Rewarding the cash pool leader

Example 2 — Treasury entity as lender

Chapter X · ¶10.138–10.142 · MNE Group y

OECD Guidelines 2022
At a glance
T runs the same kind of cash pool as M in Example 1 — but T also raises external finance, sets the intra-group rates and bears credit, liquidity and currency risk. Same architecture, very different reward.
External lenders
Bond markets · third-party banks
external funding
Company T
MNE group treasury entity
intra-group loans
Group members
Borrowers within MNE Group y

T also operates the group cash pool and bears credit, liquidity and currency risk on the intra-group leg — and decides how (or whether) to hedge.

  1. T is the treasury entity of MNE Group y and transacts both intra-group and externally.
  2. T raises finance for the group by issuing bonds or borrowing from third-party banks.
  3. T arranges intra-group loans to meet the funding needs of other group members and operates a group-wide cash pool.
  4. T sets the intra-group interest rates and bears credit, liquidity and currency risk on the intra-group leg — and decides on hedging.
A

Unlike M in Example 1, T does substantive treasury work — it controls credit, liquidity and currency risks, has the money to bear them, sets the intra-group rates, and is on the hook for the spread between what it borrows at and what it lends at.

How should T's intra-group activities be classified and rewarded?

OECD analysis · Lender — may earn the spread
¶10.140–10.141. T is performing functions and assuming risks that go beyond the co-ordination role of a cash pool leader, and T controls those risks with the capacity to bear them. The actual transactions are accurately delineated as intra-group loans, and T should be compensated for the functions performed and risks assumed — which may include part or all of the spread.
B

T's pricing looks arm's-length from T's side. But group member U — one of the borrowers from T — argues it could get cheaper funding directly from its own relationship bank.

Does T's arm's-length pricing automatically settle the price for U?

OECD analysis · Counterparty options matter
¶10.142. The other group members which transact with T would still only do so if this left them no worse off than their next best option. So if U's relationship-bank quote is genuinely the better realistic alternative, the arm's-length test is not satisfied just because T's side prices to T's lender benchmarks.
Key takeaway
When the entity at the centre of a cash pool actually controls — and has the capacity to bear — the financial risks, the substance is an intra-group lender, not a co-ordinator. The reward can include part or all of the spread, but counterparties still need to be no worse off than their next best option.

Related: Section C.1 (intra-group loans) · Section C.2.3.1 (rewarding the cash pool leader) · Section D.1 of Chapter I (accurate delineation · risk control & capacity) · Example 1 (co-ordinator)

Test yourself on this example, question by question.Open it in the interactive walkthrough →