Risk analysis in six steps

Example 9 — Manufacturing services and capacity utilisation risk

Chapter I · Example 2 (risk) · ¶1.84, 1.87, 1.91, 1.102 · Company A · Company B

OECD Guidelines 2022
At a glance
Company B built and equipped its plant to Company A's specifications and makes products to Company A's designs. Company A determines the volumes, runs the supply chain and, under the contract, assumes the capacity utilisation and supply chain risks. Who bears the cost of an under-used plant, and what if the contract is not followed in practice?
Company A
Provides specifications and designs · determines volumes · runs the supply chain
specifications, designs and volumes → · manufactured products ←
Company B
Builds and equips the plant · employs and trains personnel · schedules production
  1. Company B builds and equips its plant to Company A's specifications, and employs and trains competent manufacturing personnel.
  2. Company B makes products for Company A, to technical requirements and designs that Company A provides.
  3. Company A determines the volume levels; Company B determines production scheduling on the basis of those volumes.
  4. Company A runs the supply chain, which includes procuring components and raw materials, and it carries out regular quality checks of the manufacturing process.
  5. Under the contract, the capacity utilisation risk and the supply chain risk are assumed by Company A.
A

Company B has incurred fixed costs, but as Company A determines the volumes, Company B cannot manage their recovery by deciding over how many units they are spread. Each of the two companies has the financial capacity for its respective risks.

Who should be allocated the risk that the plant is under-utilised?

OECD analysis · Under-utilisation risk with Company A
Company A controls the risks it assumes under the contract: it determines the volumes, runs the supply chain and determines significant component and raw material costs and the security of supply. Company B performs manufacturing services and controls the risk of failing to deliver them competently. Both companies do what the contract requires, each controls the risks it assumes and each has the financial capacity to bear them, so step 5 is not needed (¶1.87). The upside and downside of the significant risks should be allocated to Company A, including under-utilisation and its consequences, such as a failure to cover fixed costs, write-downs or closure costs. Company B's remuneration should reflect its own performance risk and its funding costs for acquiring the plant (¶1.102).
B

As before, Company A runs the supply chain and the contract specifies that it assumes the supply chain risks. But when key components were not secured on time, Company A did not reimburse Company B.

How does the risk analysis deal with the supply chain risk now?

OECD analysis · On to step 5
Step 4(i) asks whether the parties follow the contract. Here they do not: Company B is left unreimbursed, so in fact it assumes the downside consequences of the supply chain risk. Under step 4(ii), however, Company B has no control over that risk, while Company A does control it. The party assuming the risk therefore does not control it, and the analysis has to go on to step 5. ¶1.91 stops at that point; under step 5 the risk should go to the enterprise that exercises control and has the financial capacity to assume it (¶1.98).
Key takeaway
Owning the plant and incurring its fixed costs does not settle who bears the risk of idle capacity: that risk goes to the party that controls it and can bear it financially. And where conduct leaves a risk with a party that does not control it, the analysis does not stop at conduct but moves on to step 5.

Related: Section D.1.2.1.3 (step 3: functional analysis in relation to risk) · ¶1.88 (step 4(i): is the contractual assumption of risk followed in the parties' conduct?) · ¶1.98 (step 5: allocation of risk)

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