be spent in a conventional examination, although in the aggregate there may be no net time savings, for example, in jurisdictions that do not have an audit procedure and where the existence of an APA may not directly affect the amount of resources devoted to compliance.

4.156

Bilateral and multilateral APAs substantially reduce or eliminate the possibility of juridical or economic double or non taxation since all the relevant jurisdictions participate. By contrast, unilateral APAs do not provide certainty in the reduction of double taxation because tax administrations affected by the transactions covered by the APA may consider that the methodology adopted does not give a result consistent with the arm’s length principle. In addition, bilateral and multilateral APAs can enhance the mutual agreement procedure by significantly reducing the time needed to reach an agreement since competent authorities are dealing with current data as opposed to prior year data that may be difficult and time-consuming to produce.

4.157

The disclosure and information aspects of an APA programme as well as the co-operative attitude under which an APA can be negotiated may assist tax administrations in gaining insight into complex international transactions undertaken by MNEs. An APA programme can improve knowledge and understanding of highly technical and factual circumstances in areas such as global trading and the tax issues involved. The development of specialist skills that focus on particular industries or specific types of transactions will enable tax administrations to give better service to other taxpayers in similar circumstances. Through an APA programme tax administrations have access to useful industry data and analysis of pricing methodologies in a co-operative environment.

F.4. Disadvantages relating to advance pricing arrangements

4.158

Unilateral APAs may present significant problems for tax administrations and taxpayers alike. From the point of view of other tax administrations, problems arise because they may disagree with the APA’s conclusions. From the point of view of the associated enterprises involved, one problem is the possible effect on the behaviour of the associated enterprises. Unlike bilateral or multilateral APAs, the use of unilateral APAs may not lead to an increased level of certainty for the taxpayer involved and a reduction in economic or juridical double taxation for the MNE group. If the taxpayer accepts an arrangement that over-allocates income to the jurisdiction making the APA in order to avoid lengthy and expensive transfer pricing enquiries or excessive penalties, the administrative burden shifts from the jurisdiction providing the APA to other tax jurisdictions. Taxpayers should not feel compelled to enter into APAs for these reasons.

4.159

Another problem with a unilateral APA is the issue of corresponding adjustments. The flexibility of an APA may lead the taxpayer and the associated party to accommodate their pricing to the range of permissible pricing in the APA. In a unilateral APA, it is critical that this flexibility preserve the arm’s length principle since a foreign competent authority is not likely to allow a corresponding adjustment arising out of an APA that is inconsistent, in its view, with the arm’s length principle.

4.160

Another possible disadvantage would arise if an APA involved an unreliable prediction on changing market conditions without adequate critical assumptions, as discussed above. To avoid the risk of double taxation, it is necessary for an APA programme to remain flexible, because a static APA may not satisfactorily reflect arm’s length conditions.

4.161

An APA programme may initially place a strain on transfer pricing audit resources, as tax administrations will generally have to divert resources earmarked for other purposes (e.g. examination, advising, litigation, etc.) to the APA programme. Demands may be made on the resources of a tax administration by taxpayers seeking the earliest possible conclusion to an APA request, keeping in mind their business objectives and time scales, and the APA programme as a whole will tend to be led by the demands of the business community. These demands may not coincide with the resource planning of the tax administrations, thereby making it difficult to process efficiently both the APAs and other equally important work. Renewing an APA, however, is likely to be less time-consuming than the process of initiating an APA. The renewal process may focus on updating and adjusting facts, business and economic criteria, and computations. In the case of bilateral arrangements, the agreement of the competent authorities of both Contracting States is to be obtained on the renewal of an APA to avoid double taxation (or non-taxation).

4.162

Another potential disadvantage could occur where one tax administration has undertaken a number of bilateral APAs which involve only certain of the associated enterprises within an MNE group. A tendency may exist to harmonise the basis for concluding later APAs in a way similar to those previously concluded without sufficient regard being had to the conditions operating in other markets. Care should therefore be taken with interpreting the results of previously concluded APAs as being representative across all markets.

4.163

Concerns have also been expressed that, because of the nature of the APA procedure, it will interest taxpayers with a good voluntary compliance history. Experience in some jurisdictions has shown that, most often, taxpayers which would be interested in APAs are very large corporations which would be audited on a regular basis, with their pricing methodology then being examined in any event. The difference in the examination conducted of their transfer pricing would be one of timing rather than extent. As well, it has not been demonstrated that APAs will be of interest solely or principally to such taxpayers. Indeed, there are some early indications that taxpayers, having experienced difficulty with tax administrations on transfer pricing issues and not wishing these difficulties to continue, are often interested in applying for an APA. There is then a serious danger of audit resources and expertise being diverted to these taxpayers and away from the investigation of less compliant taxpayers, where these resources could be better deployed in reducing the risk of losing tax revenue. The balance of compliance resources may be particularly difficult to achieve since an APA programme tends to require highly experienced and often specialised staff. Requests for APAs may be concentrated in particular areas or sectors, e.g. global trading, and this can overstretch the specialist resources already allocated to those areas by the authorities. Tax administrations require time to train experts in specialist fields in order to meet unforeseeable demands from taxpayers for APAs in those areas.

4.164

In addition to the foregoing concerns, there are a number of possible pitfalls as described below that could arise if an APA programme were improperly administered, and tax administrations who use APAs should make strong efforts to eliminate the occurrence of these problems as APA practice evolves.

4.165

For example, an APA might seek more detailed industry and taxpayer specific information than would be requested in a transfer pricing examination. In principle, this should not be the case and the documentation required for an APA should not be more onerous than for an examination, except for the fact that in an APA the tax administration will need to have details of predictions and the basis for those predictions, which may not be central issues in a transfer pricing examination that focuses on completed transactions. In fact, an APA should seek to limit the documentation, as discussed above, and focus the documentation more closely on the issues in light of the taxpayer’s business practices. Tax administrations need to recognise that:

  • a) Publicly available information on competitors and comparables is limited;
  • b) Not all taxpayers have the capacity to undertake in-depth market analyses; and,
  • c) Only parent companies may be knowledgeable about group pricing policies.
4.166

Another possible concern is that an APA may allow the tax administration to make a closer study of the transactions at issue than would occur in the context of a transfer pricing examination, depending on the facts and circumstances. The taxpayer must provide detailed information relating to its transfer pricing and satisfy any other requirements imposed for the verification of compliance with the terms and conditions of the APA. At the same time, the taxpayer is not sheltered from normal and routine examinations by the tax administration on other issues. An APA also does not shelter a taxpayer from examination of its transfer pricing activities. The taxpayer may still have to establish that it has complied in good faith with the terms and conditions of the APA, that the material representations in the APA remain valid, that the supporting data used in applying the methodology were correct, that the critical assumptions underlying the APA are still valid and are applied consistently, and that the methodology is applied consistently. Tax administrations should, therefore, seek to ensure that APA procedures are not unnecessarily cumbersome and that they do not make more demand of taxpayers than are strictly required by the scope of the APA application.

4.167

Problems could also develop if tax administrations misuse information obtained in an APA in their examination practices. If the taxpayer withdraws from its APA request or if the taxpayer’s application is rejected after consideration of all of the facts, any nonfactual information provided by the taxpayer in connection with the APA request, such as settlement offers, reasoning, opinions, and judgments, cannot be treated as relevant in any respect to the examination. In addition, the fact that a taxpayer has applied unsuccessfully for an APA should not be taken into account by the tax administration in determining whether to commence an examination of that taxpayer.

4.168

Tax administrations also should ensure the confidentiality of trade secrets and other sensitive information and documentation submitted to them in the course of an APA proceeding. Therefore, domestic rules against disclosure should be applied. In a bilateral APA the confidentiality requirements on treaty partners would apply, thereby preventing public disclosure of confidential data.

4.169

An APA programme cannot be used by all taxpayers because the procedure can be expensive and time-consuming and small taxpayers generally may not be able to afford it. This is especially true if independent experts are involved. APAs may therefore only assist in resolving mainly large transfer pricing cases. In addition, the resource implications of an APA programme may limit the number of requests a tax administration can entertain. In evaluating APAs, tax administrations can alleviate these potential problems by ensuring that the level of inquiry is adjusted to the size of the international transactions involved.

F.5. Recommendations

F.5.1. In general

4.170

Since the Guidelines were published in their original version in 1995, a significant number of OECD member countries have acquired experience with APAs. Those jurisdictions which do have some experience seem to be satisfied so far, so that it can be expected that under the appropriate circumstances the experience with APAs will continue to expand. The success of APA programmes will depend on the care taken in determining the proper degree of specificity for the arrangement based on critical assumptions, the proper administration of the programme, and the presence of adequate safeguards to avoid the pitfalls described above, in addition to the flexibility and openness with which all parties approach the process.

4.171

There are some continuing issues regarding the form and scope of APAs that require greater experience for full resolution and agreement among member countries, such as the question of unilateral APAs. The Committee on Fiscal Affairs intends to monitor carefully any expanded use of APAs and to promote greater consistency in practice among those countries that choose to use them.

F.5.2. Coverage of an arrangement

4.172

When considering the scope of an APA, taxpayers and tax administrations need to pay close attention to the reliability of any predictions so as to exclude unreliable predictions. In general, great care must be taken if the APA goes beyond the methodology, its application, and critical assumptions. See paragraphs 4.134-4.139.

F.5.3. Unilateral versus bilateral (multilateral) arrangements

4.173

Wherever possible, an APA should be concluded on a bilateral or multilateral basis between competent authorities through the mutual agreement procedure of the relevant treaty. A bilateral APA carries less risk of taxpayers feeling compelled to enter into an APA or to accept a non-arm’s-length agreement in order to avoid expensive and prolonged enquiries and possible penalties. A bilateral APA also significantly reduces the chance of any profits either escaping tax altogether or being doubly taxed, Moreover, concluding an APA through the mutual agreement procedure may be the only form that can be adopted by a tax administration which lacks domestic legislation to conclude binding agreements directly with the taxpayer.

F.5.4. Equitable access to APAs for all taxpayers

4.174

As discussed above, the nature of APA proceedings may de facto limit their accessibility to large taxpayers. The restriction of APAs to large taxpayers may raise questions of equality and uniformity, since taxpayers in identical situations should not be treated differently. A flexible allocation of examination resources may alleviate these concerns. Tax administrations also may need to consider the possibility of adopting a streamlined access for small taxpayers. Tax administrations should take care to adapt their levels of inquiry, in evaluating APAs, to the size of the international transactions involved.

F.5.5. Developing working agreements between competent authorities and improved procedures

4.175

Between those jurisdictions that use APAs, greater uniformity in APA practices could be beneficial to both tax administrations and taxpayers. Accordingly, the tax administrations of such jurisdictions may wish to consider working agreements with the competent authorities for the undertaking of APAs. These agreements may set forth general guidelines and understandings for the reaching of mutual agreement in cases where a taxpayer has requested an APA involving transfer pricing issues.

4.176

In addition, bilateral APAs with treaty partners should conform to certain requirements. For example, the same necessary and pertinent information should be made available to each tax administration at the same time, and the agreed upon methodology should be in accordance with the arm’s length principle.

G. Arbitration

4.177

As trade and investment have taken on an increasingly international character, the tax disputes that, on occasion, arise from such activities have likewise become increasingly international. And more particularly, the disputes no longer involve simply controversy between a taxpayer and its tax administration but also concern disagreements between tax administrations themselves. In many of these situations, the MNE group is primarily a stakeholder and the real parties in interest are the governments involved. Although traditionally problems of double taxation have been resolved through the mutual agreement procedure, relief is not guaranteed if the tax administrations, after consultation, cannot reach an agreement on their own and if there is no mechanism, such as an arbitration clause similar to the one of paragraph 5 of Article 25, to provide the possibility of a resolution. However, where a particular tax treaty contains an arbitration clause similar to the one of paragraph 5 of Article 25, this extension of the mutual agreement procedure makes a resolution of the case still possible by submitting one or more issues on which the competent authorities cannot reach an agreement to arbitration.

4.178

In the 2008 update to the OECD Model Tax Convention, Article 25 was supplemented with a new paragraph 5 which provides that, in the cases where the competent authorities are unable to reach an agreement within two years, the unresolved issues will, at the request of the person who presented the case, be solved through an arbitration process. This extension of the mutual agreement procedure ensures that where the competent authorities cannot reach an agreement on one or more issues that prevent the resolution of a case, a resolution of the case will still be possible by submitting those issues to arbitration. Arbitration under paragraph 5 of Article 25 is an integral part of the mutual agreement procedure and does not constitute an alternative route to solving tax treaty disputes between States. Paragraphs 63-85 of the Commentary on Article 25 provide guidance on the arbitration phase of the mutual agreement procedure.

4.179

The existence of an arbitration clause similar to paragraph 5 of Article 25 in a particular bilateral treaty should make the mutual agreement procedure itself more effective even in cases where resort to arbitration is not necessary. The very existence of this possibility should encourage greater use of the mutual agreement procedure since both governments and taxpayers will know at the outset that the time and effort put into the mutual agreement procedure will be likely to produce a satisfactory result. Further, governments will have an incentive to ensure that the mutual agreement procedure is conducted efficiently in order to avoid the necessity of subsequent supplemental procedures.

Annex I to Chapter IVSample Memoranda of Understanding for Competent Authorities to establish bilateral safe harbours

Introduction

This Annex contains sample Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) for use by Competent Authorities in negotiating bilateral safe harbours for common categories of transfer pricing cases involving low risk distribution functions, low risk manufacturing functions, and low risk research and development functions. It is intended to provide jurisdictions with a tool to adapt and use in addressing, through bilateral safe harbours, important classes of transfer pricing cases that now take up a great deal of time and effort when processed on a case by case basis. Competent authorities are of course free to modify, add or delete any provision of the sample agreement when concluding their own bilateral agreements.

Reasons for concluding a bilateral safe harbour MOU

As described in Chapter IV, Section E.4 of these Guidelines, one of the potential problems arising from the use of unilateral transfer pricing safe harbours is that they may increase the risk of double taxation and double non-taxation. This can occur if the jurisdiction granting the unilateral safe harbour shades the safe harbour towards the high end of an acceptable arm’s length profit range, while a treaty partner on the other end of the transaction disagrees with the assertion that the defined safe harbour profit level reflects arm’s length dealing. Some critics contend that there is a tendency for safe harbour profit ranges to increase over time, exacerbating this potential problem. It is also sometimes suggested that unilateral safe harbours can tend to force taxpayers into reporting higher than arm’s length levels of income, and to incur some resulting double taxation, as the price to be paid for administrative convenience and simplicity. Finally, unilateral safe harbours can, at times, provide a windfall to taxpayers whose specific facts might suggest that income above the safe harbour level would be more consistent with arm’s length dealing. These double tax and windfall issues would likely be quite pronounced in connection with safe harbours directed at some of the most common types of transfer pricing transactions. Transactions such as sales of goods to a local distribution affiliate for resale on a limited risk basis in the local market, contract manufacturing arrangements, and contract research arrangements could clearly raise these issues. It is perhaps for this reason that few jurisdictions, if any, have developed functioning safe harbours for dealing with these common types of transfer pricing issues. Distribution margins and manufacturing mark-ups can sometimes be quite consistent across geographies and across many industries. Therefore guidance on normal settlement ranges for these types of cases could have the effect of reducing the number of transfer pricing audits and reducing competent authority dockets and other transfer pricing controversy by a substantial margin if reasonable ranges of results could be agreed bilaterally and published. These types of cases could potentially be addressed through bilateral MOUs adopted and publicised by competent authorities. Some jurisdictions have adopted such arrangements on a bilateral basis. The general view of such jurisdictions is that treaty provisions based on Article 25(3) of the OECD Model Tax Convention provide sufficient authority to support a bilateral competent authority agreement on a safe harbour rule that would apply to numerous similarly situated taxpayers. Article 25(3) provides: “The competent authorities of the Contracting States shall endeavour to resolve by mutual agreement any difficulties or doubts arising as to the interpretation or application of the Convention. They may also consult together for the elimination of double taxation in cases not provided for in the Convention.” A competent authority agreement on a bilateral transfer pricing safe harbour should properly be characterised as a “mutual agreement” that “resolves difficulties or doubts arising as to the interpretation or application” of Article 9 of the Treaty. Although nothing would prevent the jurisdictions’ competent authorities from adopting safe harbour provisions under Article 25(3) on a multilateral basis if the conditions and circumstances so allow, the particular types of transactions described above are such that jurisdictions will often adopt a bilateral approach. If such MOUs existed, qualifying taxpayers would be able to manage their financial results to fall within the agreed safe harbour range, secure in the understanding that those results would be accepted in both jurisdictions agreeing to the MOU concerned. A commonly cited precedent for this type of approach is the agreement between the United States and Mexico regarding safe harbour profit ranges for maquiladora operations. A bilateral approach to the development of safe harbours would have a number of advantages over unilateral transfer pricing safe harbours:

  • A bilateral approach executed through competent authority MOUs could increase the likelihood that safe harbour provisions do not result in double taxation or double non-taxation.
  • Bilateral safe harbours could be tailored to the economics of a particular market and circumstances, and thus be compatible with the arm’s length principle.
  • Bilateral safe harbours could be entered into on a selective basis with jurisdictions having similar tax rates, thus minimising the possibility that the safe harbour provision itself would create opportunities for transfer pricing manipulation and providing a means for limiting the application of the safe harbour to situations where transfer pricing risk is quite low.
  • If the relevant jurisdictions desire, bilateral safe harbours could initially be limited to small taxpayers and/or small transactions in order to limit exposures to government tax revenue that might otherwise be created by the safe harbour.
  • Safe harbours adopted by means of a competent authority MOU could be reviewed and modified from time to time by competent authority agreement, thus assuring that the provisions stay up to date and reflect developments in the broader economy.
  • For developing countries with serious resource constraints, bilateral MOUs entered into with a number of treaty partners could provide a means of protecting the local tax base in common transfer pricing fact patterns without an inordinate enforcement effort. The following elements may be of relevance in the negotiation and conclusion of an MOU. 1. Description of and criteria to be fulfilled by the qualifying enterprises. These could include: a) A description of the functions required to be performed (or to be disallowed) as a condition to application of the safe harbour; b) The risks to be assumed by the participating enterprises as a condition to application of the safe harbour; c) The mix of assets permitted to be used by the participating enterprises as a condition of application of the safe harbour; d) A description of classes of entities excluded from the safe harbour provision (by virtue of size, industry, etc.). 2. Description of the qualifying transactions covered by the MOU; 3. Determination of the arm’s length range of tested party compensation; 4. The years to which the MOU applies; 5. Statement that the MOU is binding on both of the tax administrations involved; 6. Reporting and monitoring procedures for the MOU; 7. Documentation and information to be maintained by the participating enterprises: 8. A mechanism for resolving disputes. Set forth below are sample MOUs for three types of transactions: (i) performance of low risk manufacturing services; (ii) performance of low risk distribution services; and (iii) performance of low risk contract research and development services.

Sample Memorandum of Understanding on Low Risk Manufacturing Services

Preamble

1

The Competent Authorities of [State A] and [State B] have reached an understanding relating to the arm’s length remuneration applicable to low risk manufacturing services performed by a Qualifying Enterprise resident in [State A] on behalf of an associated enterprise resident in [State B], and by a Qualifying Enterprise resident in [State B] on behalf of an associated enterprise resident in [State A] in the circumstances described herein. The purpose of this memorandum of understanding is to provide legal certainty to Qualifying Enterprises by establishing specific procedures to comply with the transfer pricing rules in [State A] and [State B] and to eliminate double taxation.

2

This memorandum of understanding is entered into under authority of Article [25] of the [Tax Treaty] (the “Treaty”) between [State A] and [State B]. It implements the principles of Article [9] of the Treaty in the circumstances described herein. It applies to taxable years of Qualifying Enterprises ending in calendar years [20__] through [20__]. This term will be extended for another five years unless either State notifies the other, in writing, of its intent to terminate this memorandum of understanding on or prior to December 31 [20__]. Expiration of this memorandum of understanding will have effect for taxable years of Qualifying Enterprises ending after the last day of the calendar year in which the application of this memorandum of understanding terminates.

3

For purposes of this memorandum of understanding, an “enterprise” means the enterprise defined in Article [3], paragraph [1] of the Treaty.

Qualifying Enterprise

4

For purposes of this memorandum of understanding, a Qualifying Enterprise must have each of the characteristics described in this paragraph.

  • a) The Qualifying Enterprise shall be a resident of a Contracting State for purposes of the Treaty and shall conduct business operations predominantly in such State.
  • b) The principal business activity of the Qualifying Enterprise shall be either the performance of manufacturing services in its State of residence on behalf of an associated enterprise (within the meaning of Article [9] of the Treaty) resident in the other Contracting State, or alternatively, the production of manufactured products for sale to such associated enterprise.
  • c) The Qualifying Enterprise shall have entered into a written agreement with the associated enterprise, prior to the commencement of the relevant taxable year of the Qualifying Enterprise, pursuant to which the associated enterprise assumes the principal business risks associated with the manufacturing activities of the Qualifying Enterprise and agrees to compensate the Qualifying Enterprise for its manufacturing activities at levels consistent with this memorandum of understanding.
  • d) Annual research, development, and product engineering expense of the Qualifying Enterprise shall, in the aggregate, be less than [__] percent of its net sales revenue.
  • e) The Qualifying Enterprise shall not engage in advertising, marketing and distribution functions, credit and collection functions, or warranty administration functions with regard to the products it manufactures.
  • f) The Qualifying Enterprise shall not retain title to finished products after they leave its factory, shall not bear any transportation or freight expense with respect to such finished products, and shall not bear any risk of loss with respect to damage or loss of finished products in transit.
  • g) The Qualifying Enterprise shall not engage in managerial, legal, accounting, or personnel management functions other than those directly related to the performance of its manufacturing activities.
  • h) At least [__] percent of the assets of the Qualifying Enterprise shall consist of manufacturing plant and equipment, raw material inventory, and work in process inventory, calculated on the basis of the average of assets held on the last day of each of the four quarterly periods during the relevant taxable year of the Qualifying Enterprise.
  • i) The finished product inventory of the Qualifying Enterprise shall not exceed [__] percent of the annual net sales of the Qualifying Enterprise, calculated on an average asset basis in the manner described in paragraph (h) above.
5

A Qualifying Enterprise may not:

  • a) Conduct its principal business activity in any of the following industries: [__].
  • b) Have annual net sales in excess of [__].
  • c) Have total assets in excess of [__].
  • d) Derive more than [__] percent of its net revenues from transactions other than Qualifying Transactions.
  • e) Have undergone a transfer pricing audit in either [State A] or [State B] within the past [__] years which resulted in adjustments in excess of [__].

Qualifying Transactions

6

For purposes of this memorandum of understanding, a Qualifying Transaction shall be (i) the rendering of manufacturing services by the Qualifying Enterprise on behalf of an associated enterprise resident in the other Contracting State and/or (ii) the sale of manufactured products produced by the Qualifying Enterprise to an associated enterprise resident in the other Contracting State, in each case without the interposition of other transactions or parties.

Determination of the Taxable Income of the Qualifying Enterprise

7

In the event a Qualifying Enterprise elects to apply the provisions of this memorandum of understanding:

  • a) In the event the Qualifying Enterprise holds title to raw materials and work in process inventory related to the Qualifying Transactions, the net income before tax of the Qualifying Enterprise with respect to its Qualifying Transactions for the taxable year shall be in the range of [equal to] [__ to __] percent of the total costs of the Qualifying Enterprise, excluding from the base for computing the profit percentage only net interest expense, currency gain or loss, and any non-recurring costs.
  • b) In the event the associated enterprise holds title to raw materials and work in process inventory related to the Qualifying Transactions, the net income before tax of the Qualifying Enterprise with respect to the Qualifying Transactions for the taxable year shall be in the range of [equal to] [__ to __] percent of the total costs of the Qualifying Enterprise, excluding from the base for computing the profit percentage only net interest expense, currency gain or loss, and any non-recurring costs.
  • c) Accounting terms utilised in this memorandum of understanding shall be defined in accordance with generally accepted financial accounting principles in the residence jurisdiction of the Qualifying Enterprise.
8

Each of [State A] and [State B] agree that compensation for Qualifying Transactions calculated in accordance with this memorandum of understanding shall be deemed to constitute an arm’s length level of compensation for purposes of applying the transfer pricing rules of such State and the provisions of Article [9] of the Treaty.

Permanent Establishment

9

The Competent Authorities of [State A] and [State B] agree that the associated enterprise which is party to a Qualifying Transaction shall not be deemed to have a permanent establishment in the jurisdiction of residence of the Qualifying Enterprise by virtue of the performance of low risk manufacturing services on its behalf by the Qualifying Enterprise or by virtue of such associated enterprise taking title to products produced by the Qualifying Enterprise in the jurisdiction of residence of the Qualifying Enterprise.

Election and Reporting Requirements

10

A Qualifying Enterprise and the relevant associated enterprise may elect to apply the provisions of this memorandum of understanding consistently in [State A] and [State B] by filing a notice with [__] of [State A] and [__] of [State B] no later than [__] covering the Qualifying Transactions.

11

The required notice shall include:

  • An affirmative statement that the taxpayers intend to apply and be bound by this memorandum of understanding [for the current year] [for a period of (__) years beginning with the current year];
  • An affirmative statement that income and expense from Qualifying Transactions will be reported on a consistent basis in [State A] and [State B] in accordance with this agreement;
  • A narrative description of the Qualifying Transactions;
  • Identification of each of the associated enterprises that are parties to the Qualifying Transactions;
  • Audited financial statements of the Qualifying Enterprise for the relevant year and sufficient additional financial and accounting information to demonstrate the status of the Qualifying Enterprise as a Qualifying Enterprise;
  • A detailed calculation of the income of the Qualifying Enterprise from Qualifying Transactions applying the principles of this memorandum of understanding;
  • A statement that the Qualifying Enterprise will respond within 60 days to any request of the tax authority of its jurisdiction of residence for information deemed necessary by such tax authority to verify qualification of the enterprise for treatment under this memorandum of understanding.
12

Satisfaction of the election and reporting requirements of this memorandum of understanding, and reporting income calculated in accordance with its terms in a timely filed tax return for the year, shall relieve the Qualifying Enterprise and its relevant associated enterprise from the obligation to comply with the otherwise applicable transfer pricing documentation requirements of [State A] and [State B] with respect to the Qualifying Transactions.

13

A Qualifying Enterprise and its relevant associated enterprise not electing treatment of their Qualifying Transactions under this memorandum of understanding shall be subject to the application of the transfer pricing and documentation rules of [State A] and [State B] as if this memorandum of understanding were not in force.

14

All disputes with regard to the application of this memorandum of understanding shall be referred to the competent authorities of [State A] and [State B] for resolution by mutual agreement.

15

The competent authorities of [State A] and [State B] may exchange information where necessary to carry out this agreement under the provisions of Article [26] of the Treaty.

Termination of the Agreement

16

Either [State A] or [State B] may terminate this memorandum of understanding at any time upon written notice to the competent authority of the other Contracting State and publication of such notice. Such termination will have effect for taxable years of Qualifying Enterprises beginning after the last day of the calendar year in which delivery and publication of such notice of termination occurs.

Sample Memorandum of Understanding on Low Risk Distribution Services

Preamble

17

The Competent Authorities of [State A] and [State B] have reached an understanding relating to the arm’s length remuneration applicable to low risk distribution services performed by a Qualifying Enterprise resident in [State A] on behalf of an associated enterprise resident in [State B], and by a Qualifying Enterprise resident in [State B] on behalf of an associated enterprise resident in [State A] in the circumstances described herein. The purpose of this memorandum of understanding is to provide legal certainty to Qualifying Enterprises by establishing specific procedures to comply with the transfer pricing rules in [State A] and [State B] and to eliminate double taxation.

18

This memorandum of understanding is entered into under authority of Article [25] of the [Tax Treaty] (the “Treaty”) between [State A] and [State B]. It implements the principles of Article [9] of the Treaty in the circumstances described herein. It applies to taxable years of Qualifying Enterprises ending in calendar years [20__] through [20__]. This term will be extended for another five years unless either State notifies the other, in writing, of its intent to terminate this memorandum of understanding on or prior to December 31 [20__]. Expiration of this memorandum of understanding will have effect for taxable years of Qualifying Enterprises ending after the last day of the calendar year in which the application of this memorandum of understanding terminates.

19

For purposes of this memorandum of understanding, an “enterprise” means the enterprise defined in Article [3], paragraph [1] of the Treaty.

Qualifying Enterprise

20

For purposes of this memorandum of understanding, a Qualifying Enterprise must have each of the characteristics described in this paragraph.

  • a) The Qualifying Enterprise shall be a resident of a Contracting State for purposes of the Treaty and shall conduct business operations predominantly in such State.
  • b) The principal business activity of the Qualifying Enterprise shall be either the performance of marketing and distribution services in its State of residence on behalf of an associated enterprise (within the meaning of Article [9] of the Treaty) resident in the other Contracting State, or alternatively, the purchase by the Qualifying Enterprise of products from an associated enterprise resident in the other Contracting State for resale to unrelated customers in its jurisdiction of residence.
  • c) The Qualifying Enterprise shall have entered into a written agreement with the associated enterprise, prior to the commencement of the relevant taxable year of the Qualifying Enterprise, pursuant to which the associated enterprise assumes the principal business risks associated with the marketing and distribution activities of the Qualifying Enterprise and agrees to assure that the Qualifying Enterprise is compensated for its marketing and distribution activities at levels consistent with this memorandum of understanding.
  • d) Annual research, development, and product engineering expense of the Qualifying Enterprise shall, in the aggregate, be less than [__] percent of its net sales revenue.
  • e) The Qualifying Enterprise shall not engage in manufacturing or assembly functions with regard to the products it markets and distributes.
  • f) The total marketing and advertising expense of the Qualifying Enterprise shall not exceed [__] percent of its net sales.
  • g) The Qualifying Enterprise shall not engage in managerial, legal, accounting, or personnel management functions other than those directly related to the performance of its marketing and distribution activities.
  • h) The finished product inventory of the Qualifying Enterprise shall not exceed [__] percent of the annual net sales of the Qualifying Enterprise, calculated on the basis of the average inventory held on the last day of each of the four quarterly periods during the relevant taxable year of the Qualifying Enterprise.
21

A Qualifying Enterprise may not:

  • a) Conduct its principal business activity in any of the following industries: [__].
  • b) Have annual net sales in excess of [__].
  • c) Have total assets in excess of [__].
  • d) Derive more than [__] percent of its net revenues from transactions other than Qualifying Transactions.
  • e) Have undergone a transfer pricing audit in either [State A] or [State B] within the past [__] years which resulted in adjustments in excess of [__].

Qualifying Transactions

22

For purposes of this memorandum of understanding, a Qualifying Transaction shall be (i) the rendering of marketing and distribution services by the Qualifying Enterprise on behalf of an associated enterprise resident in the other Contracting State and/or (ii) the sale of products to unrelated customers purchased by the Qualifying Enterprise from an associated enterprise resident in the other Contracting State, in each case without the interposition of other transactions or parties.

Determination of the Taxable Income of the Qualifying Enterprise

23

In the event a Qualifying Enterprise elects to apply the provisions of this memorandum of understanding:

  • a) The net income before tax of the Qualifying Enterprise with respect to its Qualifying Transactions for the taxable year shall be in the range of [equal to] [__ to __] percent of the total net sales of the Qualifying Enterprise.
  • b) Accounting terms utilised in this memorandum of understanding shall be defined in accordance with generally accepted financial accounting principles in the jurisdiction of residence of the Qualifying Enterprise.
24

Each of [State A] and [State B] agree that compensation for Qualifying Transactions calculated in accordance with this memorandum of understanding shall be deemed to constitute an arm’s length level of compensation for purposes of applying the transfer pricing rules of such State and the provisions of Article [9] of the Treaty.

Permanent Establishment

25

The Competent Authorities of [State A] and [State B] agree that the associated enterprise that is party to a Qualifying Transaction shall not be deemed to have a permanent establishment in the jurisdiction of residence of the Qualifying Enterprise by virtue of the performance of low risk marketing and distribution services on its behalf by the Qualifying Enterprise or by virtue of the Qualifying Enterprise purchasing products from such associated enterprise in Qualifying Transactions for resale to unrelated customers.

Election and Reporting Requirements

26

A Qualifying Enterprise and the relevant associated enterprise may elect to apply the provisions of this memorandum of understanding consistently in [State A] and [State B] by filing a notice with [__] of [State A] and [__] of [State B] no later than [__] covering the Qualifying Transactions.

27

The required notice shall include:

  • An affirmative statement that the taxpayers intend to apply and be bound by this memorandum of understanding [for the current year] [for a period of (__) years beginning with the current year];
  • An affirmative statement that income and expense from Qualifying Transactions will be reported on a consistent basis in [State A] and [State B] in accordance with this agreement;
  • A narrative description of the Qualifying Transactions;
  • Identification of each of the associated enterprises that are parties to the Qualifying Transactions;
  • Audited financial statements of the Qualifying Enterprise for the relevant year and sufficient additional financial and accounting information to demonstrate the status of the Qualifying Enterprise as a Qualifying Enterprise;
  • A detailed calculation of the income of the Qualifying Enterprise from Qualifying Transactions applying the principles of this memorandum of understanding;
  • A statement that the Qualifying Enterprise will respond within 60 days to any request of the tax authority of its jurisdiction of residence for information deemed necessary by such tax authority to verify qualification of the enterprise for treatment under this memorandum of understanding.
28

Satisfaction of the election and reporting requirements of this memorandum of understanding, and reporting income calculated in accordance with its terms in a timely filed tax return for the year, shall relieve the Qualifying Enterprise and its relevant associated enterprise from the obligation to comply with the otherwise applicable transfer pricing documentation requirements of [State A] and [State B] with respect to the Qualifying Transactions.

29

A Qualifying Enterprise and its relevant associated enterprise not electing treatment of their Qualifying Transactions under this memorandum of understanding shall be subject to the application of the transfer pricing and documentation rules of [State A] and [State B] as if this memorandum of understanding were not in force.

30

All disputes with regard to the application of this memorandum of understanding shall be referred to the competent authorities of [State A] and [State B] for resolution by mutual agreement.

31

The competent authorities of [State A] and [State B] may exchange information where necessary to carry out this agreement under the provisions of Article [26] of the Treaty.

Termination of the Agreement

32

Either [State A] or [State B] may terminate this memorandum of understanding at any time upon written notice to the competent authority of the other Contracting State and publication of such notice. Such termination will have effect for taxable years of Qualifying Enterprises beginning after the last day of the calendar year in which delivery and publication of such notice of termination occurs.

Sample Memorandum of Understanding on Low Risk Research and Development Services

Preamble

33

The Competent Authorities of [State A] and [State B] have reached an understanding relating to the arm’s length remuneration applicable to low risk research and development services performed by a Qualifying Enterprise resident in [State A] on behalf of an associated enterprise resident in [State B], and by a Qualifying Enterprise resident in [State B] on behalf of an associated enterprise resident in [State A] in the circumstances described herein. The purpose of this memorandum of understanding is to provide legal certainty to Qualifying Enterprises by establishing specific procedures to comply with the transfer pricing rules in [State A] and [State B] and to eliminate double taxation.

34

This memorandum of understanding is entered into under authority of Article [25] of the [Tax Treaty] (the “Treaty”) between [State A] and [State B]. It implements the principles of Article [9] of the Treaty in the circumstances described herein. It applies to taxable years of Qualifying Enterprises ending in calendar years [20__] through [20__]. This term will be extended for another five years unless either State notifies the other, in writing, of its intent to terminate this memorandum of understanding on or prior to December 31 [20__]. Expiration of this memorandum of understanding will have effect for taxable years of Qualifying Enterprises ending after the last day of the calendar year in which the application of this memorandum of understanding terminates.

35

For purposes of this memorandum of understanding, an “enterprise” means the enterprise defined in Article [3], paragraph [1] of the Treaty.

Qualifying Enterprise

36

For purposes of this memorandum of understanding, a Qualifying Enterprise must have each of the characteristics described in this paragraph.

  • c) The Qualifying Enterprise shall be a resident of a Contracting State for purposes of the Treaty and shall conduct business operations predominantly in such State.
  • d) The principal business activity of the Qualifying Enterprise shall be the performance of research and development services in its State of residence on behalf of an associated enterprise (within the meaning of Article [9] of the Treaty) resident in the other Contracting State.
  • e) The Qualifying Enterprise shall have entered into a written agreement with the associated enterprise, prior to the commencement of the relevant taxable year of the Qualifying Enterprise, pursuant to which: (i) the associated enterprise assumes the principal business risks associated with the research and development services of the Qualifying Enterprise, including the risk that the research and development will not be successful; (ii) the Qualifying Enterprise agrees that all interests in intangibles developed through its research and development services shall belong to the associated enterprise; and (iii) the associated enterprise agrees to compensate the Qualifying Enterprise for its research and development services at levels consistent with this memorandum of understanding.
  • f) The Qualifying Enterprise shall not engage in product manufacturing and assembly functions, advertising, marketing and distribution functions, credit and collection functions, or warranty administration functions.
  • g) The Qualifying Enterprise shall not utilise proprietary patents, know-how, trade secrets, or other intangibles in performing its research and development services other than those made available to it by the associated enterprise.
  • h) The Qualifying Enterprise shall not engage in managerial, legal, accounting, or personnel management functions other than those directly related to the performance of its research and development services.
  • i) The research and development programme carried out by the Qualified Enterprise shall be designed, directed and controlled by the associated enterprise.
37

A Qualifying Enterprise may not:

  • j) Conduct its principal business activity in any of the following industries: [__].
  • k) Have annual payroll and other operating expenses in excess of [__].
  • l) Have total assets in excess of [__].
  • m) Derive more than [__] percent of its net revenues from transactions other than Qualifying Transactions.
  • n) Have undergone a transfer pricing audit in either [State A] or [State B] within the past [__] years which resulted in adjustments in excess of [__].

Qualifying Transactions

38

For purposes of this memorandum of understanding, a Qualifying Transaction shall be the rendering of research and development services by the Qualifying Enterprise on behalf of an associated enterprise resident in the other Contracting State without the interposition of other transactions or parties.

Determination of the Taxable Income of the Qualifying Enterprise

39

In the event a Qualifying Enterprise elects to apply the provisions of this memorandum of understanding:

  • o) The net income before tax of the Qualifying Enterprise with respect to its Qualifying Transactions for the taxable year shall be in the range of [equal to] [ __ to __ ] percent of the total costs of the Qualifying Enterprise incurred in performing research and development services, excluding from the base for computing the profit percentage only net interest expense, currency gain or loss, and any non-recurring costs.
  • p) Accounting terms utilised in this memorandum of understanding shall be defined in accordance with generally accepted financial accounting principles in the jurisdiction of residence of the Qualifying Enterprise.
40

Each of [State A] and [State B] agree that compensation for Qualifying Transactions calculated in accordance with this memorandum of understanding shall be deemed to constitute an arm’s length level of compensation for purposes of applying the transfer pricing rules of such State and the provisions of Article [9] of the Treaty.

Permanent Establishment

41

The Competent Authorities of [State A] and [State B] agree that the associated enterprise that is party to a Qualifying Transaction shall not be deemed to have a permanent establishment in the jurisdiction of residence of the Qualifying Enterprise by virtue of the performance of low risk research and development services on its behalf by the Qualifying Enterprise.

Election and Reporting Requirements

42

A Qualifying Enterprise and the relevant associated enterprise may elect to apply the provisions of this memorandum of understanding consistently in [State A] and [State B] by filing a notice with [__] of [State A] and [__] of [State B] no later than [__] covering the Qualifying Transactions.

43

The required notice shall include:

  • An affirmative statement that the taxpayers intend to apply and be bound by this memorandum of understanding [for the current year] [for a period of (__) years beginning with the current year];
  • An affirmative statement that income and expense from Qualifying Transactions will be reported on a consistent basis in [State A] and [State B] in accordance with this agreement;
  • A narrative description of the Qualifying Transactions;
  • Identification of each of the associated enterprises that are parties to the Qualifying Transactions;
  • Audited financial statements of the Qualifying Enterprise for the relevant year and sufficient additional financial and accounting information to demonstrate the status of the Qualifying Enterprise as a Qualifying Enterprise;
  • A detailed calculation of the income of the Qualifying Enterprise from Qualifying Transactions applying the principles of this memorandum of understanding;
  • A statement that the Qualifying Enterprise will respond within 60 days to any request of the tax authority of its jurisdiction of residence for information deemed necessary by such tax authority to verify qualification of the enterprise for treatment under this memorandum of understanding.
44

Satisfaction of the election and reporting requirements of this memorandum of understanding, and reporting income calculated in accordance with its terms in a timely filed tax return for the year, shall relieve the Qualifying Enterprise and its relevant associated enterprise from the obligation to comply with the otherwise applicable transfer pricing documentation requirements of [State A] and [State B] with respect to the Qualifying Transactions.

45

A Qualifying Enterprise and its relevant associated enterprise not electing treatment of their Qualifying Transactions under this memorandum of understanding shall be subject to the application of the transfer pricing and documentation rules of [State A] and [State B] as if this memorandum of understanding were not in force.

46

All disputes with regard to the application of this memorandum of understanding shall be referred to the competent authorities of [State A] and [State B] for resolution by mutual agreement.

47

The competent authorities of [State A] and [State B] may exchange information where necessary to carry out this agreement under the provisions of Article [26] of the Treaty.

Termination of the Agreement

48

Either [State A] or [State B] may terminate this memorandum of understanding at any time upon written notice to the competent authority of the other Contracting State and publication of such notice. Such termination will have effect for taxable years of Qualifying Enterprises beginning after the last day of the calendar year in which delivery and publication of such notice of termination occurs.

Annex II to Chapter IVGuidelines for conducting Advance Pricing Arrangements under the Mutual Agreement Procedure (MAP APAs)

A. Background

A.1. Introduction

1

Advance Pricing Arrangements (“APAs”) are the subject of extensive discussion in the Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations at Chapter IV, Section F. The development of working arrangements between competent authorities is considered in paragraph 4.175:

Between those jurisdictions that use APAs, greater uniformity in APA practices could be beneficial to both tax administrations and taxpayers. Accordingly, the tax administrations of such jurisdictions may wish to consider working agreements with the competent authorities for the undertaking of APAs. These agreements may set forth general guidelines and understandings for the reaching of mutual agreement in cases where a taxpayer has requested an APA involving transfer pricing issues.

It should be noted that the use of the term “agreement” in the above quotation is not intended to give any status to such procedural arrangements above that provided for by the Mutual Agreement Article of the OECD Model Tax Convention. Additionally, the Committee on Fiscal Affairs stated in paragraph 4.171 of the Guidelines that it intended “to monitor carefully any expanded use of APAs and to promote greater consistency in practice amongst those countries that choose to use them.”

2

This annex follows up on the above recommendations. The objective is to improve the consistency of application of APAs by providing guidance to tax administrations on how to conduct mutual agreement procedures involving APAs. Although the focus of the annex is on the role of tax administrations, the opportunity is taken to discuss how best the taxpayer can contribute to the process. This guidance is intended for use by those countries – both OECD members and non-members – that wish to use APAs.

A.2. Definition of an APA

3

Many jurisdictions have had, for some time, procedures (e.g. rulings) enabling the taxpayer to obtain some degree of certainty regarding how the law will be applied in a given set of circumstances. The legal consequences of the proposed action are determined in advance, based on assumptions about the factual basis. The validity of this determination is dependent upon the assumptions being supported by the facts when the actual transactions take place. The term APA refers to a procedural arrangement between a taxpayer or taxpayers and a tax administration intended to resolve potential transfer pricing disputes in advance. The APA differs from the classic ruling procedure, in that it requires the detailed review and to the extent appropriate, verification of the factual assumptions on which the determination of legal consequences is based, before any such determination can be made. Further, the APA provides for a continual monitoring of whether the factual assumptions remain valid throughout the course of the APA period.

4

An APA is defined in the first sentence of paragraph 4.134 of the Guidelines as “an arrangement that determines, in advance of controlled transactions, an appropriate set of criteria (e.g. method, comparables and appropriate adjustments thereto, critical assumptions as to future events) for the determination of the transfer pricing for those transactions over a fixed period of time.” It is also stated in paragraph 4.142 that “The concept of APAs also may be useful in resolving issues raised under Article 7 of the OECD Model Tax Convention relating to allocation problems, permanent establishments, and branch operations.”

5

In the Guidelines (see paragraph 4.140) the arrangements solely between a taxpayer or taxpayers and a tax administration are referred to as “unilateral APAs”. The Guidelines encourage bilateral APAs and recommend in paragraph 4.173 that “Wherever possible, an APA should be concluded on a bilateral or multilateral basis between competent authorities through the mutual agreement procedure of the relevant treaty.” A bilateral APA is based on a single mutual agreement between the competent authorities of two tax administrations under the relevant treaty. A multilateral APA is a term used to describe a situation where there is more than one bilateral mutual agreement.

6

Although, commonly an APA will cover cross-border transactions involving more than one taxpayer and legal enterprise, i.e. between members of a MNE group, it is also possible for an APA to apply to only one taxpayer and legal enterprise. For example, consider an enterprise in Country A that trades through branches in Countries B, C and D. In order to have certainty that double taxation will not occur, Countries A, B, C and D will need to share a common understanding of the measure of profits to be attributed to each jurisdiction in respect of that trading activity under Article 7 of the OECD Model Tax Convention. This certainty could be achieved by the negotiation of a series of separate, but mutually consistent, bilateral mutual agreements, i.e. between A and B, A and C and A and D. The existence of multiple bilateral mutual agreements raises a number of special issues and these are discussed further in Section B, paragraphs 21-27 of this annex.

7

It is important to distinguish the different types of APAs and so the bilateral or multilateral APAs, which are the main subject of this annex, are hereafter referred to as “MAP APAs”. The APAs that do not involve a mutual agreement negotiation are referred to as “unilateral APAs”. The generic term “APA” is used where the feature to be discussed applies to both types of APA. It should be noted that, in the vast majority of cases a bilateral APA will be concluded under the mutual agreement procedure of a double tax convention. However, in some cases where a bilateral APA has been sought and the treaty is not appropriate, or where a treaty is not applicable, the competent authorities of some jurisdictions may nevertheless conclude an arrangement using the executive power conferred on the heads of tax authorities. The term MAP APA should be interpreted, with the necessary adaptations, as including such exceptional agreements.

8

The focus of this annex is on providing guidance to enable tax authorities to resolve disputes through the mutual agreement procedure, thereby helping to eliminate the risk of potential double taxation and providing the taxpayer with reasonable certainty of tax treatment. However, it should be noted that there are other mechanisms for achieving the same goals which are not discussed in this annex.

A.3. Objectives of the APA process

9

It has been the experience of a number of jurisdictions that the resolution of transfer pricing disputes by traditional audit or examination techniques has often proved very difficult and also costly for taxpayers and tax authorities both in terms of time and resources. Such techniques inevitably examine transfer prices (and the surrounding conditions) some time after they were set and there can be genuine difficulties in obtaining sufficient information to evaluate properly whether arm’s length prices were used at the time they were set. These difficulties led in part to the development of the APA process as an alternative way of solving transfer pricing issues in some cases in order to avoid some of the problems described above. The objectives of an APA process are to facilitate principled, practical and co-operative negotiations, to resolve transfer pricing issues expeditiously and prospectively, to use the resources of the taxpayer and the tax administration more efficiently, and to provide a measure of predictability for the taxpayer.

10

To be successful, the process should be administered in a non-adversarial, efficient and practical fashion and requires the co-operation of all the participating parties. It is intended to supplement, rather than replace, the traditional administrative, judicial, and treaty mechanisms for resolving transfer pricing issues. Consideration of an APA may be most appropriate when the methodology for applying the arm’s length principle gives rise to significant questions of reliability and accuracy, or when the specific circumstances of the transfer pricing issues being considered are unusually complex.

11

One of the key objectives of the MAP APA process is the elimination of potential double taxation. Unilateral APAs give rise to considerable concerns in this area, which is why “most jurisdictions prefer bilateral or multilateral APAs” (paragraph 4.141 of the Guidelines). However, some kind of confirmation or agreement between the taxpayer and the tax administration is necessary in order to give effect to the MAP APA in each of the participating jurisdictions. The exact form of such confirmation or agreement depends on the domestic procedures in each jurisdiction (discussed in more detail in paragraphs 65-66 of this annex). Such a confirmation or agreement also provides a mechanism to ensure that the taxpayer complies with the terms and conditions of the MAP APA on which this confirmation or agreement is based.

12

Further, in order to meet the objectives described in this section, the MAP APA process needs to be conducted in a neutral manner. In particular, the process should be neutral as regards the residence of the taxpayer, the jurisdiction in which the request for the MAP APA was initiated, the audit or examination status of the taxpayer and the selection of taxpayers in general for audit or examination. The guidance in paragraph 4.167 of the Guidelines on possible misuse by tax administrations in their examination practices of information obtained in the APA process should also be borne in mind. The guidance given in this annex is intended to assist in attaining the objectives described in this section.

B. Eligibility for a MAP APA

B.1. Treaty issues

13

The first question that arises is whether it is possible for there to be an APA. The eligibility of a taxpayer to apply for a unilateral APA will be determined by the specific domestic requirements of the relevant tax administration. MAP APAs are governed by the mutual agreement procedure of the applicable double tax agreement, Article 25 of the OECD Model Tax Convention, and are administered at the discretion of the relevant tax administrations. The work pursuant to Action 14 of the BEPS Action Plan to ensure the timely, effective and efficient resolution of treaty-related disputes recommended, as non-binding best practice 4, that jurisdictions should implement bilateral APA programmes as soon as they have the capacity to do so, recognising that APAs provide a greater level of certainty in both treaty partner jurisdictions, lessen the likelihood of double taxation and may proactively prevent transfer pricing disputes. In this regard, it should be noted that the country mutual agreement procedure profiles prepared pursuant to element 2.2 of the Action 14 minimum standard include information on the bilateral APA programmes.

14

In some cases the taxpayer will only request a unilateral APA. The reasons for the taxpayer not requesting a MAP APA should be explored. Following the guidance given by the Guidelines in paragraph 4.173 that “wherever possible, an APA should be concluded on a bilateral or multilateral basis”, the tax authorities should encourage the taxpayer to request a MAP APA if the circumstances so warrant. Some jurisdictions if they determine that another tax administration should be involved may refuse to enter into unilateral negotiations with the taxpayer, even though the taxpayer still insists on a unilateral approach.

15

The negotiation of a MAP APA requires the consent of the relevant competent authorities. In some cases, the taxpayer will take the initiative by making simultaneous requests to the affected competent authorities. In other cases the taxpayer may file a request with one jurisdiction under the relevant domestic procedure and ask it to contact the other affected jurisdiction(s) to see if a MAP APA is possible. Consequently, as soon as is administratively practicable, the competent authority in that jurisdiction should notify the relevant tax treaty partner(s) to determine whether they want to participate. The other tax administration should respond to the invitation as quickly as practicable, bearing in mind the need to have sufficient time to evaluate whether their participation is possible or feasible.

16

However, Article 25 does not oblige the competent authorities to enter into MAP APAs at the request of the taxpayer. The willingness to enter into MAP APAs will depend on the particular policy of a jurisdiction and how it interprets the mutual agreement article of its bilateral treaties. Some competent authorities will only consider such an agreement for cases that require the resolution of “difficulties or doubts arising as to the interpretation or application of the Convention”. The desire of the taxpayer for certainty of treatment is therefore not, in isolation, sufficient to pass the above threshold. Other competent authorities apply a less restrictive threshold for entering into MAP APAs, based on their view that the MAP APA process should be encouraged. Additionally, the taxpayer must qualify for the benefit of a particular treaty (e.g. by qualifying as a resident of one of the Contracting States) and must satisfy any other criteria contained in the mutual agreement article.

B.2. Other factors

17

The fact that a taxpayer may be under audit or examination should not prevent the taxpayer from requesting a MAP APA in respect of prospective transactions. The audit or examination and the mutual agreement procedure are separate processes and generally can be resolved separately. Audit or examination activities would not normally be suspended by a tax administration whilst the MAP APA is being considered, unless it is agreed by all parties that the audit or examination should be held in abeyance because the obtaining of the MAP APA would assist with the completion of the audit or examination. Nevertheless, the treatment of the transactions being audited or examined may be informed by the methodology agreed to be applied prospectively under the MAP APA, provided that the facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction under audit or examination are comparable with those relating to the prospective transactions. This issue is discussed further in paragraph 69 below.

18

The ability to conclude a MAP APA is predicated on full co-operation by the taxpayer. The taxpayer and any associated enterprises should: a) provide their full co-operation in assisting the tax administrations with the evaluation of their proposal; and b) provide, upon request, any additional information necessary for that evaluation, for example, details of their transfer pricing transactions, business arrangements, forecasts and business plans, and financial performance. It is desirable that this commitment from the taxpayer be sought before commencing the MAP APA process.

19

In some cases the freedom of one or both competent authorities to agree to a MAP APA may be limited, for example by a legally binding decision affecting issues subject to the APA proposals. In such circumstances, as the MAP APA process is by definition consensual, it is within the discretion of the affected competent authorities (subject to the domestic laws and policies of each jurisdiction) whether to engage in MAP APA discussions. For example, a competent authority may decline to enter into discussions if it determines that such a limitation on the position of the other competent authority unacceptably reduces the likelihood of mutual agreement. However, it is likely that in many cases MAP APA discussions would be viewed as desirable even though the flexibility of one or both competent authorities is restricted. This is a matter for the competent authorities to determine on a case by case basis.

20

When deciding whether a MAP APA is appropriate, a key consideration is the extent of the advantage to be gained by agreeing a method for avoiding the risk of double taxation in advance. This requires the exercise of judgement and the need to balance the efficient use of limited resources, both financial and human, with the desire to reduce the likelihood of double taxation. Tax administrations might consider the following items as relevant:

  • a) Does the methodology and the other terms and conditions of the proposal respect the guidance given by the Guidelines? If not, it will be desirable to get the taxpayer to revise the proposal accordingly, in order to increase the chances of reaching a mutual agreement. As paragraph 17 of the preface to the Guidelines states “these guidelines are also intended primarily to govern the resolution of transfer pricing cases in mutual agreement proceedings”.
  • b) Are any “difficulties or doubts as to the interpretation or application of the Convention” likely to significantly increase the risk of double taxation and so justify the use of resources to settle any problems in advance of the proposed transactions?
  • c) Would the transactions covered by the proposal be ongoing in nature and is there a significant part of any limited life project left?
  • d) Are the transactions in question seriously contemplated and not of a purely hypothetical nature? The process should not be used to find out the likely views of the tax administration on a general point of principle – there are other established methods for doing this in many jurisdictions.
  • e) Is a transfer pricing audit already in progress in relation to past years where the fact pattern was substantially similar? If so, the outcome of the audit may be expedited by participating in a MAP APA, the terms of which could then be applied to inform or resolve the audit and any unresolved mutual agreement for earlier years.

B.3. Multilateral MAP APAs

21

The desire for certainty has resulted in an emerging trend for taxpayers to seek multilateral MAP APAs covering their global operations. The taxpayer approaches each of the affected jurisdictions with an overall proposal and suggests that it would be desirable if the negotiations be conducted on a multilateral basis involving all the affected jurisdictions, rather than by a series of separate negotiations with each tax authority. It should be noted that there is no multilateral method of implementing any agreement that may be reached, except by concluding a series of separate bilateral MAP APAs. The successful negotiation of a series of bilateral MAP APAs in this way would provide greater certainty and lower costs to the MNE group than if separate MAP APAs were undertaken bilaterally and in isolation of each other.

22

Although, as described above, there are potential benefits to having multilateral MAP APAs, a number of issues need to be considered. First, it is unlikely to be appropriate for a single transfer pricing methodology to be applied to the wide variety of facts and circumstances, transactions and jurisdictions likely to be the subject of a multilateral MAP APA, unless the methodology can be appropriately adapted to reflect the particular facts and circumstances found in each jurisdiction. Therefore, care would need to be taken by all the participating jurisdictions to ensure that the methodology, even after such adaptation, represented a proper application of the arm’s length principle in the conditions found in their jurisdiction.

23

Second, issues also arise because under a multilateral MAP APA several competent authorities are effectively involved in a process that was designed for a bilateral process. One issue is the extent to which it may be necessary to exchange information between all the affected jurisdictions. This could be problematic in cases where there are no transaction flows or common transactions between two or more of the affected treaty partners, so creating doubts as to whether the information is relevant to the particular bilateral MAP APA being discussed. However, in cases where similar transactions are conducted by different parts of the MNE or in which the area considered relates to trading on an integrated basis, there may be a need to have information about flows between other parties in order to be able to understand and evaluate the flows that are the subject of the particular bilateral MAP APA. Another problem is that it may be difficult to judge whether such information is indeed relevant prior to obtaining it.

24

Further, even if the information is relevant to the particular bilateral MAP APA, there may still be potential problems of confidentiality preventing the exchange of that information, either under the terms of the exchange of information article(s) of the relevant treaty or under the domestic law of one of the participating tax administrations. Given the wide range of possible circumstances likely to be found in multilateral MAP APAs, no general solution to these problems can be prescribed. Rather such issues need to be addressed specifically in each of the separate bilateral MAP APAs.

25

In cases where information about flows between other parties is found to be relevant, some exchange of information problems could possibly be overcome by not relying on treaty information exchange provisions, but instead asking the taxpayer to assume responsibility for providing information to all the affected tax administrations (though procedures would still be needed to verify that the same information is in fact provided to all tax administrations). Finally, in some cases the mutual agreement articles of the relevant treaties may not provide an adequate basis for such multilateral consideration and discussion, although the mutual agreement article of the OECD Model Tax Convention is designed to assist in the elimination of double taxation in a wide variety of circumstances, and therefore would, if applicable, appear to provide adequate authority in most situations.

26

In summary, as discussed in Section A, the desire by the taxpayer for certainty is not by itself sufficient to oblige a tax administration to enter into a MAP APA where this might be inappropriate. An invitation to participate in a multilateral MAP APA would therefore be evaluated in accordance with the usual criteria for determining whether a bilateral MAP APA could be pursued and each proposed bilateral APA would also be separately evaluated. A decision would then be taken whether the completion of the negotiations for the bilateral MAP APAs that the administration has decided to pursue, would best be served by its participation in multilateral negotiations. This evaluation will be made on a case-by-case basis.

27

The development of multilateral MAP APAs is at a relatively early stage, except perhaps in the global trading field. Indeed, where global trading is conducted on a fully integrated basis (i.e. the trading and risk management of a book of financial products takes place in a number of different locations, usually at least three), a multilateral, as opposed to a bilateral, APA has become the norm1. It is intended to monitor closely further developments in the area of multilateral MAP APAs.

Footnote 1
  1. For more details see OECD (1998), The Taxation of Global Trading of Financial Instruments, OECD, Paris.

C. Request for MAP APAs

C.1. Introduction

28

Although a MAP APA by its nature involves an agreement between tax administrations, the process needs considerable involvement by the taxpayer or taxpayers in order to be successful. This section looks at the first stages in this process, namely the request for the MAP APA which is normally initiated by the taxpayer(s). (N.B. Some tax administrations consider that they should take the initiative and actively encourage taxpayers to make requests in appropriate cases, for example following completion of an audit or risk assessment analysis.) Once it has been decided that a MAP APA is indeed appropriate, the primary responsibility for providing the participating tax administrations with sufficient information for them to be able to conduct mutual agreement negotiations will inevitably rest with the taxpayer(s). Consequently, the taxpayer should submit a detailed proposal for review by the relevant tax administration and be prepared to provide further information as requested by the tax administration.

C.2. Preliminary discussions

29

A feature of many domestic procedures for the obtaining of a unilateral APA is the ability to have a preliminary meeting (or meetings) before a formal request is made. Such a meeting (or meetings) provides a taxpayer with an opportunity to discuss with the tax administration the suitability of an APA, the type and extent of information which may be required and the scope of any analyses required for the completion of a successful APA. (For example, the extent of any functional analysis of affiliated enterprises; identification, selection and adjustment of comparables; and the need for, and the scope of, market, industry and geographic analyses.) The process also provides the taxpayer with an opportunity to discuss any concerns regarding disclosure and confidentiality of data, the term of the APA and the like. Experience has generally shown that the ability to have such preliminary discussions expedites the processing of any subsequent formal MAP APA proposal.

30

In the context of a MAP APA, the ability of the relevant competent authorities to have preliminary discussions with the taxpayer(s) may also be useful. In addition to the matters mentioned above, the discussions could usefully explore whether the circumstances were suitable for a MAP APA, for example whether there were sufficient “difficulties or doubts as to the interpretation or application of the Convention”.

31

The preliminary meeting may also have a useful role in clarifying the expectations and objectives of the taxpayer(s) and the tax administration. It also provides an opportunity to explain the process, the policy of the tax administration on MAP APAs and to give details of any procedures for giving effect in domestic law to the agreement when completed. At the same time, the tax administration could provide guidance as to the content of the proposal, and the time frame for evaluating and concluding the mutual agreement. Tax administrations should publish general guidance on the MAP APA process in accordance with the recommendation for other types of mutual agreements in paragraphs 4.62-4.63 of the Guidelines.

32

The preliminary meeting process may be conducted on either an anonymous or a named basis, depending on domestic custom and practice. If on an anonymous basis, however, sufficient information about the operations will be required in order to make any discussion meaningful. The form of any meetings should be agreed between the parties and a preliminary meeting may range from an informal discussion to a formal presentation. Typically, it is in the taxpayer’s interest to provide the tax administration with a memorandum outlining the topics for discussion. More than one preliminary meeting may be required in order to achieve the objective of having an informal discussion of the potential suitability of a MAP APA request, its likely scope, the appropriateness of a methodology or the type and extent of information to be provided by the taxpayer.

33

As well as informal discussions with its taxpayer(s), it may be useful for the respective competent authorities to have an early exchange of views on whether a MAP APA would be appropriate. This could avoid unnecessary work if it is unlikely that one of the competent authorities will participate. These discussions may be of an informal nature and do not necessarily require a formal face to face meeting. Also there may be opportunities to have such exchanges during the course of regular competent authority meetings and negotiations.

C.3. MAP APA proposals

C.3.1. Introduction
34

If the taxpayer wishes to pursue a MAP APA request, it will need to make a detailed proposal to the relevant tax administration, pursuant to any domestic procedural requirements, e.g. a requirement to file the request with a designated part of the domestic tax administration. For a MAP APA, the purpose of the taxpayer’s proposal is to give the relevant competent authorities all the information needed to evaluate the proposal and to undertake mutual agreement discussions. Jurisdictions have a number of ways of ensuring the competent authorities get the necessary information. One way is for the taxpayer to be able to make the proposal directly to the competent authority. Another way of achieving this goal is for the taxpayer to make available a copy of any domestic APA proposal to the other participating jurisdictions. Ideally, the exact form and content of the proposal will have been established at any preliminary meetings.

C.3.2. Activities usually covered in a MAP APA process
35

The scope of the MAP APA would depend on the wishes of the participating jurisdictions, as well as those of the taxpayer. It can apply to resolve issues covered by Articles 7 and 9 of the OECD Model Convention and would determine to what extents profits would arise in the tax jurisdictions involved.

36

The MAP APA may cover all of the transfer pricing issues of a taxpayer (or of the members of a MNE group) or may be more limited, for example to a particular transaction, sets of transactions, product lines or to only some members of a MNE group. Some jurisdictions, whilst recognising the need for flexibility in the process, have concerns over the appropriateness of specific issue APAs. It may be difficult to evaluate some issues in isolation, for example where the transactions covered by the proposal are highly interrelated with transactions not covered by the proposal, or where there is a need to analyse transfer pricing issues in a wider context because intentional set offs are involved (see paragraphs 3.13-3.17 of the Guidelines).

37

A MAP APA may also cover issues other than the transfer pricing methodology, provided that these other issues are sufficiently clearly connected to the underlying transfer pricing issues so as to make it worthwhile attempting to resolve them in advance and provided that the other issues come within the terms of the mutual agreement article in the relevant treaty. That will be something to be decided between the affected parties for each individual case.

C.3.3. Content of a MAP APA proposal
38

The content of the proposal and the extent of the necessary supporting information and documentation will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and the requirements of the individual participating tax administrations. It is therefore not considered practicable to list or define exactly what should be provided. The guiding principle, however, should be to provide the information and documentation necessary to explain the facts relevant to the proposed methodology and to demonstrate its application in accordance with the appropriate Article of the relevant treaty. The proposal should therefore be consistent with any general guidance given by the Commentary of the OECD Model Tax Convention on the corresponding Articles, together with the guidance on the application of the arm’s length principle of Article 9 given by the Guidelines in cases involving transfer pricing between associated enterprises.

39

In terms of the supporting information and documentation to be included, the guidance in Chapter IV (paragraphs 4.165-4.168) and Chapter V of the Guidelines on documentation requirements should be borne in mind. However, because of the prospective nature of the agreement sought, different types of information may need to be supplied than in mutual agreement cases, which only relate to transactions already undertaken. As a guide, the following information may be of general relevance for MAP APAs, although it should be stressed that the list below is not intended to be exhaustive or prescriptive in nature:

  • a) The transactions, products, businesses or arrangements that will be covered by the proposal; (including, if applicable, a brief explanation of why not all of the transactions, products, businesses or arrangements of the taxpayer(s) involved in the request have been included);
  • b) The enterprises and permanent establishments involved in these transactions or arrangements;
  • c) The other jurisdiction or jurisdictions which have been requested to participate;
  • d) Information regarding the world-wide organisational structure, history, financial statement data, products, functions and assets (tangible and intangible) of any associated enterprises involved;
  • e) A description of the proposed transfer pricing methodology and details of information and analyses supporting that methodology, e.g. identification of comparable prices or margins and expected range of results etc.;
  • f) The assumptions underpinning the proposal and a discussion of the effect of changes in those assumptions or other events, such as unexpected results, which might affect the continuing validity of the proposal;
  • g) The accounting periods or tax years to be covered;
  • h) General description of market conditions (e.g. industry trends and the competitive environment);
  • i) A discussion of any pertinent ancillary tax issues raised by the proposed methodology;
  • j) A discussion of, and demonstration of compliance with, any pertinent domestic law, tax treaty provisions and OECD guidelines that relate to the proposal; and
  • k) Any other information which may have a bearing on the current or proposed transfer pricing methodology and the underlying data for any party to the request.

The rest of this section discusses some of the most important items from the above list in more detail.

C.3.4. Comparable pricing information
40

The taxpayer should include a discussion of the availability and use of comparable pricing information. This would include a description of how the search for comparables was carried out (including search criteria employed), what data relating to uncontrolled transactions was obtained and how such data was accepted or rejected as being comparable. The taxpayer should also include a presentation of comparable transactions along with adjustments to account for material differences, if any, between controlled and uncontrolled transactions. In cases where no comparables can be identified, the taxpayer should demonstrate, by reference to relevant market and financial data (including the internal data of the taxpayer), how the chosen methodology accurately reflects the arm’s length principle.

C.3.5. Methodology
41

The MAP APA proposal should provide a full description of the chosen methodology. In cases involving associated enterprises, the chosen methodology should also respect the guidance found in the Guidelines on applying the arm’s length principle of Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention. It is stated in paragraph 2.11 of the Guidelines that “further, any method should be permitted where its application is agreeable to the members of the MNE group involved with the transaction or transactions to which the methodology applies and also to the tax administrations in the jurisdictions of all those members.” That guidance on use of transfer pricing methods is particularly relevant in the context of a MAP APA, because of the opportunity to obtain advance agreement on the method to be used. The application of the methodology should be supported by data which can be obtained and updated over the period of the MAP APA without imposing too great a burden on the taxpayer, and which can be reviewed and verified effectively by the tax administrations.

42

The taxpayer should, to the extent possible, provide an analysis of the effect of applying the chosen methodology or methodologies during the proposed period of the agreement. Such an analysis necessarily will have to be based on projected results and so details of the assumptions on which those projections were made will be needed. It may also be helpful to illustrate the effect of applying the APA methodology or methodologies to the periods immediately before the APA period. The usefulness of this analysis, even as an illustration, will depend on the facts and circumstances surrounding the transactions in question being comparable to those applying to the prospective transactions contemplated under the proposal.

C.3.6. Critical assumptions
43

In entering into a MAP APA relating to the arm’s length pricing of controlled transactions that have not yet occurred, it is necessary to make certain assumptions about the operational and economic conditions that will affect those transactions when they take place. The taxpayer should describe in the proposal the assumptions on which the ability of the methodology to accurately reflect the arm’s length pricing of future transactions is based. Additionally, the taxpayer should explain how the chosen methodology will satisfactorily cope with any changes in those assumptions. The assumptions are defined as “critical” if the actual conditions existing at the time the transactions occur could diverge from those that were assumed to exist, to the extent that the ability of the methodology reliably to reflect arm’s length pricing is undermined. One example might be a fundamental change to the market arising from new technology, government regulations, or widespread loss of consumer acceptance. In such a case, the divergence may mean that the agreement would need to be revised or cancelled.

44

To increase the reliability of the MAP APA methodology, taxpayers and tax administrations should attempt to identify critical assumptions that are, where possible, based on observable, reliable and independent data. Such assumptions are not limited to items within the control of the taxpayer. Any set of critical assumptions needs to be tailored to the individual circumstances of the taxpayer, the particular commercial environment, the methodology, and the type of transactions covered. They should not be drawn so tightly that certainty provided by the agreement is jeopardised, but should encompass as wide a range of variation in the underlying facts as the parties to the agreement feel comfortable with. In general, however, and by way of example only, critical assumptions might include:

  • a) Assumptions about the relevant domestic tax law and treaty provisions.
  • b) Assumptions about tariffs, duties, import restrictions and government regulations.
  • c) Assumptions about economic conditions, market share, market conditions, end-selling price, and sales volume.
  • d) Assumptions about the nature of the functions and risks of the enterprises involved in the transactions.
  • e) Assumptions about exchange rates, interest rates, credit rating and capital structure.
  • f) Assumptions about management or financial accounting and classification of income and expenses; and
  • g) Assumptions about the enterprises that will operate in each jurisdiction and the form in which they will do so.
45

It may also be helpful to set parameters for an acceptable level of divergence for some assumptions in advance, in order to provide the necessary flexibility. These parameters would need to be set individually for each particular MAP APA and would form part of the negotiations between the competent authorities. Only if the divergence from the prediction exceeded the parameter would the assumption become “critical” and action considered. Any action to be taken might also depend on the nature of the assumption and the level of divergence.

46

If the reliability of the proposed transfer pricing methodology is known to be sensitive to exchange rate fluctuations, it would seem sensible to design a methodology that was capable of accommodating a certain degree of expected fluctuation, perhaps by providing for prices to be adjusted to take into account exchange rate movements. Also it could be agreed in advance that movements in either direction of up to X% would require no action, that movements greater than X% but less than Y% would trigger a prospective review of the methodology to make sure it remained appropriate, whilst a movement of more than Y% would mean that a critical assumption had been breached and it would be necessary to prospectively re-negotiate the MAP APA. These parameters would need to be set individually for each particular MAP APA and would form part of the negotiation between the competent authorities.

C.3.7. Unexpected results
47

A problem may arise when the results of applying the transfer pricing methodology agreed in the MAP APA do not fulfil the expectations of one of the parties, as that party may question whether the critical assumptions, and the methodology which they support, are still valid. The resolution of such questions may take a considerable amount of time and effort, thereby negating one of the objectives of the whole process. One possible solution to this problem is to include enough flexibility in the proposal to cope with likely changes in the facts and circumstances so that unexpected results are less likely to occur so that there is less risk that the MAP APA agreement based upon the proposal will need to be renegotiated. The proposal must still, of course, conform to the arm’s length principle.

48

One way of achieving the above objective is to design a methodology that appropriately takes into account likely changes in facts and circumstances; for example, some variation between projected and actual sales volume can be built in to the pricing methodology at the outset by including prospective price adjustment clauses or allowing pricing to vary with volume. The allowable level of deviation should be set by reference to what would have been accepted by independent parties.

49

Another possible way of achieving the objective of increasing certainty, is to agree an acceptable range of results from applying the method of the MAP APA. In order to conform with the arm’s length principle, the range should be agreed by all affected parties in advance, thereby avoiding the use of hindsight, and based on what independent parties would have agreed to in comparable circumstances (see paragraphs 3.55-3.66 for discussion of the range concept). For example, the quantum of an item, such as a royalty, would be accepted so long as it remained within a certain range expressed as a proportion of the profits.

50

If the results fall outside the agreed range, the action to be taken would depend on what had been negotiated in the proposal in accordance with the wishes of the parties. Some parties may not wish to take the risk that the results will be significantly different from what they expected. Accordingly, they would use the range concept simply as a means of determining whether a critical assumption had been breached as described in paragraph 46. Other parties may place more emphasis on certainty of treatment than on avoiding unexpected results and so may agree that the MAP APA should contain a mechanism for adjusting the results so that they fall within the range agreed in advance.

C.3.8. Duration of the MAP APA
51

By its nature, an APA applies to prospective transactions and so one issue to be decided is how long it will last. There are two sets of conflicting objectives that affect the negotiation of the appropriate term. On the one hand, it is desirable to have a sufficiently long period so as to grant a reasonable degree of certainty of treatment. Otherwise, it may not be worth making the initial effort of resolving potential transfer pricing problems in advance, as opposed to tackling problems only when they arise through the normal audit or tax return examination procedures. On the other hand, a long period makes the predictions as to future conditions on which the mutual agreement negotiations are based less accurate, thereby casting doubt on the reliability of the MAP APA proposals. The optimal trade-off between these two sets of objectives will depend on a number of factors, such as the industry, the transactions involved and the economic climate. The term should therefore be negotiated between the competent authorities on a case-by case basis. Experience to date has shown that a MAP APA might, on average, last for 3-5 years.

D. Finalisation of the MAP APA

D.1. Introduction

52

The success of the MAP APA process, as an alternative to relying solely on traditional audit or examination techniques, depends to a large extent on the commitment of all the participants. The ability of the relevant competent authorities to reach agreement in a prompt manner will be determined both by their actions and importantly by the willingness of the taxpayer(s) to provide all the necessary information as promptly as possible. The usefulness of the process, both for taxpayers and tax authorities, will be significantly diminished if the MAP APA is not agreed until the period proposed to be covered in the taxpayer’s request has nearly expired. Such delay may also make it more difficult to avoid the use of hindsight when evaluating the proposal because the results of applying the methodology will be known for most of the period proposed by the MAP APA. Understandably, given the relatively early stage in the evolution of the MAP APA process, the goal of prompt prospective resolution has not always been met in the past. To some extent, of course, some delay in the process is inevitable; MAP APAs tend to deal with large taxpayers, complex fact patterns, and difficult legal and economic issues, all of which require time and resources in order to understand and evaluate.

53

Tax authorities are encouraged, where possible, to devote sufficient resources and skilled personnel to the process to ensure that cases are settled promptly and efficiently. Some tax authorities may wish to improve the efficiency of their MAP APA programmes by setting informal goals for the length of time taken to complete the process and by publishing the average completion time. Particular treaty partners may also agree to set informal goals for completion of their bilateral negotiations. Given the often complex and difficult fact patterns, the possible need for translations and the relative novelty of such arrangements, it is not felt desirable to set more specific or binding targets for concluding MAP APAs at this stage. However, it will be appropriate to set more specific targets for completion time in the future, once more experience with the MAP APA process has been gained.

54

Once a taxpayer’s proposal has been received by the tax administrations, they should mutually agree on the co-ordination of the review, evaluation and negotiation of the MAP APA. The MAP APA process can conveniently be broken up into two main stages; a) fact finding, review and evaluation and b) the competent authority discussions, each of which is discussed in greater detail below.

D.2. Fact finding, review and evaluation

D.2.1. General
55

In reviewing the MAP APA proposal, the tax administrations may undertake whatever steps they deem appropriate in the circumstances to conduct the mutual agreement procedure. These include, but are not limited to: requests for further information deemed relevant to review and evaluate the taxpayer’s proposal, the carrying out of fieldwork (e.g. visits to taxpayer’s premises, interviews with staff, review of financial or managerial operations, etc.) and the engaging of necessary experts. Tax administrations may also have recourse to information collected from other sources, including information and data on comparable taxpayers.

56

The aim of this stage of the MAP APA process is for the participating competent authorities to have all relevant information, data, and analyses they need for the negotiations. Where one tax administration obtains additional information from the taxpayer relevant to the subject of the MAP APA, for example at a meeting with the taxpayer’s staff, both the taxpayer and the tax administration should ensure the information reaches the other participating tax administration(s). The relevant competent authorities should arrange, amongst themselves and the taxpayers, for an appropriate mechanism to corroborate the completeness and details of documents and information supplied by the taxpayer(s). The requirements of the participating competent authorities should be respected. For example, many jurisdictions require that not only is the same factual information provided to all participating competent authorities but that it should, as far as is practicable, be made available at the same time.

57

The prospective nature of a MAP APA often involves the provision by the taxpayer of commercial information relating to forecasts which is likely to be even more sensitive to disclosure than information supplied after the event. Accordingly, in order to ensure that taxpayers have confidence in the MAP APA process, tax administrations should ensure that taxpayer information provided during the course of the MAP APA process is subject to the same secrecy, confidentiality and privacy safeguards of the relevant domestic law as any other taxpayer information. Further, where information is exchanged between competent authorities under the terms of the tax treaty, that information can be disclosed only in accordance with the specified terms of the treaty, and any exchange must comply with the exchange of information article(s) of the relevant treaty.

58

Generally, the competent authorities would conduct simultaneous, independent reviews and evaluations of the taxpayer’s proposal, assisted in this task, where necessary, by transfer pricing, industry, or other specialists from elsewhere in their tax administration. However, it may be more efficient in appropriate cases to have some degree of joint fact finding. This could take a variety of forms ranging from an occasional joint fact finding meeting or site visit, to the preparation of a joint report by delegated caseworkers.

D.2.2. Role of taxpayer in the fact finding, review and evaluation process
59

In order to expedite the process, taxpayers should take responsibility for ensuring that the competent authorities, before they start to negotiate, are in possession of the same facts, have all the information they need and have a thorough understanding of the issues. This can be achieved by the taxpayer routinely making information requested by one tax administration available, at broadly the same time, to the other tax administration, preparing and transmitting notes of fact finding meetings by one tax administration to the other tax administration and where logistically and economically practical, facilitating joint fact finding meetings. The taxpayer should also arrange for any necessary translations to be made and ensure there is no undue delay in responding to requests for further relevant information. The taxpayer should also be entitled to confer with its tax administrations when mutually appropriate and convenient while the proposal is undergoing review and evaluation, and should be kept informed of progress.

D.3. Conduct of Competent Authority discussions

D.3.1. Co-ordination amongst the Competent Authorities
60

Many jurisdictions prefer to be fully involved in the process as soon as it commences and wish to work closely with the other competent authorities. Other countries prefer to confine their involvement to reviewing and commenting upon the MAP APA proposals as they near completion. However, the involvement of all participating tax administrations in the process at an early stage is recommended, subject to resource constraints, as this should maximise the efficiency of the process and help forestall unnecessary delays in concluding the mutual agreement.

61

The competent authorities should conduct the mutual agreement discussions in a timely manner. This requires the devotion of sufficient resources and appropriately skilled personnel to the process. It is desirable that the competent authorities discuss and co-ordinate an appropriate plan of action with regards to such matters as: designating authorised officers, exchanging of information, co-ordination of the review and evaluation of the proposal, tentative scheduling of dates for further consultations, negotiation and conclusion of a suitable agreement. The level of input and resources required should be tailored to the individual requirements of the case.

62

Experience has also shown that early and frequent discussion between the competent authorities as problems arise can be helpful and can avoid unpleasant surprises during the process. Given the nature of MAP APAs, there will often be significant issues which cannot be resolved simply by exchange of position papers and so more formal exchanges, such as face to face meetings between the competent authorities may be required. Use of conference calls or video conferencing may be helpful.

D.3.2. Role of the taxpayer in Competent Authority discussions
63

The role of the taxpayer in this process is necessarily more limited, than in the fact finding process, given that the finalisation of a MAP APA is a government to government process. The competent authorities may agree to have the taxpayer make a presentation of the factual and legal issues before the discussions themselves commence, when the taxpayer would leave. It also may be helpful to arrange to have the taxpayer available, on call, to answer any factual questions that may arise during the discussions. The taxpayer should avoid presenting new factual information or making supplementary representations at this meeting. The tax authorities will require time to review such matters and this will necessitate a postponement of a final decision on the proposed MAP APA. Such information should have been supplied prior to the commencement of the discussions.

D.3.3. Withdrawal from the APA process
64

The taxpayer or tax administration may withdraw from the MAP APA process at any time. However, withdrawal from the process, especially at a late stage and without good cause, should be discouraged because of the inevitable waste of resources caused by such action. When a MAP APA request is withdrawn neither the taxpayer nor the tax administrations should have any obligations to each other, and any previous undertakings and understandings between the parties would be of no further force and effect, unless otherwise required by domestic law (e.g. APA user fee may not be refundable). If a tax administration proposes to withdraw, the taxpayer should be advised of the reasons for such action and given an opportunity to make further representations.

D.3.4. Mutual agreement document
65

Participating competent authorities should prepare a draft mutual agreement when they have agreed on the methodology and other terms and conditions. It may be that, despite the best efforts of the competent authorities, the proposed mutual agreement does not completely eliminate double taxation. The taxpayer(s) should therefore be given an opportunity to say whether such a draft MAP APA is acceptable before it is finalised; there can be no question of imposing such an agreement in advance without the taxpayer’s consent.

66

The MAP APA will be in the form of a written document and the content, layout etc. will be decided by the participating competent authorities. In order to achieve the objective of providing a clear record of the mutual agreement and for the agreement to be effectively implemented, the mutual agreement should contain the following minimum information or should refer to where this information is provided in the MAP APA proposal documentation:

  • a) The names and addresses of the enterprises that are covered by the arrangement;
  • b) The transactions, agreements or arrangements, tax years or accounting periods covered;
  • c) A description of the agreed methodology and other related matters such as agreed comparables or a range of expected results;
  • d) A definition of relevant terms which form the basis of applying and calculating the methodology (e.g. sales, cost of sales, gross profit, etc.);
  • e) Critical assumptions upon which the methodology is based, the breach of which would trigger renegotiation of the agreement;
  • f) Any agreed procedures to deal with changes in the factual circumstances which fall short of necessitating the renegotiation of the agreement;
  • g) If applicable, the agreed tax treatment of ancillary issues;
  • h) The terms and conditions that must be fulfilled by the taxpayer in order for the mutual agreement to remain valid together with procedures to ensure that the taxpayer is fulfilling those terms and conditions;
  • i) Details of the taxpayer’s obligations to the tax administrations as a result of the domestic implementation of the MAP APA (e.g. annual reports, record keeping, notification of changes in critical assumptions etc.); and
  • j) Confirmation that, in order to secure the confidence of taxpayers and competent authorities in a MAP APA process in which information is exchanged freely, all information submitted by a taxpayer in a MAP APA case (including the identity of the taxpayer) will be protected from disclosure to the fullest extent possible under the domestic laws of the respective jurisdictions and all information exchanged between the competent authorities involved in such a case will be protected in accordance with the relevant bilateral tax treaty and applicable domestic laws.

D.4. Implementation of the MAP APA

D.4.1. Giving effect to the MAP APA and providing confirmation to the taxpayer
67

Once the MAP APA has been finally agreed, the participating tax authorities need to give effect to the agreement in their own jurisdiction. The tax administrations should enter into some kind of a confirmation or agreement with their respective taxpayers consistent with the mutual agreement entered into by the participating competent authorities. This confirmation or agreement would provide the taxpayer with the certainty that the transfer pricing transactions covered by the MAP APA would not be adjusted, so long as the taxpayer complies with the terms and conditions of the mutual agreement, as reflected in the domestic confirmation or agreement and has not made materially false or misleading statements during the process, including statements made in annual compliance reports. The terms and conditions would include certain assumptions which, if not met, might require an adjustment to be made or the agreement to be reconsidered.

68

The way this confirmation or agreement is given will vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and the exact form will depend on the particular domestic law and practice. In some jurisdictions the confirmation or agreement will take the form of an APA under the relevant domestic procedure. To implement the mutual agreement effectively, the domestic confirmation or agreement must be consistent with the MAP APA and give the taxpayer, as a minimum, the same benefits as negotiated in the mutual agreement. Additionally, where it was not possible to completely eliminate double taxation, it is open to one of the participating jurisdictions to give unilateral relief from the remaining double taxation in its domestic confirmation procedure. Also, that confirmation or agreement may cover additional matters to those contained in the MAP APA, for example the domestic tax treatment of other or ancillary issues, additional record keeping or documentation requirements and the filing of reports. Care should be taken to ensure that none of the additional terms of the domestic confirmation or agreement conflict with the terms of the MAP APA.

D.4.2. Possible retroactive application (“Roll back”)
69

Neither the tax administrations nor the taxpayer are in any way obliged to apply the methodology agreed upon as part of the MAP APA to tax years ending prior to the first year of the MAP APA (often referred to as “rolling back”). Indeed, to do so might be impossible if a different fact pattern then prevailed. However, the methodology to be applied prospectively under the MAP APA may be instructive in determining the treatment of comparable transactions in earlier years. In some cases, the transfer prices may already be under enquiry by one tax administration in accounting periods prior to the MAP APA period and that tax administration and the taxpayer may wish to take the opportunity to use the agreed methodology to resolve the enquiry, or, pursuant to domestic law requirements, the tax administration may choose to make such an adjustment even without the taxpayer’s request or agreement. Element 2.7 of the Action 14 minimum standard states that jurisdictions with bilateral APA programmes should provide for the roll-back of APAs (to previous filed tax years not included within the original scope of the APA) in appropriate cases, subject to the applicable time limits (such as domestic law statutes of limitation for assessments) where the relevant facts and circumstances in the earlier tax years are the same and subject to the verification of these facts and circumstances on audit.

E. MAP APA monitoring

70

It is essential that the tax administrations are able to establish that the taxpayer is abiding by the terms and conditions on which the mutual agreement is based, throughout its duration. As the mutual agreement is made between the tax administrations and the taxpayer is not a party to such arrangements, the tax administrations have to rely on the domestic confirmation or agreement procedure described above in order to monitor the taxpayer’s compliance. If the taxpayer fails to abide by the terms and conditions of the MAP APA, then it no longer need be applied. This section therefore focuses on the aspects of the domestic procedures necessary for the successful implementation of the MAP APA and on the necessary measures to ensure the taxpayer’s compliance with all of its terms and conditions.

E.1. Record keeping

71

The taxpayer and the tax administrations should agree the types of documents and records (including any necessary translations) that the taxpayer must maintain and retain for the purposes of verifying the extent of the taxpayer’s compliance with the MAP APA. The guidance in Chapters IV and V of the Guidelines should be followed in order to avoid the documentation requirements becoming overly burdensome. Provisions regarding the retention period and the response time for producing the documents and records may also be included.

E.2. Monitoring mechanisms

E.2.1. Annual reports
72

For each tax year, or accounting period, covered by the MAP APA, the taxpayer may be required to file, in addition to its tax return, an annual report describing the taxpayer’s actual operations for the year and demonstrating compliance with the terms and conditions of the MAP APA, including the information necessary to decide if the critical assumptions, or other safeguards, have been met. This information should be made available by the taxpayer to the tax administration with which it has concluded the domestic confirmation or agreement, in the manner provided for under the relevant domestic law or procedure.

E.2.2. Audit
73

A MAP APA applies only to the parties specified in the agreement and in respect of the specified transactions. The existence of such an agreement would not prevent the participating tax administrations from undertaking audit activity in the future, although any audit of transactions that are covered by the MAP APA would be limited to determining the extent of the taxpayer’s compliance with its terms and conditions and whether the circumstances and assumptions necessary for the reliable application of the chosen methodology continue to exist. The affected tax administrations may require the taxpayer to establish that:

  • a) The taxpayer has complied with the terms and conditions of the MAP APA;
  • b) The representations in the proposal, the annual reports and in any supporting documentation, remain valid and that any material changes in facts or circumstances have been included in the annual reports;
  • c) The methodology has been accurately and consistently applied in accordance with the terms and conditions of the MAP APA; and
  • d) The critical assumptions underlying the transfer pricing methodology remain valid.

E.3. Consequences of non-compliance or changes in circumstances

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In general, the consequences of non-compliance with the terms and conditions of a MAP APA, or the failure to meet a critical assumption, will turn on a) the terms of the MAP APA, b) any further agreement between the competent authorities as to how to deal with such non-compliance or failure, and c) any applicable domestic law or procedural provisions. That is, the MAP APA itself may explicitly prescribe procedures to follow, or describe the consequences that will arise, in situations of non-compliance or failure. In such situations, the competent authorities may, at their discretion, enter into discussions of what action to take on a case by case basis. Finally, domestic law or procedural provisions may impose consequences or obligations on the taxpayer and affected tax administration. The following paragraphs provide suggested guidelines similar to procedures that have been adopted in some jurisdictions and which have, on the whole, proved workable. It should be emphasised, however, that some tax administrations may wish to adopt different procedures and approaches.

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If the tax administrations determine that any requirement of the MAP APA has not been met, they may nevertheless agree, based on the terms and conditions of the MAP APA, to continue to apply it, for example where the effect of the failure to comply is not material. If they do not agree to continue to apply the MAP APA, there are three options that a tax administration could take. The nature of the action to be taken is likely to depend on the seriousness of the non compliance.

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The most drastic action is revocation, which has the effect that the taxpayer is treated as if the MAP APA had never been entered into. Less serious is cancellation, which means the taxpayer is treated as if the MAP APA had been effective and in force but only up to the cancellation date and not for the whole of the proposed period. If the MAP APA is cancelled or revoked, then for those tax years or accounting periods for which the cancellation or revocation is effective, the relevant tax administrations and taxpayers will retain all their rights under their domestic laws and treaty provisions, as though the MAP APA had not been undertaken. Finally, the MAP APA may be revised, which means that the taxpayer will still have the benefit of the MAP APA for the whole of the proposed period, albeit that different terms apply before and after the revision date. Further details are provided below.

E.3.1. Revoking a MAP APA
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A tax administration may revoke a MAP APA (either unilaterally or by mutual agreement) if it is established that:

  • a) There was a misrepresentation, mistake or omission that was attributable to the neglect, carelessness, or wilful default of a taxpayer when filing the MAP APA request and submission, the annual reports, or other supporting documentation or in supplying any related information; or
  • b) The participating taxpayer(s) failed to materially comply with a fundamental term or condition of the MAP APA.
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When a MAP APA is revoked, the revocation is retroactive to the first day of the first tax year or accounting period for which the MAP APA was effective and the MAP APA will no longer have any further force and effect on the affected taxpayer(s) and the other tax administration. Because of the serious effect of this action, the tax administration proposing to revoke a MAP APA should only do so after a careful and thorough evaluation of the relevant facts and should inform and consult with the affected taxpayer(s) and other tax administration(s) on a timely basis.

E.3.2. Cancelling a MAP APA
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A tax administration may cancel a MAP APA (either unilaterally or by mutual agreement) if it is established that one of the following situations has arisen:

  • a) There was a misrepresentation, mistake or omission that was not attributable to the neglect, carelessness, or wilful default of a taxpayer when filing the MAP APA request and submission, the annual reports, or other supporting documentation or in supplying any related information; or
  • b) The participating taxpayer(s) failed to materially comply with any term or condition of the MAP APA; or
  • c) There was a material breach of one or more of the critical assumptions; or
  • d) There was a change in tax law, including a treaty provision materially relevant to the MAP APA; and it has not proved possible to revise the agreement (see paragraphs 80-82 below) to take account of the changed circumstances.
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When a MAP APA is cancelled the date of cancellation will be determined by the nature of the event that led to the cancellation. This may be a specific date, for example if the event giving rise to the cancellation was a material change in tax law (although the MAP APA may still provide for there to be a period of transition between the date of change in the law and the cancellation date). In other cases, the cancellation will be effective for a particular tax year or accounting period, for example where there was a material change in one of the critical assumptions which could not be ascribed to a particular date in that tax year or accounting period. The MAP APA will no longer have any further force on the affected taxpayer(s) and the other tax administration from the date of cancellation.

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The tax administration may waive cancellation if the taxpayer can show reasonable cause, to the satisfaction of the tax administration, and if the taxpayer agrees to make any adjustment proposed by the tax administration to correct the misrepresentation, mistake, omission or non-compliance, or take into account the changes in critical assumptions, tax law or treaty provision relevant to the APA. Such action may give rise to the revision of the MAP APA (see below).

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The tax administration proposing the cancellation should inform and consult with the affected taxpayer(s) and the other tax administration(s) in a timely manner. This consultation should include an explanation of the reasons for proposing that the APA be cancelled. The taxpayer should be given an opportunity to respond before any final decision is taken.

E.3.3. Revising a MAP APA
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The validity of the transfer pricing methodology is dependent on the critical assumptions continuing to apply for the duration of the MAP APA. The MAP APA and any domestic confirmation or agreement should therefore require the taxpayer to notify the affected tax administrations of any changes. If, after evaluation by the tax administrations, it is established that there has been a material change in conditions noted in a critical assumption, the MAP APA may be revised to reflect the change. As discussed above, the MAP APA may also contain assumptions, which although falling short of being critical to the validity of the MAP APA, nevertheless warrant a review by the affected parties. One result of such a review may again be a revision of the MAP APA. However, in many cases the terms and conditions of the MAP APA may be sufficiently flexible to account for the effects of such changes without the need for revision.

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The taxpayer’s notification to the tax administrations that such a change has taken place should be filed as soon as practicable after the change occurs, or the taxpayer becomes aware of the change, and in any event no later than the date for filing, if required, the annual report for that year or accounting period. Early notification is encouraged in order to give the affected parties more time to try to reach agreement on revising the MAP APA, thereby reducing the likelihood of cancellation.

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The revised MAP APA should state the date from which the revision is effective and also the date on which the original MAP APA is no longer effective. If the date of the change can be precisely identified, then normally the revision should take effect from that date but if a precise date cannot be identified, then normally the MAP APA would be revised with effect from the first day of the accounting period following the one in which the change took place. If the tax administrations and the taxpayer cannot agree on the need for a revised MAP APA or how to revise the MAP APA, the MAP APA will be cancelled and will no longer have any further force and effect on the participating taxpayers and tax administrations. The determination of the effective date of the cancellation of the MAP APA will normally follow the same principles as applied to determine the date of revision.

E.4. Renewing a MAP APA

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A request to renew a MAP APA should be made at the time prescribed by the participating tax administrations, bearing in mind the need for sufficient lead time for the taxpayer(s) and tax administrations to review and evaluate the renewal request and to reach agreement. It may be helpful to commence the renewal process well before the existing MAP APA has expired.

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The format, processing, and evaluation of the renewal application would usually be similar to those for an initial MAP APA application. However, the necessary level of detail may be reduced with the agreement of the participating tax administrations, particularly if there have not been material changes in the facts and circumstances of the case. Renewal of a MAP APA is not automatic and depends on the consent of all parties concerned and on the taxpayer demonstrating, among other things, compliance with the terms and conditions of the existing MAP APA. The methodology and terms and conditions of the renewed MAP APA may, of course, differ from those of the previous MAP APA.

The annex to Chapter IV on baseline distribution activities, Amount B, has its own page: Amount B, by paragraph.