Compensation for the restructuring itself

Example 1 — Full-fledged → limited-risk distributor

Ch.IX · ¶9.2, 9.39, 9.41, 9.45 · MNE Group · sales conversion

inRange illustration, not an OECD example
At a glance
A long-established full-fledged distributor in Country A is converted into an LRD for a Principal in Country B. Profit potential drops sharply. Is something owed at the moment of conversion — and on what basis?
FFD-A → LRD-A
Pre-restructuring full-fledged distributor; post-restructuring limited-risk distributor
rights, contract, intangibles?
Principal-B
Foreign associated enterprise (post-restructuring counter-party)
  1. FFD-A has long operated as a full-fledged distributor under a multi-year contract for a given product line; expected returns are above an LRD margin.
  2. Group decides to centralise risk and decision-making in Principal-B; FFD-A is converted to a limited-risk distributor.
  3. Post-restructuring, LRD-A earns a stable, modest return (the OECD's ¶9.45 illustration uses ~+2% per year); Principal-B captures residual.
  4. Question turns to whether anything is owed for the conversion itself.
A

FFD-A still had several years of enforceable contract rights, and it owned local marketing intangibles it had built up over time.

Does the conversion itself need to be priced — and if so, why?

Analysis · Conversion needs to be priced
¶9.39 sets the test: the question is whether there is a transfer of something of value (an asset or an ongoing concern) or a termination/substantial renegotiation of existing arrangements that would be compensated between independent parties. ¶9.41 makes clear that an entity with considerable rights or assets at the time of the restructuring has considerable profit potential that must be remunerated. Here the rights under the contract AND the local marketing intangibles are both 'something of value', so the conversion itself needs to be priced (Section E and/or F of Part I).
B

Same conversion — but this distributor (FFD-A2) only has a rolling one-year arrangement and owns no local intangibles. Pre-conversion profits were higher, post-conversion they're lower and stable.

Does the drop in expected profit, on its own, need to be compensated?

Analysis · No separate conversion fee
¶9.39: the arm's length principle does not require compensation for a mere decrease in the expectation of an entity's future profits. ¶9.41: if an entity has no discernible rights or other assets at the time of the restructuring, it has no compensable profit potential. The post-restructuring TP still needs to be set at arm's length (Part II), but the conversion itself triggers no separate compensation.
Key takeaway
The conversion itself needs a separate compensation only when there is a transfer of something of value or a substantial renegotiation of existing arrangements. A bare fall in expected future profits — with no rights, no intangibles, no enforceable contract term being surrendered — is not compensable at arm's length.

Related: Section D (reallocation of profit potential) · Section E (transfer of something of value) / Section F (indemnification) · Section D.1 of Chapter I (accurate delineation)

Test yourself on this example, question by question.Open it in the interactive walkthrough →