Rewarding the cash pool leader

Example 1 — Cash pool leader as co-ordinator

Chapter X · ¶10.133–10.137 · MNE Group X

OECD Guidelines 2022
At a glance
M sits at the legal centre of a physical cash pool — its account is what the bank sweeps to and from. But the credit risk stays with the members and X (the parent) guarantees M's facility. Service fee, or bank-like spread?
Third-party bank
Provides facility; daily sweeps
facility ↑ · sweeps ↓
M
Cash pool leader (sub of X)
target-balance transfers
H · J · K · L
Pool members (fellow subs of M)

X (parent) guarantees M's facility but is not itself a pool participant. All participants share the same functional currency, which is the only currency in the pool.

  1. X is the parent of an MNE group; subsidiaries H, J, K, L are pool participants and fellow sub M acts as cash pool leader.
  2. M signs a cash-management services agreement with an unrelated bank and sets a target balance for each pool participant.
  3. Each day, the bank moves cash to or from M's concentration account to hit each participant's target; net surplus is deposited by M, net deficits are met by the bank lending to M.
  4. Members H and J supply surplus; K and L draw funding. Interest on each member balance is charged or paid per the pooling agreement, and M pays less (or receives more) interest to the bank than absent the pool.
A

M signs the bank agreement and runs the daily sweeps — but credit risk stays with the pool members, the bank takes credit risk on M, and the parent X guarantees M's facility.

Is M a co-ordinator, a bank-like intermediary, or a real lender?

OECD analysis · Co-ordinator
¶10.137. The functional analysis shows that M is not subject to credit risk — that risk remains with the cash pool members. M is not performing the functions or assuming the risks that a bank would. Being the legal counterparty to the sweeps does not, by itself, transfer the economic risk to M.
B

M has been characterised as a pure co-ordinator — no credit risk, no bank-like functions. X guarantees its facility. Question now: how should M get paid?

What's the right reward for M?

OECD analysis · Service-fee reward
¶10.137. M would not earn the kind of reward a bank earns — for example, retaining the interest spread between deposits and loans. Equally, the OECD frames the reward as commensurate with M's service functions, not as bare cost reimbursement. So a service-fee-style return is the right characterisation.
Key takeaway
A co-ordinating cash pool leader earns a service-fee-style return, not the spread. The credit risk stays with the pool members, and the leader doesn't perform a bank's functions — so it shouldn't earn a bank's reward.

Related: Section C.2.3.1 (rewarding the cash pool leader) · ¶10.143–10.145 (rewarding the cash pool members) · Example 2 (treasury entity)

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