Compensation for the restructuring itself

Example 10 — Distributor conversion: three profitability profiles

Ch.IX · ¶9.46–9.47 · Distributor · foreign principal

OECD Guidelines 2022
At a glance
A full-fledged distributor becomes a limited risk distributor with projected profitability of 2% per year, after its distribution arrangement is renegotiated and risk is reallocated between it and a foreign associated enterprise. The Guidelines give three sets of historical and projected figures. What does each show from the distributor's side?
Distributor
Full-fledged under the existing arrangement · limited risk after the conversion
risks and associated profit potential
Foreign associated enterprise
Principal after the conversion

The example shows the distributor's perspective only; the Guidelines state that the principal's perspective should also be taken into account.

  1. The starting point is a full-fledged distributor with a long-term contractual arrangement and five years of profitability data. In the set-up in ¶9.45, its rights under that contract give it the realistic option of accepting or refusing a conversion.
  2. Under the restructuring it would become a limited risk distributor acting for a foreign associated enterprise, the principal. The existing distribution arrangement is renegotiated, and the renegotiation reallocates risk between the parties.
  3. Profitability is projected on both footings: as a full-fledged distributor over the remaining term of the agreement, and as a limited risk distributor for the next three years.
  4. In all three scenarios the limited risk projection is 2% per year; the historical and full-fledged figures differ from one scenario to the next.
A

Scenario 1 of the Guidelines' table. As a full-fledged distributor, profitability in the last five years was -2%, 4%, 2%, 0% and 6%, and it is projected at -2% to 6% over the remaining term of the agreement, with significant uncertainties within that range. As a limited risk distributor, it is projected at 2% per year for the next three years.

Would an independent party be willing to give up this uncertain profit potential for a stable 2%?

OECD analysis · It depends
Here the distributor gives up a profit potential that is significantly uncertain in return for a rate of profitability that is fairly low but stable. The Guidelines draw no inference from these figures as to whether an independent party would accept that trade. It would depend on the return it anticipates under each alternative, its level of risk tolerance, the options realistically available to it and possible compensation for the restructuring itself. The example shows the distributor's perspective only, although the principal's should also be taken into account, and it is not meant as a statement on method selection, the aggregation of transactions or arm's-length remuneration rates for distribution.
B

Scenario 2 of the Guidelines' table. As a full-fledged distributor, profitability in the last five years was 5%, 10%, 5%, 5% and 10%, and it is projected at 5% to 10% over the remaining term of the agreement, with significant uncertainties within that range. As a limited risk distributor, it is projected at 2% per year for the next three years.

Would independent parties in the distributor's situation agree to the conversion for no additional compensation?

OECD analysis · Unlikely without additional compensation
Both the five-year record and the projection for the remaining term put the full-fledged distributor at 5% to 10%, against 2% per year after the conversion. On those figures, and despite the uncertainties in the projection, the Guidelines take a view: it is unlikely that an independent distributor in this position would give up the risks and the profit potential that goes with them without further compensation, if it had the choice not to. The text goes no further than "unlikely" and does not say how much compensation would be needed. The example shows the distributor's perspective only and is not meant as a statement on method selection or arm's-length remuneration rates.
C

Scenario 3 of the Guidelines' table. As a full-fledged distributor, profitability in the last five years was 5%, 7%, 10%, 8% and 6%, but it is projected at only 0% to 4% over the remaining term of the agreement, with significant uncertainties within that range; the table puts this down to new competitive pressures. As a limited risk distributor, it is projected at 2% per year for the next three years.

What does this scenario show about assessing the profit potential the distributor gives up?

OECD analysis · History alone is not enough
The five-year record lies between 5% and 10%, but with new competitive pressures the projection for the remaining term is only 0% to 4%. The Guidelines use this scenario for one point: the analysis should look at the profit potential going forward, and where the commercial or economic environment has changed significantly, historical data alone is not a sufficient basis. They do not say whether compensation would be due on these figures. The example shows only the distributor's perspective and says nothing about method selection or arm's-length remuneration rates.
Key takeaway
Whether a distributor would give up risk and profit potential for a low but stable return depends on what it can expect under each model, its risk tolerance, its realistic options and any compensation for the restructuring. That profit potential is assessed going forward: past profits matter only as far as they indicate future ones.

Related: Section D.2 of Part I (reallocation of risks and profit potential) · ¶9.45 (the conversion on which the three scenarios build) · Example 1 (full-fledged → limited-risk distributor)

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